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1 Chapter 1
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Contribution
In this dissertation I use accounting based valuation models to primarily estimate the cor-
responding cost of equity (capital) and use the estimated values in empirical research and
in the framework of an estimation approach. The methodological aspect of my dissertation
falls under the literature branch of implied cost of capital (ICC) which is well established in
finance and accounting. The economic aspect of my dissertation addresses capital market
relevant issues, stemming from research in marketing and monetary economics. After a short
introduction including a methodological review of the ICC models I use, I present two working
papers in the second and third chapter and end my dissertation with a fourth chapter on a
new estimation approach.
The second chapter is based on a working paper I wrote with Martin Artz (Frankfurt School of
Finance and Management). In it we investigate the association between customer satisfaction
and the firm’s cost of equity using ICC as a forward-looking, ex-ante measurement approach.
We further use ICC to decompose firm value into cash and cost of equity effects of customer
satisfaction changes. Doing so, this is the first study, up to my knowledge, quantifying cost of
equity effects of customer satisfaction and estimating the relative importance of these cost of
equity effects in relation to pure cash effects of customer satisfaction changes.
Customer satisfaction has been established as a central non-financial performance measure in
academic research and corporate practice. The growing interest in this construct has emerged
due to its effect on firm’s future cash flows via the customers’ resulting buying behavior
(Banker and Mashruwala, 2007; Bonacchi et al.; Hauser et al., 1994; Ittner and Larcker, 1998).
Starting from a discussion whether customer satisfaction provides information for financial
markets beyond what is reflected in current accounting metrics (Ittner and Larcker, 1998;
Ittner et al., 2009; Jacobson and Mizik, 2009), a large body of work has found a positive
association between customer satisfaction and the firm’s market value of equity (Anderson
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et al., 2004; Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Mittal et al., 2005), making customer satisfaction
metrics also a useful indicator for stock market participants in predicting the firm’s level and
variability of future cash flows. Given this evidence, an emerging interest has developed not
only in whether customer satisfaction is associated with firm value, but also in how exactly it
is related to firm value. Analyzing this precise link requires both, considering cash (or growth)
effects in the numerator and cost of equity effects in the denominator as usually suggested in
discounted cash flow models of firm valuation. The relation between customer satisfaction
and net cash effects has been a major element in empirical research so far and seems to have
persisting effects over time. Thus, current customer satisfaction changes affect future customer
behavior and therefore future cash flows of the firm. Consequently, much work has shown a
positive association of customer satisfaction with future revenues (Ittner and Larcker, 1998;
Ittner et al., 2009), future cash flows (Gruca and Rego, 2005), and future earnings (Ittner
et al., 2009; Mittal et al., 2005). Empirical research, however, is rather limited on the risk
side, particularly in the matter of cost of equity. Anderson and Mansi (2009) show a negative
association with the cost of debt but do not (intend to) give insights regarding the cost of
equity. Closest evidence in this regard is provided by Tuli and Bharadwaj (2009) who show
that customer satisfaction is negatively associated with both, firm’s systematic and firm’s
unsystematic risk. However, their study does not address the question whether customer
satisfaction is associated with lower cost of equity. This missing link makes it difficult to form
an opinion about the importance of the influence of customer satisfaction on the risk profile of
the firm in relation to pure cash flow effects. Identifying an association allows estimating an
economic impact in terms of basis points and to identify the relative importance of cash and
risk effects of customer satisfaction for firm value.
The contribution of the second chapter is threefold. First, we investigate the association
between customer satisfaction and the cost of equity. In contrast to prior empirical studies
in the customer satisfaction literature, we analyze ex-ante measures of the firm’s cost of
equity to estimate the precise economic effects of customer satisfaction. Estimates based
on historical-information are contaminated by firm-specific cash flow related changes and
firm-specific discount factor related changes (Elton, 1999) and are claimed to be “unavoidably
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imprecise” (Fama and French, 1997, p. 153). Our approach instead exploits changes in future
earnings to identify changes in the cost of equity. The appeal of such a measure lies in the
nature of its derivation, both being forward-looking and combining current market and book
values with growth forecasts of the firm’s future cash flows (e.g., Gebhardt et al. (2001); Easton
(2004); Pástor et al. (2008)). Rather than relying on estimates based on realized returns or
dividend yields, this approach explicitly attempts to account for revisions in cash flow changes
due to customer satisfaction when estimating the cost of equity effects. In our analyses, we
find a robust negative association between customer satisfaction as measured by the American
Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) and the cost of equity. These findings contribute to
the literature linking immaterial asset management of firms with the cost of equity such as
corporate reputation (Cao et al., 2015) or corporate social responsibility initiatives (Ghoul
et al., 2011). Second, following the literature on return decomposition, we break down firm
value in form of returns into its cash flow and cost of equity effects (Chen et al., 2013).
We attempt to contribute to the question whether customer satisfaction contributes to firm
value primarily due to changes in growth expectations regarding future cash flows or due to
changes in the firm’s cost of equity. Similar to Hail and Leuz (2009), we decompose realized
returns by varying cash flows but holding the cost of equity constant (and vice versa). We use
several different investment horizons representing the period over which changes in customer
satisfaction and firm value are measured. Once we increase the investment horizon, we find a
positive, consistent and growing association between customer satisfaction and the cash effect
for the longer horizons on the one hand and between customer satisfaction and the cost of
equity effect for shorter horizons on the other hand. Hence, the cash flow effect starts weaker
than the cost of equity effect but overtakes the latter for all investment horizons beyond three
years. This result is surprising and stands in contrast to the large body of literature dealing
with the cash flow implications for customer satisfaction: first, this literature merely neglects
the importance of cost of equity effects and second, this literature usually (at least implicitly)
assumes immediate effects on future cash flows. Beyond these findings, our approach on linking
customer satisfaction to firm value might be useful in the context of other intangible assets
of the firm. Third, we split our sample into two subsamples having a low and a high state
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of sales uncertainty respectively. We rerun the above analyses for both subsamples and find
that the effects of customer satisfaction on cost of equity are highly significant and higher in
magnitude in a state of high sales uncertainty, while these effects are non-significant in a state
of low sales uncertainty. We also find that the results distinguishing between the cash flow
effect and the cost of equity effect are more pronounced in a state of high sales uncertainty.
The results in a state of low sales uncertainty seem to be similar for the cash flow effect and
the cost of equity effect.
The third chapter is based on a working paper I wrote with Ferdinand Elfers (University of
Mannheim). In it we use the ICC to estimate the rate of return required by the stockholders
of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). We use the implied risk premium (IRP), calculated
as ICC minus the risk-free rate, to investigate directly whether stock prices are adjusted
to information about the business risk of a BHC as suggested by the concept of market
discipline. Market discipline requires that investors have incentives and the ability to monitor
the risk position of banks, and that they translate their knowledge into economic transactions
(“market monitoring”, e.g., requiring higher returns or withdrawing funds when perceiving
high risk). Managers in turn are expected to adapt their risk behavior accordingly in order to
avoid funding problems or excessive cost of capital (“market influencing”, see Flannery, 2001).
A further distinction can be made between direct market discipline, where the disciplining
mechanism takes place directly between banks and the market, and indirect market discipline,
where supervisors use market based signals to trigger regulatory action.
While the monitoring incentives of debt holders (e.g., Hannan and Hanweck (1988); Flannery
and Sorescu (1996); Billett et al. (1998); Park and Peristiani (1998); DeYoung et al. (2001);
Jagtiani et al. (2002); Sironi (2003); Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004); Hadad et al. (2011))
might be weakened as they are protected by the regulatory capital buffer and institutional
safety nets such as deposit insurance or (implicit) government bail-out guarantees, no such
mechanisms exist for stockholders. In addition, stock market data is in general readily
observable and more easily comparable than information on various debt instruments. It
therefore seems promising to investigate whether market monitoring takes place in stock
5 Chapter 1
markets. There has not been any prior work using ICC (or IRP) in the context of market
discipline. Using IRP makes it possible to test for direct market discipline in stock markets.
This allows us to address a gap in the literature on market monitoring.
Thus the first contribution of the third chapter is that estimating the IRP allows us to isolate
the risk discount factor and therefore provides a clearer understanding of direct stock market
discipline than could be achieved so far, but without needing to resort to stock volatility or
specific negative information events. As a second contribution, we further examine whether
the IRP captures (distress) risk information that goes beyond current observable accounting
risk indicators and thus might serve as a useful signal for indirect market discipline. In
particular, we gauge the informational content of IRP in a prediction model of severe rating
downgrades, partially through explicitly comparing it to other market based information
(similar to variables used by e.g., Jordan et al. (2000); Distinguin et al. (2006); Stiroh (2006);
Curry et al. (2008); Auvray and Brossard (2012)) to analyze whether the IRP provides any
additional value in predicting bank distress. Our third and final contribution is the relation of
our first two contributions to the question whether distress risk is priced in equity returns
which is ultimately empirical and has become an important point of contention in the literature
on cost of equity (e.g., (Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; Vassalou and Xing, 2004;
Campbell et al., 2008; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; George and Hwang, 2010; Kapadia,
2011; Conrad et al., 2012)). By providing a detailed risk analysis of the financial sector, which
has been excluded by other studies so far, we contribute to this ongoing discussion.
In the fourth and last chapter I introduce a new approach aimed at simultaneously estimating
all drivers (input variables) of an accounting valuation model. My estimation approach extends
the models from Easton (2004) and Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011). Stated differently, it aims
at a methodological equilibrium between the components of the accounting valuation model,
the (implied) cost of capital, expected future earnings, expected earnings growth and expected
future dividends. All previous research, up to my knowledge, assume a constant dividend
payout ratio or a deterministic function for it and rely on analyst consensus earnings forecasts
(e.g. from I/B/E/S) in order to proxy for expected future earnings and dividend payout
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ratio respectively. Aside from the unrealistic assumption of a constant dividend payout ratio
for future years, analyst earning forecasts have been shown to be biased differently among
firms with different characteristics, leading to false estimates of ICC as shown in Easton and
Sommers (2007). Hence, it is important that ICC estimates are in balance (equilibrium) with
estimates of earning forecasts and other input variables.
The contribution of my approach is twofold. The first contribution is estimating ICC, being in
a steady state with all other input variables (while estimating the change in earnings growth,
similar to Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011)). All the other approaches, including the one by
Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011), have concentrated only on estimating or determining a subset
of the input variables, ICC (and earnings growth). The second contribution is that it allows
simultaneous estimation of expected future earnings and expected future dividends if estimates
of ICC and earnings growth were given. Up to my knowledge the literature so far estimates
earnings and dividends using separate models, i.e. they are not linked together through an
accounting based valuation model. Hence my approach extends the literature on earnings and
dividends estimation.
1.2 Implied Cost of Capital Models
Throughout the first two chapters I compute ICC using as the main model the one by Pástor
et al. (2008) (and Lee et al. (2009)) and for robustness purposes the models by Gebhardt et al.
(2001) and Easton (2004). In the third chapter I derive an estimation approach which is based
on the valuation model by Easton (2004). These three established models cover the three main
kinds of net present value models used in accounting and finance research as I elaborate on
them below. Using these models to estimate ICC I minimize the quadratic difference between
the left hand-side, stock price, and the right-hand side, valuation model, until it is less than
or equal to a specific predetermined bound, set to 10−10.
Pástor et al. (2008) estimate ICC using a valuation model which discounts earnings distributed
to equity shareholders. It extends alternative models by introducing estimation functions for
earnings forecasts and plowback (equity reinvestment) rates and elongating the valuation time
7 Chapter 1
horizon T from 2, 5 or 12 years to 15 years.
pt =
T∑
s=1
FEt+s(1− bt+s)
(1 + re)s
+ FEt+s+1
re(1 + re)T
(1.1)
where FEt+s are earnings forecasts, bt+s is the plowback rate (one minus the payback ratio),
re is the cost of equity and T is the horizon after which the terminal value of the model starts.
FEt+1 and FEt+2 are assigned starting values. For periods t + 3 to t + T + 1 the growth
FEt+s is defined through the following sequence.
FEt+s = FEt+s−1(1 + gt+s) (1.2)
gt+s = gt+s−1 exp
( log(g/gt+3)
T − 1
)
(1.3)
The plowback rate is derived from financial statements for periods t+ 1 and t+ 2 as one minus
the payout ratio. For periods t+ 3 to t+ T the plowback rate is defined through the following
sequence.
bt+s = bt+s−1 − bt+2 − b
T − 1 (1.4)
Following Pástor et al. (2008), in order to derive the steady-state rates for earnings growth
and plowback, I assume that the steady-state growth rate g equals the gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate and assume sustainable growth to determine b from g = ROI × b, where
ROI is the steady-state return on investments. I then set ROI = re such that b becomes
b = g/re.
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Gebhardt et al. (2001) estimate ICC using a residual income model which anchors on contem-
poraneous equity book value and adds the residual income with respect to expected income in
future years. The time horizon T is set to 12 years.
pt = bvt +
T−1∑
s=1
FROEt+s − re
(1 + re)s
bvt+s−1 +
FROEt+T − re
re(1 + re)T−1
bvt+T−1 (1.5)
where bvt+s are equity book values imputed using the clean surplus relation, bvt+s =
bvt+s−1(1+FROEt+s∗bt+1).1 FROEt+s are return on equity forecasts, defined as FROEt+s =
FEt+s/bvt+s−1. I use the same input values for FEt+1, FEt+2, gt+3 and bt+1 as for model
(1.1).
FROEt+3 =
FEt+2(1 + gt+3)
bvt+1
FROEt+s = FROEt+s−1 − FROEt+3 −ROEmedian
T − 3
where the second equation is used for s > 3. ROEmedian is the 10-year ROE median for each
industry according to Fama & French (1997).
Easton (2004) estimates ICC using an abnormal earnings growth (AEG) model which anchors
on capitalized earnings and adds the AEG component with respect to expected earnings
growth. After some modifications the following model is derived.
pt =
FEt+2 + re(1− bt+1)FEt+1 − FEt+1
r2e
(1.6)
1Gebhardt et al. (2001) assume a constant payout ratio for all future periods.
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where FEt+1, FEt+2 and bt+1 are defined as for model (1.1).
All three kinds of models with theoretically infinite time horizon are equivalent if the clean
surplus relation holds, i.e. book value of equity of a specific year of reference equals book value
of equity of the previous year plus earnings of the year of reference less paid dividends of the
year of reference.2 In their implementation they differ however as demonstrated above.
2Intuitively put, no items may bypass the income statement. Hence equity will only be affected by the
income statement.
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2 Customer Satisfaction, Cost of Equity and Firm Value De-
composition
This chapter is based on a working paper I wrote with
Martin Artz (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management).
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the association between customer satisfaction and the firm’s
cost of equity using a forward-looking, ex-ante measurement approach. We use this cost of
equity measure to decompose firm value into cash flow and cost of equity effects of customer
satisfaction changes. Doing so, this is the first study quantifying cost of equity effects of
customer satisfaction and estimating the relative importance of these cost of equity effects in
relation to pure cash effects of customer satisfaction changes.
Customer satisfaction has been established as a central non-financial performance measure in
academic research and corporate practice. The growing interest in this construct has emerged
due to its effect on firm’s future cash flows via the customers’ resulting buying behavior
(Banker and Mashruwala, 2007; Bonacchi et al.; Hauser et al., 1994; Ittner and Larcker, 1998).
Starting from a discussion whether customer satisfaction provides information for financial
markets beyond what is reflected in current accounting metrics (Ittner and Larcker, 1998;
Ittner et al., 2009; Jacobson and Mizik, 2009), a large body of work has found a positive
association between customer satisfaction and the firm’s market value of equity (Anderson
et al., 2004; Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Mittal et al., 2005), making customer satisfaction metrics
also a useful indicator for stock market participants in predicting the firm’s level and variability
of future cash flows.
Given this evidence, an emerging interest has developed not only in whether customer
satisfaction is associated with firm value, but also in how exactly it is related to firm value.
Analyzing this precise link requires both, considering cash (or growth) effects and cost of equity
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effects as usually suggested in discounted cash flow models of firm valuation. The relation
between customer satisfaction and net cash effects has been a major element in empirical
research so far. Satisfied customers show higher retention rates, word-of-mouth, willingness
to pay, and cross-selling, and, on the other hand, are more efficient to handle with regard to
complaints, pay defaults, and search. Most importantly, these effects seem to persist over time
and thus, current customer satisfaction changes affect future customer behavior and therefore
future cash flows for the firm. Consequently, much work has shown a positive association
of customer satisfaction with future revenues (Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Ittner et al., 2009),
future cash flows (Gruca and Rego, 2005), and future earnings (Ittner et al., 2009; Mittal
et al., 2005). Empirical research, however, is rather limited on the risk side, particularly in
the matter of cost of equity. Anderson and Mansi (2009) show a negative association with
the cost of debt but do not (intend to) give insights regarding the cost of equity. Studying
the implications of customer satisfaction on cost of equity is important beyond its influence
on the cost of debt. In particular, multiple conflicts of interest between debt holders and
equity holders exist and whether customer satisfaction is value increasing due to lower cost of
financing might be differently perceived by those parties with opposing interests (Cao et al.,
2015). Closest evidence in this regard is provided by Tuli and Bharadwaj (2009) who show
that customer satisfaction is negatively associated with both, firm’s systematic and firm’s
unsystematic risk. However, their study does not address the question whether customer
satisfaction is associated with lower cost of equity. This missing link makes it difficult to form
an opinion about the importance of the influence of customer satisfaction on the risk profile
of the firm in relation to pure cash flow effects. Identifying an association between customer
satisfaction on the one hand and cost of equity and firm value components on the other hand
allows us to estimate an economic impact in terms of interest rates basis points and to identify
the relative importance of cash and risk effects of customer satisfaction for firm value.
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, we investigate the association between
customer satisfaction and the cost of equity. In contrast to prior empirical studies in the
customer satisfaction literature, we analyze ex-ante measures of the firm’s cost of equity to
estimate the precise economic effects of customer satisfaction. Historical estimates capture
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information which is not fully available to market participants at the time new customer
satisfaction figures are provided. Stated differently, these returns are contaminated by firm-
specific cash flow related changes and firm-specific discount factor related changes (Elton,
1999) and are claimed to be “unavoidably imprecise” (Fama and French, 1997, p. 153). Our
approach instead exploits changes in future earnings to identify changes in the cost of equity.
The appeal of such a measure lies in the nature of its derivation, both being forward-looking
and combining current market and book values with growth forecasts of the firm’s future cash
flows. Rather than relying on estimates based on realized returns or dividend yields, this
approach explicitly attempts to account for revisions in cash flow changes due to customer
satisfaction when estimating the cost of equity effects. We use an approach developed by
Pástor et al. (2008) (and Lee et al. (2009)) which is especially applicable in our context since it
is based on a valuation model which discounts all earnings assigned to equity holders. Several
robustness checks using alternative accounting-based valuation models (Gebhardt et al., 2001;
Easton, 2004) deliver similar results. All approaches allow us to explicitly capture potentially
unobserved heterogeneity on the firm- and time-level beyond additional determinants of the
cost of equity. In our analyses, we find a robust negative association between customer
satisfaction as measured by the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) and the cost
of equity. In economic terms, an increase in 10 points in the ACSI results in a decrease of
40 to 65 basis points in cost of equity which is economically significant and meaningful, but
not too large to be implausible. These findings contribute to the literature linking immaterial
asset management of firms with the cost of equity such as corporate reputation (Cao et al.,
2015), corporate social responsibility initiatives (Ghoul et al., 2011) or customer concentration
(Dhaliwal et al., 2015). Comparing the magnitude of our results on cost of equity to the
results from Dhaliwal et al. (2015) on cost of equity, we find that an increase of one standard
deviation of customer satisfaction decreases cost of equity by 24.88 to 40.43 basis points while
an increase of one standard deviation of customer concentration increases the cost of equity
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by 3.997 to 9.828 basis points.3
Second, we take full advantage of the cost of equity measure we derive as the internal rate of
return using a valuation model. Following the literature on return decomposition, we break
down firm value in form of returns into its cash flow and cost of equity effects (Chen et al.,
2013). We attempt to contribute to the question whether customer satisfaction contributes
to firm value primarily due to changes in growth expectations regarding future cash flows or
due to changes in the firm’s cost of equity. Similar to Hail and Leuz (2009), we decompose
realized returns by varying cash flows but holding the cost of equity constant (and vice versa).
We use several different investment horizons representing the period over which changes in
customer satisfaction and firm value are measured. Once we increase the investment horizon,
we find a positive, consistent and growing association between customer satisfaction and the
cash effect for the longer horizons on the one hand and between customer satisfaction and
the cost of equity effect for shorter horizons on the other hand. Hence, the cash flow effect
starts weaker than the cost of equity effect but overtakes the latter for all investment horizons
beyond three years. This result is surprising and stands in contrast to the large body of
literature dealing with the cash flow implications for customer satisfaction: first, this literature
merely neglects the importance of cost of equity effects and second, this literature usually (at
least implicitly) assumes immediate effects on future cash flows. Beyond these findings, our
approach on linking customer satisfaction to firm value might be useful in the context of other
intangible assets of the firm.
Third, we split our sample into two subsamples having a low and high state of sales uncertainty
respectively. We rerun the analyses on cost of equity for both subsamples and find that the
effects are highly significant and higher in magnitude in a state of high sales uncertainty,
while these effects are non-significant in a state of low sales uncertainty. Further, we rerun
the analyses on the two components of firm value decomposition and find that the results
distinguishing between the cash flow effect and the cost of equity effect are more pronounced
3 The comparison to Cao et al. (2015) and Ghoul et al. (2011) is not possible because the standard deviation
of their respective measure is not reported for the corresponding full sample.
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in a state of high sales uncertainty. The results in a state of low sales uncertainty seem to be
similar for the cash flow effect and the cost of equity effect, i.e. the importance of one effect
over the other is indifferent to increasing the investment horizon.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we review related literature
streams and develop our hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the methodology and the data
sources we use for testing our hypotheses including sample description and the construction of
the dependent and independent variables. Section 2.4 presents the main results with regard to
cost of equity effects. In Section 2.5 we show the results for the decomposition of firm value
into cash and cost of equity effects. Section 2.6 reruns the above analyses under states of low
and high sales uncertainty. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Investors face uncertainty when predicting the expected rate of return, and value relevant
information can, to some extent, reduce this estimation risk (Clarkson et al., 1996). We argue
that customer satisfaction contains incremental information with regard to customers’ future
buying behavior and therefore to the firm’s future cash flows. In this regard, it has been
shown that satisfied customers do not only influence the level but also the variability of future
cash flows (Gruca and Rego, 2005). First, customers show more regular buying cycles and less
variance in buying behavior (Noordewier et al., 1990; Tuli et al., 2007). Second, variance in
customer treatment and service costs are reduced (Tuli and Bharadwaj, 2009). Third, customer
satisfaction servers as a switching barrier and customers less likely react to competitor actions
such as price promotions or advertising campaigns (Banker and Mashruwala, 2007; Narayandas,
1998).
Although customer satisfaction is considered as a critical asset to firm value, this information
is usually difficult to observe. Prior research shows that intangibles such as R&D or employee
satisfaction are likely to be incorrectly valued by investors (Chan et al., 2001; Edmans, 2011;
Hirshleifer et al., 2013). Research using the ACSI shows that analysts in particular and the
stock market in general perceive this information as value relevant beyond financial accounting
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metrics (Ngobo et al., 2012; Jacobson and Mizik, 2009; Ittner et al., 2009). We therefore expect
that customer satisfaction reduces information asymmetry for stock market participants with
regard to customers’ future buying behavior and the variability of the firm’s cash flows.
A second argument stems from customer satisfaction being related to corporate reputation
(Cao et al., 2015). Firms with higher customer satisfaction ratings are likely to attract more
public media and investor attention which in turn is supposed to increase stock liquidity.
Empirical research has found highly recognized stocks being more liquid (Lehavy and Sloan,
2008).
We therefore expect customer satisfaction to be negatively associated with the cost of equity.
Vice versa, our study is also an empirical test whether customer satisfaction information
provided by the ACSI matters beyond other types of firm-specific information. Annual reports,
conference calls, or earnings forecasts might already explicitly or implicitly include information
about the firm’s future cash flow patterns.
Establishing an empirical relation between customer satisfaction and cost of equity in the
first place, it remains an empirical question whether customer satisfaction contributes to firm
value primarily due to changes in growth expectations regarding future cash flows or due
to changes in the firm’s cost of equity. We exploit the fact that financial analysts explicitly
provide forecasts for firm growth. This allows us to decompose firm value changes due to
changes in customer satisfaction into two components: those attributable to changes in the
cost of equity and those attributable to changes in future cash flows. In line with prior findings
with regard to stock returns (e.g., Jacobson and Mizik (2009)), future cash flows (e.g., Gruca
and Rego (2005)), and systematic firm risk (Tuli and Bharadwaj, 2009) we expect an effect on
both. However, it remains an empirical question whether the risk-reduction effect or the cash
flow growth effect of customer satisfaction impacts firm value in the short and long-run and
what the relative contribution of both effects is, depending on the respective time horizon of
firm value changes.
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2.3 Methodology and Data
2.3.1 Customer Satisfaction
For measuring customer satisfaction, we use data obtained from the American Customer
Satisfaction Index (ACSI). The ACSI was developed in 1994 by the University of Michigan
Business School’s National Quality Research Center. In the ACSI measurement system,
customer satisfaction is a latent variable calculated from survey responses (see Fornell, 1992;
Fornell et al., 1996, for a complete description of the methodology).4 The resulting satisfaction
score ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the highest level of satisfaction. The
satisfaction measure used in the data is the average of the mean annual rating for each firm
obtained from ACSI. ACSI data is released yearly in different months depending on the
industry of the firm.
An important and nontrivial issue when dealing with ACSI data is how to match scores
with GVKEY identifiers from COMPUSTAT to merge ACSI information with the other
databases we use. Challenges occur for firms where both, the parent and its divisions are
represented in the index, where the parent is not, but a single division is, or where mergers
and acquisitions took place. Besides the study by Ittner et al. (2009), we are not aware of any
study transparently describing how to deal with these circumstances which can (although do
not necessarily have to) have significant implications for our empirical results. Although, the
matching procedure of Ittner et al. (2009) is very supportive, we still found cases not covered
by them. We therefore explain in Appendix A.1.1 our choice of all potential cases we faced
which are naturally at the researchers’ subjective choice.
4 A key advantage of this customer satisfaction measure is the methodological consistency across all the
firms. That is, exactly the same survey instrument, interviewing methodology, and statistical techniques are
applied to create the satisfaction index, which ensures that variation in observed satisfaction scores cannot be
attributed to methodological differences.
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2.3.2 The Cost of Equity
Our measure of the cost of equity is a forward-looking measure of expected return, denoted
implied cost of capital (ICC).5 We use “forward-looking” to indicate using only current values
and future estimates in the derivation of ICC (compared to using current and/or historical
values in other models).
In this paper we use the model from Pástor et al. (2008) as described below. ICC is the
internal rate of return that is implied by equating the price on the left hand side to the
valuation formula on the right hand side of the valuation model. All variables below are seen
from the point of view of time t (conditioned on the information available at time t). The
time index resembles the time at which the variable realized its value.
Out of the various models found in the literature to estimate ICC we deliberately choose
the model by Pástor et al. (2008) for two reasons.6 The first reason is that it extends the
alternative models by introducing estimation functions for earnings forecasts and plowback
rates and elongating the valuation period from 2, 5 or 12 years to 15 years. The second reason
is that it discounts earnings distributed to equity shareholders (comparable to cash flows) and
not residual earnings (Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001) or abnormal earnings
growth (Easton, 2004; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005). Stated differently, we estimate
the cost of equity which is directly related to the share of earnings assigned to shareholders.
Hence, this estimate is suitable to measure the association between customer satisfaction and
the cost of equity.
pt =
T∑
s=1
FEt+s(1− bt+s)
(1 + re)s
+ FEt+s+1
re(1 + re)T
, (2.1)
5 Cost of capital can be regarded as a discount rate, expected return or systematic risk interchangeably.
See Cochrane (2005) for details on that matter.
6 We also compute ICC based on the models by Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Easton (2004) and get similar
results as described in Subsection 2.4.4.
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where FEt+s are earnings forecasts, bt+s is the plowback rate (retention of earnings, i.e. one
minus the payback ratio), re is the cost of equity and T is the horizon after which the terminal
value of the model starts. FEt+1 and FEt+2 are assigned starting values. For periods t+ 3
to t + T + 1 the growth rate gt+s of FEt+s is defined such that the logarithm of the ratio
gt+s/gt+s−1 equals the logarithm of the ratio g/gt+3 divided by T − 1, g being the value this
function converges to. Since we take the logarithm of both ratios and divide the second ratio
by the number of periods, this function evolves exponentially from the growth rate at t+ 3 to
the steady-state growth rate g which sets in by t+ T + 2.
FEt+s = FEt+s−1(1 + gt+s)
log(gt+s/gt+s−1) =
log(g/gt+3)
(t+ T + 2)− (t+ 3) ⇔ gt+s = gt+s−1 exp
( log(g/gt+3)
T − 1
)
The plowback rate is derived from financial statements for periods t+ 1 and t+ 2 as one minus
the payout ratio. For periods t+ 3 to t+ T the plowback rate is linearly mean-reverted to a
steady-state plowback rate b which sets in by t+ T + 1.
bt+s − bt+s−1 = b− bt+2(t+ T + 1)− (t+ 2) ⇔ bt+s = bt+s−1 −
bt+2 − b
T − 1
Following Pástor et al. (2008) we assume a linear decline in the plowback rates because they
appear to mean-revert slower than earnings growth rates, where there is empirical evidence
that the latter mean-revert rapidly, hence the exponentially declining rate. In order to derive
the steady-state rates for earnings growth and plowback, we assume that the steady-state
growth rate g equals the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate. Furthermore we assume
sustainable growth, i.e. the current plowback rate affects succeeding earnings growth as
g = ROI × b, where ROI is the steady-state return on investments. We then set ROI = re,
assuming that competition drives ROI down to the cost of equity (capital). The steady-state
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plowback rate b becomes b = g/re.
As the valuation Model (2.1) typically does not yield a closed-form solution, we use a heuristic
to minimize the distance between the price pt on the left hand side and the valuation formula
on the right hand side of Equation 2.1 according the the unknown cost of equity re. We use
the quadratic difference as the distance between both sides of the equation in order to have a
differentiable target function with a theoretical minimum of zero, hence when the valuation
formula prices the asset perfectly. The minimization problem is executed under the conditions
with which FEt+s, gt+s, bt+s and b = g/re are computed, as explained above. Note that the
last equation is a function of the unknown re. The optimization is said to converge when the
quadratic difference between the left hand side and right hand side of Equation (2.1) is less
than or equal to a specific predetermined bound, set to 10−10.7
2.3.3 Firm Value Decomposition
We decompose returns following the approach by Chen et al. (2013) which uses analyst forecasts
of cash flows by using the valuation model by Pástor et al. (2008) described above. In the
last two decades another approach based on predictability along the lines of Campbell (1991)
and Vuolteenaho (2002) has been used which decomposes unexpected returns in (usually long
period) a sum of predicted cash flows as the cash flow component and a sum of unexpected
returns as a cost of equity component. Chen et al. (2013) argue that the predictability
approach is sensitive to the sample period, predictive variables and measure of cash flows. The
approach by Chen et al. (2013), on the other hand, does not predict any of its input variables
and defines the cash flow component (cost of equity component), henceforth denoted by cash
flow changes (cost of equity changes) as change in the stock returns through varying cash
flows while holding everything else constant (varying cost of equity while holding everything
else constant). Chen et al. (2013) use ICC as the basis for their approach and point out
that ICC is forward-looking and uses earnings forecasts based on how the market perceives
7 We use the SAS procedure proc optmodel to run the optimization problem as described above.
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future earnings, i.e. it does not need the prediction of long series of variables. They use these
properties of ICC and its use of current and forecasted data to explain price changes. By the
above reasoning we choose to use the newer and more “robust” model introduced by Chen
et al. (2013) than to resort to the older and partially flawed predictability models.
Following Chen et al. (2013), we start by the definition of the return without dividends at
point in time t over the period or investment horizon j, denoted by rett,j . We exclude the
dividends from the definition of the return as they do not play an important role regarding the
volatility of returns over different time periods. We then split the return into two components
reflecting the change only in cash flows and cost of equity respectively, cash flow changes and
cost of equity changes. In order to be able to vary cash flows (cost of equity) while holding
everything else constant, we first define the price for year t+ j, Pt+j , as a function f(ct+j , qt+j)
of cash flows as seen from the perspective of year t+ j, ct+j , and the cost of equity for year
t+ j, qt+j (ICC in this model). Varying cash flows over j time periods while holding the cost
of equity constant is either (a) f(ct+j , qt+j)− f(ct, qt+j) if we hold the cost of equity constant
at t + j or (b) f(ct+j , qt) − f(ct, qt) if we hold the cost of equity constant at t. Analogous
reasoning follows for varying the cost of equity while holding cash flows constant.
As becomes clear, the two components stem from the definition of the return and from defining
price as a function of cash flows and the cost of equity. Since the cash flows (cost of equity)
change can be defined in two different ways ((a) and (b) from above), cash flow changes (cost
of equity changes) are defined as their average.
rett,j =
Pt+j − Pt
Pt
= f(ct+j , qt+j)− f(ct, qt)
Pt
= CFt,j +DRt,j (2.2)
CFt,j =
1
2
(
f(ct+j , qt+j)− f(ct, qt+j)
Pt
+ f(ct+j , qt)− f(ct, qt)
Pt
)
(2.3)
DRt,j =
1
2
(
f(ct, qt+j)− f(ct, qt)
Pt
+ f(ct+j , qt+j)− f(ct+j , qt)
Pt
)
, (2.4)
21 Chapter 2
where
CFt,j = cash flow changes
DRt,j = cost of equity changes
In our understanding, CFt,j and DRt,j are “as-if” price changes, following the notation from
Hail and Leuz (2009), who apply a similar approach using log returns. Their approach is
however only an approximation, such that their CFt,j and DRt,j do not add up to rett,j .8
We borrow however their intuition behind “as-if” price changes, the price change (or return),
if we vary only some components of the price while holding the other components constant.
This is just like computing the price change in some components as if the other components
stayed constant. We use DR (discount rate) for cost of equity changes to be consistent with
the notation used in Chen et al. (2013).
2.3.4 Data and Descriptives
Our final sample results from merging customer satisfaction values with mainly three different
databases. The customer satisfaction data comes from the American Customer Satisfaction
Index website9. We obtained ACSI-specific industry affiliations from the ACSI website and
email conversations with ACSI representatives. We retrieve yearly accounting data on financial
statements from COMPUSTAT North America. We obtain monthly data on stock prices,
returns and number of shares outstanding from CRSP and analyst forecasts for earnings per
8 In the following we use the notation from Hail and Leuz (2009).
∆P = log(P0/P−3) = ∆PCF + ∆PCOC = log(PCF,0/P−3) + log(PCOC,0/P−3)
Pt is the price in year t, ∆PCF is the “as-if” change in cash flows, ∆PCOC is the “as-if” change in the cost
of equity, PCF,0 is the price computed using cash flows as seen in t = 0 and the cost of equity from t = −3
and PCOC,0 is the price computed using the cost of equity from t = 0 and the cash flows as seen in t = −3.
However their definition of both “as-if” changes does not add up to ∆P .
log(PCF,0/P−3) + log(PCOC,0/P−3) = log
PCF,0PCOC,0
P 2−3
6= log PCF,0 + PCOC,0
P−3
= ∆P
9 See http://www.theacsi.org/the-american-customer-satisfaction-index
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share (EPS) from I/B/E/S. We merge COMPUSTAT, CRSP and I/B/E/S using the algorithm
proposed by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
Going back to the process of computing ACSI values for a specific firm, it takes some time
until surveys have been completed and numbers have been aggregated together into one value,
i.e. ACSI values should reflect the perception and satisfaction of the market some time before
the release of these values. We therefore merge the ACSI values with the computed ICC
values 3 month before their release. Based on Pástor et al. (2008), we obtain monthly data on
prices, returns and number of shares outstanding from CRSP and require that the following
COMPUSTAT items are available: common dividends, net income (defined as Income Before
Extraordinary Items), book value of common equity and fiscal year-end date. CRSP and
I/B/E/S data come from the same month in which ICC is computed, whereas COMPUSTAT
data comes from the most recent fiscal year beginning at most 15 month and ending at least 3
month prior to that month.10 Following the below formula to calculate the net payout ratio,
and hence the plowback rate, we obtain data on share repurchases and new stock issuance
from COMPUSTAT. We obtain further accounting items from COMPUSTAT and use them
to construct control variables in the regressions in Section 2.4.3. Figure 2.1 demonstrates how
our sample is merged together.
From I/B/E/S we use the one-year-ahead EPS forecast and nonnegative two-year-ahead EPS
forecast11 for FEt+1 and FEt+2 respectively and the forecasted long-term earnings growth
rate (Ltg) for the earnings growth rate at t + 3. We require the availability of at least the
one-year-ahead EPS forecast12, adjust earnings forecast for dilution and use the mean of
analyst forecasts whereas we use the median estimate for the long-term growth rate instead as
10 Since I/B/E/S data estimates figures for the following fiscal year end, we multiply the right hand side of
the valuation Model (2.1) by (1 + re)m/12, where m is the number of month until the fiscal year end.
11 Negative two-year-ahead EPS lead to negative FEt+s for s > 3 which results in meaningless ICC. In
unreported results we relax this condition and get very similar results.
12 If Ltg is missing while FEt+1 and FEt+2 are not, it is set equal to Ltg = FEt+2/FEt+1 − 1. If Ltg
and FEt+2 are both missing, they are set equal to Ltg = FEt+1/Et − 1 and (even if Ltg is not missing)
FEt+2 = FEt+1(1 + Ltg), where Et is the most recent realized earnings. Ltg is winsorized from below and
above at the 2% and 100% levels.
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Figure 2.1: Graphical Overview of the Merging Procedure
Measurement Dates
month
0
fiscal year end
-3-6-9 +9+6+3 +12 +15
COMPUSTAT Data
-12
Monthly I/B/E/S Data for IRP Calculation **
Monthly CRSP Data for IRP Calculation *
IRP = Implied Risk Premium
* 12 end of month dates
** 12 third Thursday in the month dates
*** Different ACSI industry per month.
Release Dates
at least
3 months
ACSI ***
3 months
ACSI ***
Date for 
Analyses
Figure 2.1 illustrates the merging procedure of the data we use throughout our analyses. The ICC is computed in the
fourth month after the firm-specific fiscal year end when I/B/E/S data is released (typically on the third Thursday)
which constitutes the date for each observation in our analyses. Where we need CRSP data on stock returns, we use
historical data up to the end of the same month. We use accounting data from the preceding fiscal year end to allow
for a publication lag of at least three months. Customer satisfaction is obtained from ACSI values released 3 month
after the date of the corresponding observation as explained in Section 2.3. Stated inversely, we merge ACSI values with
computed ICC values 3 month before their release.
explicitly recommended by Thomson Financial on WRDS.13
The payout ratio is calculated as net payout in year t (NPt), i.e. dividends plus share
repurchases minus new stock issuances, divided by net income in year t (NIt). Dividends are
the common dividends paid by the firm in year t, the share repurchases are the common and
preferred stocks repurchased by the firm in year t and new stock issuances are the common
13 See http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/_001Manuals%20and%20Overviews/
_003I-B-E-S/_001Data%20Manuals/_015TF%20Estimates%20Glossary%20-%20February%202008.pdf.cfm
Marwan El Chamaa 24
and preferred stocks sold by the firm in year t.14
In order to match our data to the 48 Fama-French industries15 and compute industry-size
portfolio medians of payout ratios, we need Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for
each firm-year of COMPUSTAT data. Since SIC codes are missing for some dates per firm,
we infer missing values by filling in the most recent known SIC code for each firm-year.
Following Pástor et al. (2008), we obtain data on nominal GDP growth rates from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis.16 We use GDP percent changes based on current dollars. We compute
for each year the steady-state GDP growth rate g as the average of past annual GDP growth
rates up to that year.
Table 2.2 reports descriptive summary statistics of the variables we use in the tests in the first
part of the paper and Table 2.3 shows their pairwise Pearson correlations. For interpretive
reasons, we report ICC multiplied by 100 and interpret the coefficients as percentages. We drop
all observations negative ICC values since negative cost of equity is conceptually meaningless
(Easton, 2004). To remove outliers, we truncate the top 0.5% and bottom 0.5% of ICC17 and
winsorize other ACSI and other regressors at the respective top 0.5% and bottom 0.5%.
We start with 270 firms with ACSI values, which is reduced to 225 firms after merging the ACSI
values with ICC and control variables. Table 2.1 provides a breakdown of our sample for each
year in the sample period whereas in Table 2.2 we report summary descriptive statistics. As
for the control variables the following are based on Gebhardt et al. (2001): total assets (SIZE)
is taken from COMPUSTAT, market leverage (LEV) is long-term debt from COMPUSTAT
divided by market value computed from the monthly prices, the book-to-market ratio (BTM)
14 If the payout ratio is above 1 or below -0.5, it is set equal to the median payout ratio of the corresponding
industry-size portfolio, where the firms are sorted into the 48 Fama & French industries and then into three
equal numbered portfolios based on market capitalization per industry. The medians of the payout ratio
industry-size portfolio are winsorized at -0.5 from below.
15 See the website of Kenneth R. French http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
Data_Library/det_48_ind_port.html
16 See http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp
17Since the computation of ICC results in a wide range of results, winsorizing it would still keep a lot of
weight on the tails which might significantly deform its distribution.
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is book value of equity from COMPUSTAT divided by the market value, the mean absolute
error of forecasts (ERROR) is calculated as the mean absolute forecast error (EPS forecast
minus actual EPS) divided by the mean EPS over the past 60 months (requiring a minimum
of 24 months), all taken from I/B/E/S, and forecasted long-term earnings growth (GROWTH)
is taken from /I/B/E/S. Based on Tuli and Bharadwaj (2009) we define return on assets
(ROA) as operating income before depreciation from COMPUSTAT divided from total assets
of the previous period and R&D investments (RD) as research and development expense
from COMPUSTAT divided by total assets. We define the Fama & French beta (FF_BETA)
and standard deviation of the corresponding residuals (FF_RES_VOL) by running Fama &
French regressions (see Fama and French, 1993a) using daily returns from CRSP and daily
data from the website of Kenneth R. French. 18 The betas of the market risk premium and the
standard deviation of the residuals of these regressions are estimated for each end of month
based on the past year of daily data starting with the date itself (at least 3 month of daily
data are required, i.e. 255/4 ≈ 64 days). The Kaplan & Zingales index (KAZI) is based on
the variables and regression coefficient taken from Lamont et al. (2001).
18 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research
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Table 2.1: Sample Descriptives per Year
Year Firms
1993 19
1994 102
1995 105
1996 97
1997 93
1998 91
1999 91
2000 90
2001 105
2002 108
2003 107
2004 115
2005 119
2006 133
2007 135
2008 130
2009 129
2010 133
2011 126
2012 94
Total 225
The table provides an overview of the number of firms by year. The sample comprises an unbalanced panel of a maximum
of 225 publicly listed firms with the required ICC data available over the period from 1994 (1993 after dating ACSI
values 3 month backwards) to 2012.
(Continued . . .)
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Var N Mean Std Dev p5 p50 p95
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Var N Mean Std Dev p5 p50 p95
ICC 2,122 9.65 3.23 5.43 9.28 15.11
ACSI 2,122 76.30 6.22 66.00 76.33 86.00
SIZE 2,122 64.15 209.08 1.68 15.58 261.50
LEV 2,115 2.96 26.62 0.01 0.33 4.55
BTM 2,122 3.89 33.81 0.04 0.41 3.63
ROA 2,039 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.14 0.31
RD 2,122 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05
ERROR 2,076 0.09 0.82 -0.12 0.06 0.43
GROWTH 2,122 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.22
FF_BETA 2,115 0.95 0.40 0.41 0.90 1.65
FF_RES_VOL 2,115 4.30 2.31 1.92 3.74 8.39
KAZI 1,760 -2.51 22.31 -9.28 -0.93 1.57
The table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses in sections 2.4 and 2.5. ICC is reported as
a percentage. Total assets are denominated in billion dollars. The reported variables are defined as follows: implied cost
of capital (ICC), customer satisfaction (ACSI), total assets (SIZE), market leverage (LEV), the book-to-market ratio
(BTM), return on assets (ROA), R&D expenses to total assets (RD), the mean absolute error of forecasts (ERROR),
forecasted long-term earnings growth (GROWTH), the Fama & French beta (FF_BETA), the standard deviation of the
Fama & French residuals (FF_RES_VOL) and the Kaplan & Zingales index (KAZI). We collect financial data from
COMPUSTAT, stock market data from CRSP and analyst data from I/B/E/S.
Table 2.3 reports Pearson correlations. The correlations of all regressors with ICC (to be
found in the first column) are mostly significant and most of them show the expected sign.
Particularly, ICC is significantly negatively correlated with ACSI. Furthermore ICC (as a
measure of expected return) is significantly negatively correlated with KAZI. This finding
relates to (Lamont et al., 2001) who find constrained firms have lower returns.
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2.4 Customer Satisfaction and Cost of Equity
2.4.1 ACSI Stickiness
ACSI values vary minimally over time, i.e. they are sticky. We construct the following histogram
in Figure 2.2 of the percentage of sticky changes from year to the next for a specific firm. We
define a change from year t− 1 to year t as sticky if the ACSI value in year t is up to 2.5%
below or up to 2.5% above the ACSI value in year t− 1. It becomes evident from 2.2 that the
range of percentages of changes in ACSI values ranges over the whole line from 0% to 100%.
The vertical red line resembles the mean of the percentage of sticky changes, 45.96%. The
vertical blue line resembles the median of the percentage of sticky changes, 50%, i.e. at least
half of the firms have 50% or higher sticky ACSI changes from year to the next.
To empirically test stickiness we compute the changes of ACSI values between each two
consecutive years and test the mean of this series of changes for significantly being different
from zero (with robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey and
West (1987) standard errors having a bandwidth of 2). The p-value is 0.791, i.e. we can not
reject the null hypothesis that the difference between ACSI values between two consecutive
years is zero. Thus this stickiness likely reduces the power in our analyses which will have an
affect on the regressions in Section 2.5.
2.4.2 Univariate Tests
Following Gebhardt et al. (2001), we start in this section with univariate tests to pin down
the nature of the association between customer satisfaction and cost of equity and report the
results in Table 2.4. We run our univariate analyses (and all further regressions) using Newey
and West (1987) standard errors (having a bandwidth of 2).19
19 These are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors. The bandwidth (L) is
determined according to a rule of thumb, currently practiced as mentioned in Greene (2011). L ≈ T 1/4, where
T is the number of time periods.
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Figure 2.2: Stickiness Histogram
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The histogram shows the percentage of sticky changes from year to the next for a specific firm. A change from year t−1
to year t is defined as sticky if the ACSI value in year t is 2.5% below or 2.5% above the ACSI value in year t− 1. The
vertical red line resembles the mean of the percentage of sticky changes, 45.96%. The vertical blue line resembles the
median of the percentage of sticky changes, 50%.
We divide our sample each year into 5 equal portfolios according to customer satisfaction,
Q1 having the lowest and Q5 having the highest values. We then test the significance of the
difference between Q5 and Q1 the means and medians of ICC. As we see in Table 2.4 the
results have a negative sign and are highly significant which confirms the negative correlation
between ICC and ACSI and hence the negative association between customer satisfaction and
cost of equity.
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Table 2.4: Analysis of ICC Sensitivity to ACSI (Univariate Tests)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 p-Value
Ranked by ACSI
acsi_mean 67.38 73.38 76.60 79.99 84.21 16.83
icc_mean 10.41 9.62 9.76 9.61 9.10 -1.31 0.000***
icc_median 9.90 9.30 9.60 9.08 8.81 -1.09 0.000***
The table reports univariate tests on the difference in the ICC between firms with low and high values for ACSI. For
each year, we divide the sample into five portfolios according to ACSI. We then compute the mean and median ICC per
portfolio and test the difference between the portfolios in the highest (Q5) and lowest quintile (Q1) using Newey and
West (1987) standard errors with a bandwidth of 2 Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
2.4.3 Mulitvariate Tests
To test the incremental effect of customer satisfaction on cost of equity, we regress ACSI
and further covariates (controls) on ICC (we do not report the intercept coefficients in our
regressions).
ICCit = α+ βACSIit +
∑
k
γkControlitk + it (2.5)
In the first regression we use as controls total assets (SIZE), market leverage (LEV), the
book-to-market ratio (BTM), return on assets (ROA), R&D expenses to total assets (RD),
the mean average absolute error of forecasts (ERROR) and forecasted earnings long-term
growth (GROWTH). We include ERROR to control for forecast bias, as shown by Easton and
Sommers (2007). Hail and Leuz (2009) explain that if earnings forecasts are overestimated
but the market adjusts its price accordingly downwards, then ICC will be overestimated as
well. By including ERROR as defined in 2.3.4, we apply a similar approach as done by Hail
and Leuz (2009). We include GROWTH to control for growth versus mature firms. If T = 15
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in this case is too short (long) for growth (mature) firms, we might underestimate ICC for
growth firms and overestimate ICC for mature firms. Gebhardt et al. (2001) state that if a
firm characteristic, customer satisfaction in our case, is correlated with growth, not controlling
for that might lead to spurious results.
With the further regressions we control for further measures of systematic and unsystematic
risk. In the second regression we add the Fama & French beta (FF_BETA) which is an
established measure for systematic risk. We substitute in the third regression FF_BETA with
the standard deviation of Fama & French residuals (FF_RES_VOL), an established measure
for unsystematic risk. We conclude with a fourth regression where we include all the previous
control variables and both measures of systematic and unsystematic risk. The intuition behind
these regressions is to test the effect of customer satisfaction on ICC while controlling for
usual accounting, capital market and marketing controls together with established measures of
systematic and unsystematic risk. We check with our regression if ACSI still has an association
with ICC after controlling for the usual controls and measures of systematic and unsystematic
risk, i.e. we check if ACSI has an incremental effect on ICC over the control variables and risk
measures from previous literature (e.g., Gebhardt et al. (2001); Tuli and Bharadwaj (2009)).
Endogeneity in our research design might arise from financial constraints. If a firm has
financial constraints it will have difficulties acquiring new equity capital and financing customer
satisfaction initiatives such as investments in product quality. So we need to control for firms
endogenously choosing to influence the relation between cost of equity and customer satisfaction.
We do that through introducing the above defined Kaplan & Zingales index (KAZI) as a
control into our regressions. Higher values of KAZI indicate more financially constrained firms.
Table 2.5 reports the results of the four multivariate regressions of ACSI and various controls
on ICC. Panel A reports regressions with year-fixed effects while panel B reports the same
regressions with year-fixed and firm-fixed effects. Although our focus and main results are the
ones found in panel B, we report panel A to show that firm-fixed effects take out much of
the variance and hence could reduce the significance. Yet our results with firm-fixed effects
are highly significant, confirming that customer satisfaction is negatively associated with cost
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of equity of the firm, independent of the panel specification we use. 20 We run the same
regressions with year-fixed and firm-random effects and get equivalent results as reported in
Appendix A.1.3 in Table A2.
ACSI has a negative sign in all four regression, whether we use only year-fixed effects or
year-fixed and firm-fixed effects. The p-values indicate high significance and range from 0.002
to 0.005 in the case of only year-fixed effects and from 0.012 to 0.015 in the case of year-fixed
and firm-fixed effects. This confirms that an increase in customer satisfaction reduces cost of
equity. This finding is independent of the econometric panel specification and combination
of control variables we use. As explained in 2.3.4 ICC is multiplied by 100, such that we
can interpret its estimated coefficients as percentages. Customer satisfaction decreases ICC
by 0.040% - 0.042% in the case of using only year-fixed effects and 0.062% - 0.065% in the
case of year- and firm-fixed effects, i.e. a 10 point increase in ACSI decreases ICC by 40 - 65
basis points. The signs and p-values of the usual control variables and risk measures do not
vary much between regressions and panel specification. RD has a significant negative sign in
regressions (1) - (4) in panel A and regressions (1) and (2) in panel B while it is negative and
barely insignificant regressions (3) and (4) in panel B. Furthermore FF_BETA is positive but
insignificant in panel A, as one would expect a measure of systematic risk to influence another
measure of systematic risk positively however it shows negative and still insignificant results
in panel B. As for FF_RES_VOL it has negative and insignificant estimates throughout all
regression in both panels. These partially mixed and insignificant results do not change the
tenor of our results, since we include the covariates only as controls, i.e. in order to make sure
we do not omit any variables. KAZI has a negative sign and is highly significant in panel A,
20 Although none of the established studies before on customer satisfaction use firm-fixed effects, probably
because of the low within variance in customer satisfaction, we are able to show significance throughout all
four specifications. Tuli and Bharadwaj (2009) use first differences which is however not equivalent to using
firm-fixed effects. We do not have a reason to believe that there is serious serial correlation in the error term
and hence abstain from using first differences. To control for possible autocorrelation we use Newey and West
(1987) standard errors as explained above.
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Table 2.5: Analysis of ICC Sensitivity to ACSI
Panel A: Year-Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACSI -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.041***
0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003
SIZE 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LEV 0.012* 0.012* 0.013** 0.012*
0.053 0.057 0.048 0.051
BTM -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.028***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA 0.190 0.295 0.114 0.249
0.848 0.771 0.906 0.804
RD -10.77*** -11.00*** -10.36** -10.46***
0.008 0.007 0.011 0.010
ERROR -0.056 -0.055 -0.057 -0.055
0.386 0.401 0.380 0.393
GROWTH 13.874*** 13.726*** 14.062*** 13.944***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FF_BETA 0.119 0.223
0.665 0.479
FF_RES_VOL -0.026 -0.048
0.652 0.467
KAZI -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
N 1738 1738 1738 1738
adj_R2 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181
Panel B: Year-Fixed and Firm-Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACSI -0.062** -0.063** -0.064** -0.065**
0.015 0.014 0.012 0.012
SIZE 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
0.014 0.015 0.012 0.013
LEV 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
0.746 0.711 0.708 0.691
BTM -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015
0.161 0.141 0.160 0.143
ROA 7.773*** 7.657*** 7.623*** 7.572***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RD -10.85* -10.76* -9.286 -9.678
0.052 0.054 0.130 0.115
ERROR -0.174** -0.176** -0.175** -0.176**
0.046 0.048 0.042 0.045
GROWTH 19.613*** 19.652*** 19.663*** 19.680***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FF_BETA -0.286 -0.235
0.263 0.386
FF_RES_VOL -0.053 -0.037
0.442 0.613
KAZI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.924 0.906 0.840 0.851
N 1738 1738 1738 1738
adj_R2 0.496 0.496 0.496 0.496
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates based on robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
Newey and West (1987) standard errors (having a bandwidth of 2). The base sample comprises 1,714 yearly observations
from 185 firms (we loose firms because of missing values) over the time period from 1994 (1993 after dating ACSI values
3 month backwards) to 2012. The dependent variable is the ICC and the variable of interest is ACSI as presented
in section 2.3.2 and 2.3.4 respectively. We include year-fixed effects in the regressions of panel A whereas we include
year-fixed and firm-fixed effects in panel B, but do not report their results. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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but has a magnitude of zero and is insignificant in panel B. The negative sign of KAZI agrees
with the correlations in Table 2.3 and poses a similar result as in Lamont et al. (2001).
The adjusted R2 of our regressions is 18.1% throughout all regressions in panel A and 49.6%
throughout the regressions in panel B. Adjusted R2 is higher when firm-fixed effects are
introduced, since part of the variance is eliminated, the variance between firms, and we control
for more firm characteristics. Although not usual, our regressions show for each combination
of control variables with fixed effects the same adjusted R2. Keeping in mind that we are
using linear regression models without any dynamic structure (i.e. without any further lagged
control variables), these values of adjusted R2 indicate a very good fit.
2.4.4 Robustness Checks
In this subsection we discuss several robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our main
results. As seen in the above subsection we use ICC based on the model from Pástor et al.
(2008) which might give rise to two issues. First, we should assure that a different model used
to compute ICC shows similar results, i.e. our results should not be sensitive to the model itself.
Second, since the risk-free rate varies over the month of the release of ACSI figures, we should
look at the firm-specific systematic risk profile excluding the risk-free rate, i.e. the implied
risk premium (IRP) which captures the systematic risk not shared by the market.21 We run
the regressions of panel B from Table 2.5 with the ICC model from Gebhardt et al. (2001),
a simpler but still established residual income model (RIM) in the accounting and finance
literature, and get equivalent results as reported in Appendix A.1.3 in Table A3. Further, we
report the same regressions in Appendix A.1.3 in Table A4 with the ICC model from Easton
(2004), another established abnormal earnings growth (AEG) model in the accounting and
21 Risk-free rates are taken from the database of the federal reserve (see http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/h15/data.htm) and defined as the market yield on U.S. Treasury securities at 10-year constant
maturity, following Pástor et al. (2008)
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finance literature, and also get similar results with higher p-values though.22 23 We also run
these regressions with the IRP and get similar results as well. Hence we claim that our results
are sensitive neither to the model nor to whether we use the whole cost of equity or just the
risk premium.
Another assumption is the time horizon used before the period of the terminal value starts,
hence T from Subsection 2.3.2. We run our main regressions with two different time horizons,
10 years and 20 years respectively and arrive at similar results.
2.5 Customer Satisfaction and Firm Value Decomposition
In this part of the paper we decompose firm value into a cash flow component and a cost of
equity component and test the effect of customer satisfaction on both of them. Taking the
stock return of the firm as the driver of its shareholder value and equating it to a valuation
model, cash flows constitute its numerator and the cost of equity serves as the discount factor
in its denominator, as seen in Equation (2.1).
We are interested in the change in value of the firm if we change only cash flows or the cost of
equity respectively. For that purpose we use the superior measure from the first part of the
paper, the ICC.
We test the effect of the change in customer satisfaction (∆ acsi) on cash flow changes (CF)
and cost of equity changes (DR) for the years j ∈ {1 . . . 5}. j is the investment horizon, i.e.
the period over which we compute the stock returns and the corresponding “as-if” changes,
cash flow changes and cost of equity changes. If for example j = 3 DR and CF are computed
according to Equations (2.3) and (2.4).
22 The RIM and AEG model are variations of net present value models such as the discounted earnings
model of the model by Pástor et al. (2008) we use.
23 We use the main models from Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Easton (2004) respectively, but the input
variables from Pástor et al. (2008), i.e. EPS forecasts, forecasted long-term earnings growth and the plowback
rate (or payout ratio). We do this in order to keep the models and their related ICCs comparable.
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CFt,3 =
1
2
f(epst+3, . . . , epst+18+1, bt+3, . . . , bt+18, ICCt+3)− f(epst, . . . , epst+15+1, bt, . . . , bt+15, ICCt+3)
Pt
+ 12
f(epst+3, . . . , epst+18+1, bt+3, . . . , bt+18, ICCt)− f(epst, . . . , epst+15+1, bt, . . . , bt+15, ICCt)
Pt
DRt,3 =
1
2
f(epst, . . . , epst+15+1, bt, . . . , bt+15, ICCt+3)− f(epst, . . . , epst+15+1, bt, . . . , bt+15, ICCt)
Pt
+ 12
f(epst+3, . . . , epst+18+1, bt+3, . . . , bt+18, ICCt+3)− f(epst+3, . . . , epst+18+1, bt+3, . . . , bt+18, ICCt)
Pt
We regress changes in ACSI (∆ ACSI) and changes in controls on CFt,j and DRt,j to capture
the effect of customer satisfaction changes on cash flow changes and cost of equity changes
respectively (we do not report the intercept coefficients in our regressions).
CFit,j = αcj + βcj∆jACSIit +
∑
k
γck,j∆jControlitk + cit,j (2.6)
DRt,j = αdj + βdj∆jACSIit +
∑
k
γdk,j∆jControlitk + dit,j , (2.7)
where j is the investment horizon and ∆j is the difference over j years, i.e. ∆jXt = Xt−Xt−j .
We include changes in the following variables as controls: total assets (∆ SIZE), return on
assets (∆ ROA) and the book-to-market ratio (∆ BTM). Table 2.6 reports the results of the
multivariate regressions of the change in customer satisfaction on CF and DR for each of the 5
years as investment horizons with the above listed control variables. The number above each
column is j, the investment horizon in years.
The absence of significance for ∆ ACSI in most of the regressions could be traced back to
the lack of power of the model due to the stickiness of ACSI values as shown in 2.4.1. We
tackle this problem by making use of the monthly data we have and hence use up the whole
sample size and all the variance we have in our sample in order to boost up the power of the
regressions. Table 2.7 reports the results of monthly multivariate regressions of the change in
customer satisfaction on each of CF and DR for each of the 5 years. We assume the same
customer satisfaction (M_ACSI) and accounting data for the whole year and use monthly
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Table 2.6: Analysis of the Sensitivity of Firm Value Decompostion to ACSI
Panel A: Cash Flow Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ ACSI -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.017
0.405 0.532 0.951 0.582 0.129
∆ SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.001*** -0.001***
0.868 0.174 0.080 0.005 0.001
∆ BTM -0.020 -0.020 -0.009 0.023 0.010
0.373 0.304 0.874 0.390 0.586
∆ ROA 1.328** 2.396** 4.517*** 5.900*** 6.330***
0.013 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 820 820 820 820 820
adj_R2 0.072 0.084 0.125 0.142 0.138
Panel B: Cost of Equity Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ ACSI 0.014** 0.017*** 0.014* 0.014 0.010
0.043 0.007 0.087 0.163 0.292
∆ SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*
0.252 0.580 0.934 0.314 0.058
∆ BTM -0.034** -0.008 -0.017 -0.032 -0.014
0.043 0.586 0.681 0.227 0.556
∆ ROA -0.829 -0.643 -1.504*** -1.365** -0.738
0.166 0.351 0.003 0.011 0.384
N 820 820 820 820 820
adj_R2 0.068 0.057 0.067 0.084 0.039
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates based on robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
Newey and West (1987) standard errors (having a bandwidth of 2). The base sample comprises 770 yearly observations
from 117 firms (we loose firms because of missing values and lagged variables in the calculation of changes) over the time
period from 1998 to 2011. The dependent variable is cash flow changes (CFit,j) in panel A and cost of equity changes
(DRt,j) in Panel B whereas the variable of interest is the change in ACSI (∆jACSI it), all presented in sections 2.3.3
and 2.5. j represents the investment horizon, going from 1 to 5 (see column headers). We include year-fixed effects, but
do not report their results. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
ICC, CRSP and I/B/E/S values.24 25 The idea here is to increase the power of the regressions
by increasing the sample size and the resulting variation in capital market expectations. The
increased variation comes from the monthly ICC, CRSP and I/B/E/S data which we use now
compared to using only one out of twelve values per variable in yearly regressions. We show
that the effect of ∆ M_ACSI on CF starts with insignificant results but persists and increases
24 We run the same regression as in Table 2.7, where we interpolate customer satisfaction values (S_ACSI)
between their release dates of every two consecutive years to get different values for each month when the value
of ACSI changes from one year to the other. We get similar results as reported in Appendix A.1.3 in Table A5.
25 In unreported results we also run the regressions from Subsection 2.4.3 in the same monthly manner. We
get more significance but also lower coefficient estimates.
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afterwards with the number of years (length of the investment horizon). The effect of ∆
M_ACSI on DR is highly significant over lower investment horizons. The effect of ∆ M_ACSI
on CF starts being insignificant up to year three, becomes highly significant in year four with
0.016 and increases to a highly significant 0.025 in year five. The effect of ∆ M_ACSI on DR
starts with 0.003 in year one, increases to 0.011 in year three and decreases back to 0.001 in
year five, being highly significant in years two and three. The effect of ∆ M_ACSI on CF
becomes larger than the effect of ∆ M_ACSI on DR starting in year four and persists in that
manner. Note that the magnitude of the coefficients should be compared between DR and CF
for the same investment horizon. As in Subsection 2.4.4 we run also the regressions with a
valuation time horizon of 10 years and 20 years respectively and get equivalent results.
Our results are compatible with the results from Chen et al. (2013), who find that CF increases
in importance with the investment horizon compared to DR in explaining returns. Note that
CF becomes higher than DR starting in year (investment horizon) four and does not revert.
As for the interpretation of the results, we start by quoting Chen et al. (2013): “. . . the impact
of cost of equity changes is temporary and attenuated with time. In the long-run limit, all
stock return changes must be cash flow changes . . . This is a fundamental property that holds
irrespective of economic models.” Basically they are saying that returns and hence the cost of
equity are mean reverting, such that if returns increase today, they will have to decrease at
some future point in time. This explains the results that we get only in that the effect on CF
persists and increases over the various investment horizon j while the effect on DR decreases
after year three. Furthermore Chen et al. (2013) state that “. . . analyst sluggishness can be
mitigated at longer horizons. This suggests that the model might explain price variations
better at longer horizons . . .”. This explains the increasing highly significant CF magnitude
we observe as the investment horizon j increases.
This confirms the results that Chen et al. (2013) show, in that cash flow changes outweighs
cost of equity changes in explaining stock returns. Remember that stock returns are a value
driver and are positively associated with customer satisfaction according to the literature listed
in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. By decomposing stock returns into CF and DR and showing that the
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Table 2.7: Analysis of the Sensitivity of Monthly Firm Value Decompostion to Constant ACSI
Values
Panel A: Cash Flow Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ M_ACSI 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.016*** 0.025***
0.253 0.459 0.116 0.000 0.000
∆ SIZE 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001***
0.353 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
∆ BTM -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.031*** 0.016* 0.025***
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.054 0.000
∆ ROA 1.319*** 3.296*** 4.628*** 5.581*** 7.157***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 9840 9840 9840 9840 9840
adj_R2 0.083 0.158 0.166 0.162 0.165
Panel B: Cost of Equity Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ M_ACSI 0.003 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.003 0.001
0.156 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.705
∆ SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000***
0.114 0.231 0.297 0.029 0.000
∆ BTM -0.033*** -0.004 0.004 -0.028*** -0.030***
0.000 0.394 0.612 0.000 0.000
∆ ROA -0.563*** -0.989*** -1.138*** -0.922*** -1.242***
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 9840 9840 9840 9840 9840
adj_R2 0.057 0.081 0.08 0.086 0.077
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates based on robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
Newey and West (1987) standard errors (having a bandwidth of 2), similar to the regressions of table 2.6 but with
monthly data as described in section 2.5. The base sample comprises 8,873 monthly observations from 122 firms (we
loose firms because of missing values and lagged variables in the calculation of changes) over the time period from 1998
to 2012. The dependent variable is cash flow changes (CFit,j) in panel A and cost of equity changes (DRt,j) in Panel B
whereas the variable of interest is the change in ACSI (∆jACSIit), all presented in sections 2.3.3 and 2.5. j represents
the investment horizon, going from 1 to 5 (see column headers). We include year-fixed effects, but do not report their
results. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
association between CF and ACSI persists and increases compared to the association between
DR and ACSI, we establish that ACSI increases the value of the firm through increasing cash
flows on the long run and decreasing cost of equity short-term.
2.6 Customer Satisfaction under Varying Sales Uncertainty
We investigate the effect of customer satisfaction on cost of equity and firm value decomposition
in states of low and high sales uncertainty. We divide our sample into two subsamples, the
first having the pre 10 years standard deviation of sales (STDDEV_SALES) below its whole
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sample median (LOW) and the second having STDDEV_SALES above or equal to its whole
sample median (HIGH).
2.6.1 The Effect on Cost of Equity
To test the incremental effect of customer satisfaction on cost of equity in states of low and
high sales uncertainty, we run the same regressions as in Table 2.5. We report our results in
Table 2.8 with year-fixed effects split into panel A for low sales uncertainty and panel B for
high sales uncertainty. As becomes clear from both panels, the negative effect of customer
satisfaction on cost of equity is higher for high sales uncertainty and highly significant only in
this state.
Table 2.8: Analysis of ICC Sensitivity to ACSI Conditional on Sales Uncertainty
Panel A: Low Sales Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACSI -0.016 -0.010 -0.018 -0.012
0.436 0.615 0.373 0.537
N 931 931 931 931
adj_R2 0.207 0.209 0.207 0.212
Panel B: Low Sales Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACSI -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.077*** -0.077***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 779 779 779 779
adj_R2 0.161 0.16 0.16 0.159
Panel C: Difference between Low and High Sales Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DIFF 0.062** 0.068** 0.059** 0.064**
0.035 0.022 0.046 0.029
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates based on robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
Newey and West (1987) standard errors (having a bandwidth of 2). The base sample from table 2.5 is split into two
subsamples, where the pre 10 years standard deviation of sales is low (below the median) in panel A and high (above or
equal to the median) in panel B. The dependent variable is the ICC and the variable of interest is ACSI as presented in
section 2.3.2 and 2.3.4 respectively. Panel C reports the tests of the significance of the absolute value of the difference
between the respective ACSI coefficients in panels A and B. We include control variables and year-fixed effects, but do
not report their results. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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ACSI does not have any significant effect on ICC under low sales uncertainty while it decreases
ICC by 0.077% - 0.078% under high sales uncertainty, i.e. a 10 point increase in ACSI decreases
ICC by 77 - 78 basis points. These magnitudes are higher than the magnitudes in Table 2.5
where we use the whole sample, i.e. where we test the average effect for states of low and
high sales uncertainty. In panel C we test the absolute value of the difference between the
coefficients of ACSI in panel A and panel B respectively.26 In a state of high sales uncertainty
ACSI reduces ICC by 0.059% - 0.068% more than it does in a state of low sales uncertainty,
all results being highly significant.
2.6.2 The Effect on Firm Value Decomposition
We decompose firm value into a cash flow component and a cost of equity component under
states of low and high sales uncertainty to check how the effect of customer satisfaction changes
on both components varies in these different states. We run the same regressions as in Table
2.7 and report our results in Table 2.9, split into panel A for cash flow changes (CF) and panel
B for cost of equity changes (DR). Each panel is further split in results on the effect of ACSI
changes (∆ ACSI) on the respective firm value decomposition component a in state of low
sales uncertainty in the first part and results for a state of high sales uncertainty in the second
part. The third part of both panels tests the absolute value of the difference between the
coefficients of ∆ ACSI in states of low and high sales uncertainty respectively. Our findings
hint at less variation or rather more stability in a state of low sales uncertainty regarding
the effects of customer satisfaction changes on cash flow changes and cost of equity changes
respectively. However, in a state of high sales uncertainty, these effects become more distinct
between the dominant effect on CF for high investment horizons and the dominant effect of
DR for low investment horizons.
In a state of low sales uncertainty ∆ ACSI has a persistent and highly significant effect on
both CF and DR starting in year two. In a state of high sales uncertainty ∆ ACSI has a
26 This difference is tested in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 using Student’s t-distribution with degrees of freedom
according to Satterthwaite (1946) and Welch (1947).
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Table 2.9: Analysis of the Sensitivity of Monthly Firm Value Decomposition to Constant ACSI
Values Conditional on Sales Uncertainty
Panel A: Cash Flow Changes with Low and High Sales Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ M_ACSI (Low) 0.003 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.017***
0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∆ M_ACSI (High) 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.021*** 0.039***
0.379 0.567 0.836 0.000 0.000
DIFF_CF 0.001 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.006 0.023***
0.744 0.000 0.003 0.334 0.000
Panel B: Cost of Equity Changes with Low and High Sales Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ M_ACSI (Low) 0.002 0.006** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.014***
0.547 0.018 0.002 0.001 0.000
∆ M_ACSI (High) 0.004 0.009*** 0.011*** -0.002 -0.008**
0.100 0.000 0.000 0.614 0.012
DIFF_R 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.014*** 0.022***
0.554 0.425 0.841 0.009 0.000
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates based on robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
Newey and West (1987) standard errors (having a bandwidth of 2). The base sample from table 2.7 is split into two
subsamples, where the pre 10 years standard deviation of sales is low (below the median) in the first parts of panels
A and B and high (above or equal to the median) in the second parts of panels A and B. The dependent variable is
cash flow changes (CFit,j) in panel A and cost of equity changes (DRt,j) in panel B whereas the variable of interest
is the change in ACSI (∆jACSIit), all presented in sections 2.3.3 and 2.5. j represents the investment horizon, going
from 1 to 5 (see column headers). The third part of each panel reports the tests of significance of the absolute value of
the difference between the respective ACSI coefficients. We include control variables and year-fixed effects, but do not
report their results. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
strong and highly significant effect on CF for years four and five, while its effect on DR is
strong and highly significant for years two and three (the negative and significant coefficient
in year five is counter-intuitive and strengthens our argument). These results show that in
a state of low sales uncertainty the effects of ∆ ACSI on both components of firm value are
similar and persistent over the investment horizon, whereas in a state of high sales uncertainty
the effect on DR dominates for low investment horizons while the effect on CF dominates for
high investment horizons. The magnitudes of the significant effects in a state of high sales
uncertainty are mostly higher than the corresponding magnitudes in the analysis of the whole
sample in Table 2.7. Note that the third part of panel A mostly shows significant absolute
differences for low investment horizons and the third part of panel B shows significant absolute
differences for high investment horizons, i.e. these results are the counterpart of the investment
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horizons where the two components, CF and DR, dominate. For low investment horizons
and in a state of low sales uncertainty ∆ ACSI increases CF by 0.016% more than it does
in a state of high sales uncertainty. For high investment horizons and in a state of low sales
uncertainty ∆ ACSI increases DR by 0.014% - 0.022% more than it does in a state of high
sales uncertainty.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the cost of equity (capital) effects of customer satisfaction changes.
Prior research put much emphasis on overall firm valuation effects and on cash effects of
customer satisfaction. One important and unresolved question is whether these effects stem
from reductions in the cost of equity, from increases in future cash flow, or both. Furthermore,
the relative importance of both drivers of firm value in unclear. However, customer satisfaction
plays a major role in a firm’s resource allocation decisions and as a non-financial performance
measure in executive compensation contracts (Chen et al., 2015). Thus, understanding the
precise relationship of how customer satisfaction is related to firm value is of great interest to
both, academic research and practice.
We first investigate the association between customer satisfaction and the cost of equity. In
contrast to prior empirical research in the customer satisfaction literature, we analyze ex-ante
estimates of the firm’s cost of equity instead of using ex-post measures of firm risk. In our
analyses, we find a robust negative association between customer satisfaction as measured by
the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) and the cost of equity, controlling for a
large set of covariates with year-fixed and firm-fixed effects. In economic terms, an increase
in 10 points in the ACSI results in a decrease of 40 to 65 basis points which is economically
significant and meaningful, but not too large to be implausible.
Second, we decompose firm value into its two main components, namely cash flows and cost
of equity. In this way, we contribute to the open question whether customer satisfaction
contributes to firm value primarily due to changes in growth expectations regarding future
cash flows or due to changes in the firm’s cost of equity. We find a positive, consistent and
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growing association between customer satisfaction and both effects, the cash effect and the
cost of equity effect, for different investment horizons. The cash flow effect starts weaker than
the cost of equity effect but overtakes the latter for all investment horizons beyond three years.
Thus, we find that the effect of customer satisfaction in the short-run is contributing to a
reduction in firm risk which is observed and priced by capital markets. The cash effect, which
has been the major element in the theoretical and empirical literature on customer satisfaction
and valuation is manifesting later and outperforms the cost of equity effect after a certain point
in time. Stated differently, we find that changes in customer satisfaction contribute to firm
value in the short-run by cost of equity and in the long-run by cash growth effects. As with
customer satisfaction in this paper, our methodological approach and empirical estimation
can easily be transferred to other intangible assets of the firm such as corporate reputation
(Cao et al., 2015), corporate social responsibility initiatives (Ghoul et al., 2011), brand equity,
or employee satisfaction (Edmans, 2011).
Third, we rerun our analyses for two subsamples being in a state of low and high sales
uncertainty respectively. We find that the effects are highly significant and higher in magnitude
in a state of high sales uncertainty, while these effects are non-significant in a state of low
sales uncertainty. Further, we find that the results distinguishing between the cash flow effect
and the cost of equity effect are more pronounced in a state of high sales uncertainty.
Finally, our paper has several limitations and provides avenues for further research. First,
although we control for fixed effects in both the firm and time dimensions and control for
the set of covariates which is supposed to affect a firm’s cost of equity level, it is possible
that we did not incorporate all possible influences over time. Furthermore, we cannot exclude
that causality runs the other way, i.e. lower cost of equity levels allow a firm to invest in
customer satisfaction initiatives. Given that we include firm’s research and development
expenditures and the extent to which firms are financially constrained, we think that this
concern is reasonably addressed. Finally, as any study relying on data from the ACSI, we rely
on the sample of firms being represented in that index. Although these firms do not suffer
from self-selection, the findings shown have to be interpreted cautiously.
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3 Is the Cost of Equity Higher for Risky Banks? Evidence of
Stock Market Discipline Using the Implied Cost of Capital
This chapter is based on a working paper I wrote with
Ferdinand Elfers (University of Mannheim).
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Overview
In this paper we use the implied cost of capital (ICC) to estimate the rate of return required
by the stockholders of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). The required rate of return
reflects the risk discount stockholders apply to expected cash flows. We then use the implied
risk premium (IRP), calculated as ICC minus the risk-free rate, to investigate directly whether
stock prices are adjusted to information about the business risk of a BHC as suggested by the
concept of market discipline.
Market discipline requires that investors have incentives and the ability to monitor the risk
position of banks, and that they translate their knowledge into economic transactions (“market
monitoring”, e.g., requiring higher returns or withdrawing funds when perceiving high risk).
Managers in turn are expected to adapt their risk behavior accordingly in order to avoid
funding problems or excessive cost of capital (“market influencing”, see Flannery (2001)).
A further distinction can be made between direct market discipline, where the disciplining
mechanism takes place directly between banks and the market, and indirect market discipline,
where supervisors use market based signals to trigger regulatory action. With increasing
complexity of financial markets, rising costs of banking supervision and fear of regulatory
capture (Stigler, 1971; Kane, 1989), the concept has been discussed for many years (Lane, 1993;
Berger, 1991). Lately it has received additional attention as a complement or alternative to
traditional government oversight (e.g., Meyer (1999)). A prominent example is the introduction
of the third pillar of Basel II in 2006, which requires detailed risk disclosures to foster market
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discipline.
Numerous empirical studies have investigated the market’s “monitoring” ability to assess bank
risk and react accordingly (for overviews see e.g., Flannery and Nikolova, 2004; Flannery,
1998; Gilbert, 1990).27 Most of these papers focus on debt securities such as bonds, credit
default swaps (CDS) or deposits and certificates of deposits (CD). Intuitively, debt holders
should be highly averse towards bank risk, because it is potentially only detrimental to their
position. For stockholders, the incentive structure is not as clear, as they could also profit
from the upward potential of risky behavior. If the increase in expected payoffs dominates
that of the risk discount, bank managers can increase the value of equity through higher risk
taking. As Merton (1977) shows, this holds in particular under deposit insurance, where equity
payoffs correspond to a put option, the value of which increases in asset risk (see e.g., Laeven
and Levine, 2009; Park, 1997; Ritchken et al., 1993; Keeley, 1990). Furthermore, the risk
conception relevant for a diversified equity investor is systematic risk, and it is not a priori
clear whether systematic risk is necessarily aligned with the risk of financial distress relevant
for debt investors and bank supervisors.
The monitoring incentives of debt holders might however be weakened as they are protected
by the regulatory capital buffer and institutional safety nets such as deposit insurance or
(implicit) government bail-out guarantees. No such mechanisms exist for stockholders, and in
addition, stock market data is in general readily observable and more easily comparable than
information on many debt instruments. Also, the notion that equity capital is “expensive” and
that the cost of equity capital is not risk sensitive is an argument brought forward regularly by
practitioners 28 and remains a point of contention among academics (see Baker and Wurgler,
2015). It therefore seems promising and relevant to investigate whether market monitoring
takes place in stock markets. Yet, as outlined above, a proper analysis of this relation will
27 It has proven much more difficult to find evidence of actual market influencing (Baele et al., 2011; Ashcraft,
2008; Bliss and Flannery, 2001; Rajan, 2001).
28“The bank aims to apply all capital levers at its disposal before considering raising eq-
uity from investors” (Deutsche Bank CEO Anshu Jain in 2012, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323528404578452892111767284)
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require to disentangle the risk discount from expected cash flows. To address this problem,
we use the ICC as a forward-looking discount factor. To our best knowledge, there has not
been any prior work using ICC in the context of market discipline. The basic idea of ICC
computation is to set the observed stock price equal to a valuation model based on current
book and market values and analyst forecasts of future earnings/cash flows. The ICC is then
determined as the internal rate of return that solves this equation (e.g., Claus and Thomas,
2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Easton, 2004; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005; Pástor et al.,
2008), from which we calculate IRP as ICC minus the risk-free rate of return. In contrast to
e.g., beta from the CAPM or Fama & French 3-factor model, IRP thus is a forward looking
measure of firm-specific systematic risk implied only by current and forecasted information
and does not depend on noisy (average) realized returns (see e.g., Elton, 1999; Lundblad,
2007).
We compute the IRP for a large sample of U.S. BHCs for the period from 1986 to 2012
using the methodology proposed by Pástor et al. (2008). We choose the model by Pástor
et al. (2008) as a recent and sophisticated ICC model that does not impose restrictive data
requirements or severe assumptions like clean surplus accounting.29 Nevertheless, we also
employ other approaches in our robustness checks in Section 3.4.3. In the first step, we analyze
IRP from the perspective of direct market discipline. More specifically, we investigate whether
IRP varies with numerous well-established risk indicators based on accounting numbers (e.g.,
capitalization strength, asset quality, liquidity, etc.). We find a robust and significant relation
between IRP and most of these variables, indicating that stockholders do indeed monitor
banks’ risk taking and adjust prices accordingly. To our best knowledge, we are the first
to directly capture this baseline mechanism of market discipline through the cost of equity
empirically.
In the second step, we examine the ex-ante usefulness of our measure in predicting actual
bank distress, i.e. we examine the IRP as a risk signal from the viewpoint of indirect market
29See e.g., Chen et al. (2013) or Li et al. (2013).
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discipline. We find that, in particular in the long run, the IRP adds significantly to the
informative value of prediction models based on accounting and other market based indicators.
However, as the IRP apparently does not capture the idiosyncratic portion of distress risk, it
should be complemented with other appropriate measures.
3.1.2 Prior Literature and Contribution
Using IRP makes it possible to test for direct market discipline in stock markets. This allows
us to address a gap in the literature on market monitoring. Most studies in this field of
research are concerned with market disciplining by debt holders.30 Classical examples for
such studies are Pettway (1976) (capital notes), Avery et al. (1988) (subordinated notes and
debentures) and Hannan and Hanweck (1988) (CDs), while the more recent work includes
e.g., Dinger and Von Hagen (2009) (interbank borrowing), Sironi (2003) (subordinated notes
and debentures), Hall et al. (2003) (CDs), Jagtiani et al. (2002) (bond yields), DeYoung et al.
(2001) (subordinated debentures), Goldberg and Hudgins (2002); Park and Peristiani (1998)
(deposits) and Flannery and Sorescu (1996) (subordinated debentures). Other studies are more
concerned with the institutional background (deposit insurance, etc.) that shape debt-related
monitoring incentives, most notably Karas et al. (2013), Hadad et al. (2011), Demirgüc-Kunt
and Huizinga (2004), Goldberg and Hudgins (2002), Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001)
and Billett et al. (1998).
Stock prices have been examined as a source of market discipline only to a much lesser extent.
Also, the larger part of this literature concentrates on price volatility as a risk signal from the
perspective of indirect market discipline. Auvray and Brossard (2012) analyze the effects of
ownership dispersion on the accuracy of a Merton-KMV-style distance-to-default indicator
based on stock prices in predicting rating downgrades. Trutwein and Schiereck (2011) compare
stock returns and CDS spreads for a small sample of failed U.S. banks during 2008 and find
that stock returns even precede CDS as risk indicators. Curry et al. (2008) examine whether
30 There is also substantial analytical literature on this relationship (see e.g., Chen and Hasan, 2011; Evanoff
and Wall, 2000; Calomiris and Kahn, 1991).
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stock market information (volatility, abnormal returns, share turnover) adds predictive power
to accounting based forecasting models of BOPEC ratings. Stiroh (2006) uses stock price
volatility to identify risk factors in banks’ business models. Distinguin et al. (2006) investigate
the predictive power of several stock market indicators (returns, Z-Score, distance-to-default
measure) to forecast rating downgrades for European banks. Jordan et al. (2000) find that the
strength of stock market reactions to announcements of formal supervisory actions depends
strongly on the prior transparency of banks’ disclosures (a similar point is made by Penas and
Tümer-Alkan (2010)). Billett et al. (1998) show how stock returns around rating downgrades
depend on the share of insured liabilities. Berger et al. (2000) compare information implied by
stock returns (and ownership composition) with private and regulatory ratings to predict future
bank performance and find that, while generally not much related to the rating assessments,
stock returns perform well particularly with respect to performance measures not directly
focused on default risk. Park and Peristiani (2007) choose a different approach that explicitly
addresses the issue of moral hazard associated with bank shareholders ,i.e. a possible proclivity
for inappropriate risk-taking. They establish that the relationship between Tobin’s q and
failure probabilities (based on accounting ratios or a distance-to-default model) depends on
the relative value of the bank’s option and charter value.
As our first contribution, estimating the IRP allows us to isolate the risk discount factor and
therefore provides a clearer understanding of direct stock market discipline than could be
achieved so far, without needing to resort to stock volatility or specific negative information
events. Besides that, establishing the value relevance of risk information also speaks to the
discussion on bank transparency and mandated risk disclosures outside the U.S.
As a second contribution, we further examine whether the IRP captures (distress) risk
information that goes beyond current observable accounting risk indicators and thus might
serve as a useful signal for indirect market discipline. In particular, we gauge the informational
content of IRP in a prediction model of severe rating downgrades. We explicitly compare IRP
to other market based information (distance-to-default, standard deviation of returns, etc.) to
analyze whether IRP provides any additional value in predicting bank distress.
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As our third and final contribution, both these questions relate our study to the broader
general literature on the cost of equity. Conceptually, well-diversified stockholders should only
price systematic risk in terms of asset volatility. From the viewpoint of market discipline,
overall asset volatility is however less relevant than the prevention of bank distress. Intuitively,
it is plausible that systematic risk is higher for banks with a high probability of distress. Yet
the question whether distress risk is priced in equity returns is ultimately empirical and has
become an important point of contention in the literature on cost of equity. It has been a
common assumption that distress risk is the underlying factor that explains the size and value
effect in the Fama-French three factor model (Chan and Chen, 1991; Fama and French, 1996).
Depending on the default risk indicator, this has been partly confirmed (Vassalou and Xing,
2004; Kapadia, 2011), whereas other studies found evidence that firms with high implied default
risk actually earn lower realized returns (Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; Campbell
et al., 2008; Da and Gao, 2010), which has been discussed as the “distress risk puzzle”. Some
recent studies attempt to find an explanation for this counterintuitive result beyond simple
mispricing. George and Hwang (2010) suggest that the systematic component of default risk
stems from high distress costs, but that affected firms endogeneously choose low leverage and
therefore have low risk of default. Anginer and Yildizhan (2014) contend that prior studies
based on accounting ratios and the Merton model fail to distinguish between the diversifiable
and the non-diversifiable component of distress risk. They propose a method to calculate the
non-diversifiable distress risk from credit spreads and find a positive association with equity
returns. Conrad et al. (2012) however argue that firms with high implied distress risk also have
the highest potential for extremely high subsequent returns. Assuming an investor preference
for assets with lottery-like positively skewed payout distributions as suggested by Barberis and
Huang (2008), this might be the reason for low average returns in equilibrium. Ogneva et al.
(2014) calculate the conditional probability of a recession given a firm’s failure to distinguish
between systematic and unsystematic distress risk. They find that firms with the highest
systematic distress risk earn a significant risk premium. Finally, Chava and Purnanandam
(2010) emphasize that realized returns are only a noisy estimate of ex-ante required cost of
equity, as has been established by prior literature (Elton, 1999; Lundblad, 2007). Similar to
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our approach, they instead compute the ICC and find a positive association with default risk.
By providing a detailed risk analysis of the financial sector, which has been excluded by other
studies so far, we contribute to this ongoing discussion.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we derive and present the
methodology to compute the implied cost of capital. In Section 3.3, we outline the research
design, describe our sample and provide descriptive statistics. Section 3.4 contains the results
for our tests both on direct and indirect market discipline. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Computing the Implied Risk Premium
The implied risk premium (IRP) is the implied cost of (equity) capital (ICC), which is a
forward-looking measure of expected returns, minus the risk-free rate of return. We use
“forward-looking” to indicate that only current values and future estimates are used in the
derivation of the ICC (compared to using current and/or historical values in other models).
In this section, we provide detailed information on the valuation model we use to compute the
implied cost of capital in this paper.
Under the familiar discounted cash flow model, the stock price is calculated as
pt =
T∑
s=1
1
(1 + re)s
Et(xt+s), (3.1)
where pt is the price and xt+s is the asset payoff (in this case dividends, stock repurchases
etc.). Et(·) stands for expected values conditioned on the information up to time t. This risk
correction is directly made in the discount factor re, which represents the cost of (equity)
capital and can be denoted as a discount rate or the expected return. Assuming rational
behavior and sufficient portfolio diversification, re corrects only for systematic risk, whereas
idiosyncratic or unsystematic risk is not reflected in the asset price.
Following the literature, in this paper we follow the methodology from Pástor et al. (2008) to
empirically back out the implied cost of (equity) capital. ICC is the internal rate of return
that is implied by equating the price on the left hand side to the valuation formula on the
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right hand side.
pt =
T∑
s=1
FEt+s(1− bt+s)
(1 + re)s
+ FEt+T+1
re(1 + re)T
(3.2)
All variables in Equation (3.2) are seen from the point of view of time t, i.e. conditioned on
the information available up to time t. The index resembles the time at which the variable
is to realize its value. FEt+s are forecasts of yearly earnings, bt+s is the plowback rate (one
minus the payback ratio), re is the cost of (equity) capital and T is the horizon after which
we begin to compute the terminal value of the stock. FEt+1 and FEt+2 are assigned starting
values. For periods t+ 3 to t+ T + 1 an exponentially declining growth rate gt+s is defined,
which mean-reverts the growth rate at t + 3 to a steady-state growth rate g setting in by
t+ T + 2 (see below and Section 3.3.2).
FEt+s = FEt+s−1(1 + gt+s)
gt+s = gt+s−1 exp
( log(g/gt+3)
T − 1
)
The plowback rate bt+s is derived from financial statements for periods t+ 1 and t+ 2 as one
minus the payout ratio. For periods t+ 3 to t+ T , the plowback rate is linearly mean-reverted
to a steady-state plowback rate b.
bt+s = bt+s−1 − bt+2 − b
T − 1 ,
In contrast to earnings growth rates, where empirical evidence suggests rapid mean-reversion
(hence the exponentially declining rate), Pástor et al. (2008) assume a linear decline in the
plowback rates to reflect them reverting typically rather slower than the former. For the
steady-state growth rate, g is set equal to the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate.
Furthermore we presume sustainable growth, i.e. the current plowback rate affects subsequent
earnings growth as g = ROI × b, where ROI is the steady-state return on investments. ROI
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is set equal to re, assuming that competition drives ROI down to the cost of equity. The
steady-state plowback rate b then becomes b = g/re.
The valuation Model (3.2) typically does not yield a closed-form solution. We therefore use a
heuristic to minimize the distance between the price pt on the left hand side and the valuation
formula on the right hand side according to the unknown cost of equity re. We employ the
quadratic difference as the distance between both sides of the equation in order to have a
differentiable target function with a theoretical minimum of zero (when the valuation formula
prices the asset perfectly). The minimization problem is executed under the conditions used
to compute FEt+s, gt+s, bt+s and b = g/re (note that the last equation is a function of the
unknown re itself). The optimization is said to converge when the quadratic difference between
the left-hand side and right-hand side of (3.2) is less than or equal to a specific predetermined
bound, which we set to 10−10.31
3.3 Research Design and Data
3.3.1 Research Design
Our analysis is divided in two parts to cover both direct and indirect market discipline. First,
we examine the association between the IRP and various publicly available indicators of bank
risk. The question here is whether stockholders “punish” banks with a greater risk of getting
into financial distress through higher cost of funding. Direct market discipline suggests that
this alone should deter banks from excessive risk taking. This is a plausible point as (a) banks,
in particular in periods of crisis, might face the need to recapitalize through capital increases,
and (b) bank managers aim to maximize equity value, which is ceteris paribus reduced by a
high cost of equity (the discount effect might however be dominated by higher expected cash
flows on a net basis). Second, we analyze whether the IRP is useful as an ex-ante indicator of
31 We use the SAS procedure proc optmodel to run the above described optimization problem. The starting
value for re is set to 12%, which is used in other established papers on ICC. Where the heuristic does not
converge, the starting value is set to 10%.
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distress risk for indirect market discipline, i.e., whether supervisors can profit from considering
the IRP to distinguish between banks more or less likely to default in the future.
For the first part, we abstain from explicitly quantifying the risk of default (e.g., through a
logit model), as our mostly accounting based risk variables (leverage, loan losses, liquidity,
funding etc.) are all well-established measures of bank stability in the literature (see Altman
et al., 2014, for a discussion). Furthermore, as market discipline ultimately aims at influencing
banks’ risk taking behavior, these variables directly correspond to the different dimensions of
risk management that stockholders would ideally want to scrutinize. Our results therefore
implicitly also speak to the relevance of disclosing such information for non-U.S. banks.
Similar to Gebhardt et al. (2001), we begin our analysis with an array of univariate tests.
At each quarter, we divide our sample into five portfolios according to each risk variable.
We then compute the mean and median IRP per portfolio and test the difference between
the portfolio in the highest (Q5) and lowest quintile (Q1). After establishing the univariate
relations, we examine the impact of risk information on the cost of equity by estimating the
following regression model for our panel of BHCs over the entire sample period.
IRPit = α+
∑
βj RiskIndicator ijt +
∑
γj Controlijt + it (3.3)
The IRP is a forward-looking measure of expected returns reflecting investors’ expectations in
relation to future payouts. Assuming that stockholders aggregate all available information into
plausible estimates of future developments, IRP should not only reflect contemporaneous, but
as well future business risk. To substantiate this reasoning, in the next step, we re-estimate
Equation (3.3) with the vector of future accounting risk indicators.
IRPit = α+
∑
βj RiskIndicator ijt+τ +
∑
γj Controlijt+τ + it, (3.4)
where τ indicates the lead, ranging of one to twelve quarters ahead.
Having established that the IRP reflects a BHC’s risk position, in the second part we aim
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to investigate whether it contains information that is useful to predict bank distress even
beyond the other publicly available risk indicators such as in Equation (3.3). We are now
also interested in the predictive performance of the IRP relative to other (historical) market
based risk indicators such as beta, return variability or the estimated distance to default.
However, an empirical analysis of this question is challenging as BHCs formally default only
rarely. We therefore follow Distinguin et al. (2006) and Auvray and Brossard (2012) and use
rating downgrades instead of actual defaults. In particular, we code a downgrade from an
S&P rating of BBB- or higher to BB+ or lower (i.e., junk bond status) as a distress event and
an upgrade from BB+ or lower to BBB- or higher as a recovery.32
For the subsample of BHCs with available rating data, we begin our analysis with computing
the cumulative accuracy ratio for predicting rating downgrades over the next year for the IRP
and other market based risk indicators. We also depict the temporal development of the IRP
compared to other variables before the distress event. For a more rigorous examination, in
the next step, we estimate a complementary log-log regression model33 to predict such rating
downgrades over several prediction horizons.
Prob(Downgradeit+τ ) =1− exp(− exp(α+ β IRPit +
∑
γj RiskIndicator ijt
+
∑
δj Controlijt + it)) (3.5)
We include the other market based risk indicators and estimate the model in Equation (3.5)
both with and without the IRP to gauge its incremental informative value. Finally, we also
estimate a (Cox proportional hazard) duration model.
32Using this rating-based proxy for financial distress seems plausible as many of the banks classified as
distressed were taken over by competitors soon after the downgrade.
33 We use the complementary log-log model because it better fits the extremely asymmetrical distribution of
downgrades and non-downgrades compared to classical logit or probit models. However, estimating a logit or
probit model yields qualitatively and quantitatively similar results.
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hit = h0t exp(β IRPi +
∑
γj RiskIndicator ij +
∑
δj Controlij + it), (3.6)
where the hazard rate hit is defined as the probability of BHC i being downgraded at time t
conditional on having survived until that point in time.
hit = Prob(Ti = t|Ti ≥ t;Xi) (3.7)
Here, Ti is a random variable measuring the time until the severe downgrade of BHC i and Xi
is the same vector of firm specific explanatory variables as in Equation (3.5). However, these
covariates are measured only at the time when the BHC enters the sample and are held fixed
for the rest of the sample period, thus providing a flexible way of capturing the long-term
nature of IRP.
3.3.2 Sample Data
Our sample data is obtained by merging four databases. Accounting data needed for the IRP
computation and as accounting risk indicators are taken from BHCs’ financial statements filed
with the Federal Reserve Bank (FR Y-9C reports). Stock prices, returns and analyst forecasts
are downloaded from CRSP and I/B/E/S, respectively. Finally, S&P credit ratings are taken
from COMPUSTAT. All of the data are accessed using the Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS) interface. CRSP plays a central role for data mapping. We merge BHCs’ financial
statements with CRSP using the mapping table by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.34
This table maps each BHC to a PERMCO identifier from CRSP and is available from 1990.
We can then merge the data with I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT using the proposed algorithm
from WRDS.
We begin the sample selection process with all BHCs having FR Y-9C reports available on
34 http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html
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WRDS and require that data on net income and common shares outstanding is available (thus
losing all unlisted BHCs). Based on the ICC literature (e.g., Gebhardt et al. (2001), Pástor
et al. (2008)), we use income before extraordinary items and other adjustments for the holding
company (i.e., excluding noncontrolling minority interests). Common shares outstanding from
the FR Y-9C reports are used to compute earnings per share (EPS). We then merge the data
with CRSP to obtain stock prices and returns that are also needed for the computation of
alternative market based risk indicators in the second part of the analysis.
After merging the dataset with I/B/E/S, we combine the data with analyst forecasts of 1-year-
ahead (FEt+1) and 2-year-ahead earnings per share (FEt+2)35 and the long-term earnings
growth rate (Ltg).36 We require the availability of at least the one-year-ahead EPS forecast.37
As the availability of I/B/E/S earnings forecasts for more than two years ahead is low38,
we follow Pástor et al. (2008) and use the exponential growth decline formula described in
Section 3.2 directly after period t+ 2. For each earnings forecast (adjusted for dilution) we
use the mean of analyst forecasts and for long-term growth we use the median of analyst
forecasts as recommended by Thomson Financial.39 We calculate the plowback rate at t+ 1
and t+ 2 as one minus the payout ratio. We estimate the payout ratio as net payout in year
t (NPt), i.e., dividends plus share repurchases minus new stock issuances, divided by net
income in year t (NIt). Dividends are the common dividends paid in year t, share repurchases
are the common and preferred stocks repurchased in year t and new stock issuances are the
35 We do not exclude negative 2-year-ahead EPS since distressed BHCs build an essential part of our sample
for the analysis in Section 3.4.2. We run the same (unreported) regressions excluding BHC-quarters with
negative 2-year-ahead EPS and get very similar results.
36 Since I/B/E/S data provides estimates for the following fiscal year end, we multiply the right hand side
of the valuation model in Equation (3.2) by (1 + re)m/12, where m is the number of months until the fiscal year
ends.
37If Ltg is missing while FEt+2 is not, it is set equal to Ltg = FEt+2/FEt+1 − 1. If Ltg and FEt+2 are
both missing, they are set equal to Ltg = FEt+1/Et − 1 and FEt+2 = FEt+1(1 + Ltg) (the same holds if Ltg
is not missing), where Et is the most recent realized earnings. When Ltg takes values that are larger than
100% (or smaller than 2%) we assign values of 100% (2%) instead.
38 In our sample the availability is as follows: EPS1 (99.6%), EPS2 (92.7%), EPS3 (26.3%), EPS4 (8.9%),
EPS5 (5.7%) and Ltg (70.8%)
39 http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/_001Manuals%20and%20Overviews/
_003I-B-E-S/_001Data%20Manuals/_015TF%20Estimates%20Glossary%20-%20February%202008.pdf.cfm
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common and preferred stocks sold in year t. Common dividends, common and preferred stocks
repurchased and common and preferred stocks sold are obtained from the FR Y-9C reports
and are assumed to be zero if their values are missing.40 GDP figures are obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.41 We use GDP percentage changes based on current dollars,
and compute the steady-state GDP growth rate (g from Section 3.2) for each year as the
average of past annual GDP growth rates up to that year.
We then estimate the ICC and drop all observations with negative ICC values since negative
cost of equity are conceptually meaningless (Easton, 2004). We calculate the IRP from the
ICC using the yield on 10-year government bonds as the risk-free rate, taken from the database
of the Federal Reserve Bank.42 To remove outliers, we truncate the top 1% and bottom 1% of
IRP values43
For the rating data required for the second part of the analysis we use S&P Domestic Long
Term Issuer Credit Ratings. These ratings fall into the following categories: AAA, AA, A,
BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, SD, and D. Categories AA to CCC can be amended with a + or −
sign to signal relative standing in the corresponding category. The category D (SD) implies
default (selective default). To operationalize financial distress, we use similar definitions as in
Auvray and Brossard (2012), but adapted to S&P ratings: If the rating changes from BBB- or
better to BB+ or worse, this downgrade is coded as a distress event. If the rating changes
from BB+ or worse to BBB- or better, this is recorded as a recovery. The threshold from
BBB- to BB+ is chosen as it separates non-investment grade from investment grade issuers.
Throughout the analysis, we use several accounting based risk indicators from the FR Y-9C
reports to capture public information on a bank’s risk position. We choose these variables from
40 If the payout ratio is above 1 or below -0.5, it is set equal to the median payout ratio of the corresponding
size portfolio, where the BHCs are sorted into three equal numbered portfolios based on market capitalization.
The medians of the payout ratio size portfolios are winsorized at -0.5 from below.
41 http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp
42 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
43Since the computation of IRP results in a wide range of results, winsorizing it would still keep a lot of
weight on the tails which might significantly deform its distribution. Other market based risk indicators and
accounting risk indicators are winsorized at the respective top 1% and bottom 1%.
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Figure 3.1: Schematic Overview of the Merging Procedure
Figure 3.1 illustrates the merging procedure for an example period in the third quarter (Q3) of 1996. The IRP is
computed in the last month of each quarter when I/B/E/S data is released (typically on the third Thursday). Where
we need CRSP data on stock returns, we use historical data up to the end of that month. We use accounting data from
the end of the preceding quarter to allow for a publication lag of at least two months (data needed in the computation
of the IRP is aggregated to yearly data going back four quarters). For the distress prediction we begin with rating data
in the month following the IRP computation month. If the rating changes from BBB- or higher to BB+ or lower, this is
recorded as a distress event. The BHC is then dropped from the panel until it eventually recovers again. For the discrete
choice regressions in Table 3.8, we look at specific quarterly prediction horizons of at least one quarter. For example,
for a prediction four quarters ahead, we would only be interested in rating changes that occur from 7/1997 to 9/1997.
several well-established research papers on market discipline to represent different aspects of a
BHC’s capitalization strength, profitability, cost efficiency, asset quality and liquidity/funding
situation.44 Following Park and Peristiani (2007), we furthermore add statewise unemployment
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.45 The data from CRSP, I/B/E/S and S&P is
available on a daily or monthly basis. We merge it with the quarterly FR Y-9C data using
a lead of at least two months after the end of each quarter to allow for a publication lag.46
Details on the merging procedure are illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Table 3.1 provides variable definitions, data sources and source papers for all variables. Table
44 More precisely, we begin with a larger number of variables and iteratively eliminate the variable with the
largest variance inflation factor (VIF) until the largest VIF is lower than or equal to 5 to avoid multicollinearity
among the explanatory variables. VIF is defined as 1/(1−R2k), where R2k is the coefficient of determination
from the regression of the k − th accounting risk indicator on the other indicators. If the k-th indicator is
collinear with the remaining ones R2k should be close to 1, resulting in a large VIF.
45 http://www.bls.gov/help/hlpforma.htm#OEUS
46 There is a variable for the date of the report submission (BHCKF841), but it is empty throughout the
entire sample period.
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3.2, Panel A summarizes the sample selection process. We start out with 365,562 BHC-quarter
observations from 11,825 unique BHCs from 1990 to 2012. The sample size is reduced to 40,281
observations (1,034 unique BHCs) when requiring data on net income and common shares
outstanding and after merging the Y-9C data with CRSP. In the next step, we merge the data
with forecast information from I/B/E/S, reducing the sample to 24,796 BHC-quarters (844
unique BHCs) that allows the computation of the IRP. However, the computation procedure
does not converge in all cases, and after the removal of outliers, our final sample of available
IRP observations is 22,569 (818 unique BHCs) and 15,791 (674) after merging them with the
accounting risk indicators required for the first part of the analyses.
For the second part, we require S&P rating data to be available for at least three consecutive
months. This leads to a further decrease in sample size leaving 158 rated BHCs that also have
IRP data available. We merge the rating data with the rest of the variables using different lag
structures that lead to different observation numbers depending on the respective analysis. As
an example, merging rating and IRP data with a lag of one quarter yields 5,383 quarterly
observations. In our final sample, we observe 24 severe rating downgrades that qualify as a
distress event and 15 recoveries.47 Detailed information on these firms is given in Appendix
A.2.2 in Table A6. Table 3.2, Panel B provides a breakdown of our sample for each year in
Table 3.2: Sample Descriptives
Panel A: Sample Selection
Sample Step Description Quarterly Observations BHCs
BHC data downloaded from WRDS 365562 11825
ICC calculation required variables: net income and common shares outstanding 131418 4277
Merge with CRSP data 40281 1034
Merge with I/B/E/S data and restrict to existing 1-year-ahead EPS forecasts 24796 844
Compute ICCs 22569 818
Compute further dependent and independent variables and eliminate missings 15791 674
Merge COMPUSTAT S&P ratings with IRPs (example: one quarter lag) 5383 158
47 We observe 7 BHCs with only junk ratings throughout our sample period.
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Table 3.2: Sample Descriptives (Continued)
Panel A: Sample per Year
Year BHCs BHC-quarters Defaults Recoveries
1990 218 746 5 0
1991 210 693 4 0
1992 233 789 1 1
1993 237 872 0 5
1994 259 898 0 2
1995 295 1005 0 1
1996 300 1060 0 0
1997 312 1085 0 0
1998 327 1119 0 2
1999 335 1119 0 0
2000 312 1101 1 0
2001 304 1049 0 0
2002 315 1117 0 0
2003 323 1174 1 0
2004 311 1120 0 0
2005 334 1213 2 0
2006 313 1171 0 0
2007 293 1068 0 0
2008 266 913 0 0
2009 254 818 7 0
2010 266 905 3 1
2011 240 878 0 2
2012 232 656 0 1
Total 818 22569 24 15
The table provides an overview of the sample selection process (Panel A), and indicates the number of individual BHCs,
quarterly IRP observations and severe downgrades/recoveries (i.e., downgrades/upgrades from BBB- or higher to BB+
or lower and vice versa) by year (Panel B). The IRP sample comprises an unbalanced panel of a maximum of 818 publicly
listed BHCs with the required data available over the period from 1990 to 2012. Of these, we find 158 BHCs with rating
data available on COMPUSTAT.
the sample period.
Table 3.3 reports summary descriptive statistics for the variables of the first part of our
analyses (Panel A) and for the other market based risk indicators we use in the second part of
our analyses (Panel B). IRP and all ratios are reported as percentages, whereas total assets
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Var N Mean Std Dev p5 p50 p95
Direct Market Discipline
IRP 15,791 5.81 4.09 1.51 5.11 11.87
EQUITY 15,791 9.12 2.39 6.07 8.77 13.25
LLR 15,791 1.03 0.48 0.47 0.94 1.92
ROA 15,791 0.25 0.23 0.01 0.27 0.46
ROA_VOL 15,791 0.12 0.20 0.02 0.06 0.49
EFFICIENCY 15,791 366.86 687.20 50.92 280.31 996.03
PAST_DUE 15,791 0.14 0.29 0.00 0.06 0.53
CHARGEOFFS 15,791 0.08 0.13 -0.00 0.04 0.31
LLP 15,791 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.34
LOANS 15,791 62.97 13.34 38.28 64.83 81.08
EQU_INV 15,791 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.33
COMM_LOANS 15,791 11.59 7.29 1.96 10.31 25.15
CONS_LOANS 15,791 6.00 5.89 0.24 4.03 17.09
LIQUIDITY 15,791 26.37 12.59 7.35 25.15 49.67
CORE_DEP 15,791 62.25 14.79 34.41 64.34 81.87
LARGE_DEP 15,791 11.17 7.22 2.61 9.65 25.43
DEP_COST 15,791 0.57 0.29 0.13 0.56 1.04
GAP 15,791 1.37 2.06 -1.99 1.28 4.93
SIZE 15,791 28.64 146.89 0.49 2.42 89.93
UNEMPL 15,791 6.23 2.07 3.60 5.80 10.50
Indirect Market Discipline
DD 4,900 4.91 3.63 1.55 4.43 9.13
RET_VOL 5,280 5.22 2.82 2.51 4.55 10.07
FF_BETA 5,280 1.16 0.44 0.56 1.11 1.91
FF_RES_VOL 5,280 4.03 1.96 1.94 3.54 7.54
The table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses on direct and indirect market discipline.
IRP and all ratios are presented as percentages. Total assets are denominated in billion dollars. IRP is computed as
presented in Section 3.2. All other variable definitions are given in Table 3.1. The sample composition is outlined in
Table 3.2. We collect financial data from BHCs’ FR Y-9C reports, analyst data from I/B/E/S, stock market data from
CRSP and S&P rating data from COMPUSTAT.
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are reported in billion dollars. The mean implied risk premium is 5.81%, which is somewhat
higher than results from prior studies on non-financial firms and reasonable given BHCs’ high
level of leverage. With a mean market value of 28.64 billion dollars the BHCs in our final
sample are fairly large, which is likely an unavoidable consequence of restricting the sample
to BHCs that are listed and covered by analysts. The various risk indicators however reveal
ample variation in the BHCs’ business model, funding structure and risk position. Table 3.4
shows Pearson correlations.
3.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we first describe the univariate and multivariate empirical results of our analysis
of direct market discipline.48 We then go on to a series of analyses to gauge the informative
value of the implied risk premium with respect to distress prediction.
3.4.1 Direct Market Discipline
3.4.1.1 Univariate Tests
In the first part of the analysis, we investigate whether the cost of equity varies in accordance
with observable accounting risk indicators. We begin with exploring the relationship for each
risk indicator separately. Table 3.5 shows the results for testing the difference in IRP between
the portfolios of BHCs in the highest quintile (Q5) and and the ones in the lowest quintile
(Q1) of each risk indicator. 49 These univariate results are generally strongly supportive of a
market monitoring mechanism. For the vast majority of risk indicators, there is a significant
inter-quintile difference in IRP. With a difference of more than one percent this finding is most
48Intercepts are estimated, but not reported.
49As in the remainder of Section 3.4.1 we use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey
and West (1987) standard errors with a bandwith of three.
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pronounced for leverage (EQUITY)50, cost efficiency (EFFICIENCY, measured by the ratio of
noninterest expenses to net income), funding stability (CORE_DEP, share of core deposits) and
funding cost (DEP_COST, ratio of interest expenses to deposits). We also observe a noticeable
relation between the IRP and the level of periodical loan loss provisions (LLP) and the share
of liquid assets (LIQUIDITY). However, we find no such effect for the level of accumulated
loan loss reserves (LLR), the share of commercial and industrial loans (COMM_LOANS) or
the size of a BHC.
Table 3.5: Direct Market Discipline: Analysis of IRP Sensitivity to Public Risk Indicators
(Univariate Tests)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 p-Value
Ranked by EQUITY
EQUITY_mean 6.61 7.95 8.88 9.92 12.36 5.75
irp_mean 6.42 6.20 5.86 5.63 5.29 -1.13 0.000***
irp_median 5.49 5.48 5.36 5.14 4.78 -0.71 0.000***
Ranked by LLR
LLR_mean 0.55 0.83 1.00 1.20 1.70 1.15
irp_mean 5.73 5.92 5.98 6.02 5.73 0.00 0.988
irp_median 5.19 5.29 5.36 5.31 5.02 -0.16 0.502
Ranked by ROA
ROA_mean 0.01 0.20 0.25 0.31 0.43 0.42
irp_mean 6.26 6.23 5.76 5.73 5.41 -0.85 0.001***
irp_median 4.99 5.34 5.25 5.40 5.25 0.26 0.294
Ranked by ROA_VOL
ROA_VOL_mean 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.38 0.35
irp_mean 5.49 5.74 6.22 6.04 5.90 0.41 0.042**
irp_median 5.12 5.22 5.40 5.38 5.07 -0.06 0.810
Ranked by EFFICIENCY
EFFICIENCY_mean -59.56 220.59 295.34 391.31 1031.7 1091.2
irp_mean 5.58 5.53 5.63 6.07 6.59 1.01 0.000***
irp_median 4.97 5.27 5.34 5.41 5.21 0.23 0.124
(Continued . . .)
50We find a similar effect using the regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio. However, Tier 1 capital is reported in
the FR-Y9C reports only from 1997. To preserve our sample size, we therefore use balance sheet leverage
throughout the rest of the analysis.
69 Chapter 3
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 p-Value
Ranked by PAST_DUE
PAST_DUE_mean 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.51 0.51
irp_mean 6.02 5.73 5.63 5.77 6.23 0.21 0.157
irp_median 5.25 5.23 5.08 5.26 5.58 0.33 0.006***
Ranked by CHARGEOFFS
CHARGEOFFS_mean 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.24 0.24
irp_mean 5.66 5.93 5.75 6.01 6.04 0.38 0.162
irp_median 5.14 5.27 5.20 5.34 5.32 0.18 0.498
Ranked by LLP
LLP_mean 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.27 0.25
irp_mean 5.42 5.74 5.93 6.09 6.21 0.79 0.003***
irp_median 4.98 5.23 5.29 5.42 5.39 0.41 0.107
Ranked by LOANS
LOANS_mean 43.30 59.33 64.72 69.73 76.85 33.55
irp_mean 5.82 5.65 5.77 5.92 6.23 0.40 0.105
irp_median 5.30 5.08 5.23 5.25 5.45 0.15 0.259
Ranked by EQU_INV
EQU_INV_mean -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.27
irp_mean 6.13 5.72 6.61 5.91 6.03 -0.10 0.766
irp_median 5.03 5.11 5.69 5.38 5.63 0.60 0.009***
Ranked by COMM_LOANS
COMM_LOANS_mean 3.45 7.34 10.35 14.04 22.87 19.42
irp_mean 6.25 5.97 5.63 5.63 5.91 -0.34 0.205
irp_median 5.37 5.28 5.10 5.19 5.40 0.02 0.892
Ranked by CONS_LOANS
CONS_LOANS_mean 0.82 2.78 4.79 7.55 14.36 13.53
irp_mean 6.27 6.13 5.69 5.73 5.58 -0.69 0.001***
irp_median 5.50 5.30 5.14 5.20 5.30 -0.21 0.151
Ranked by LIQUIDITY
LIQUIDITY_mean 13.77 19.96 24.42 29.72 42.45 28.68
irp_mean 6.24 5.86 5.86 5.71 5.73 -0.51 0.006***
irp_median 5.53 5.23 5.23 5.06 5.14 -0.39 0.015**
Ranked by CORE_DEP
CORE_DEP_mean 41.20 59.23 65.22 70.17 76.87 35.67
irp_mean 6.63 5.98 5.70 5.54 5.56 -1.07 0.000***
irp_median 6.02 5.42 5.13 4.93 4.89 -1.13 0.000***
Ranked by LARGE_DEP
LARGE_DEP_mean 3.98 7.07 9.67 13.11 21.21 17.23
irp_mean 5.86 5.52 5.69 5.82 6.50 0.65 0.020**
irp_median 5.46 5.11 5.06 5.18 5.53 0.07 0.585
(Continued . . .)
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 p-Value
Ranked by DEP_COST
DEP_COST_mean 0.38 0.50 0.57 0.63 0.77 0.39
irp_mean 5.60 5.59 5.70 5.81 6.70 1.10 0.003***
irp_median 5.24 5.16 5.22 5.13 5.78 0.54 0.002***
Ranked by GAP
GAP_mean -1.35 0.38 1.30 2.35 4.18 5.53
irp_mean 6.06 5.74 5.71 5.96 5.93 -0.13 0.661
irp_median 5.27 5.14 5.16 5.37 5.47 0.21 0.122
Ranked by SIZE
SIZE_mean 0.68 1.34 2.53 6.47 136.30 135.62
irp_mean 6.67 6.26 5.41 5.08 5.98 -0.68 0.217
irp_median 5.59 5.36 4.96 4.89 5.84 0.24 0.477
Ranked by UNEMPL
UNEMPL_mean 4.69 5.70 6.30 6.93 8.22 3.53
irp_mean 5.82 5.67 5.71 5.90 6.30 0.48 0.003***
irp_median 5.31 5.22 5.21 5.17 5.37 0.06 0.553
The table reports univariate tests on the difference in the IRP between BHCs with low and high values for each risk
indicator presented in Panel A of Table 3.1. At each quarter, we divide the sample into five portfolios according to each
risk variable. We then compute the mean and median IRP per portfolio and test the difference between the portfolios
in the highest (Q5) and lowest quintile (Q1) using Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a bandwidth of 3.
Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
3.4.1.2 Multivariate Regressions
In the next step, we estimate the joint relation between BHC risk and the IRP in a multivariate
regression framework as outlined in Equation (3.3). The regression results (including quarter-
fixed effects) are reported in Table 3.6. The first column shows results for the model specification
including the full vector of bank accounting risk variables. As suggested by Easton and Sommers
(2007), if earnings forecasts are consistently overestimated for a BHC but its price is adjusted
downwards accordingly by the market, then the IRP will be overestimated. Therefore, in the
second column we follow a similar approach as Hail and Leuz (2009) and include the mean
absolute error of forecasts (ERROR), which is calculated as the mean absolute forecast error
(EPS forecast minus actual EPS) divided by the mean EPS over the past 36 months (requiring
a minimum of 24 months). Gebhardt et al. (2001) recommend the inclusion of a long-term
growth variable which can be explained as such. If T = 15 is too short (long) for a detailed
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prediction horizon for growth (mature) BHCs, we might underestimate IRP for growth BHCs
and overestimate IRP for mature BHCs. If a BHC characteristic is correlated with growth,
this might lead to spurious results. Therefore, in the third column we also add the long-term
earnings growth rate (GROWTH) as a further control variable. Finally, in the fourth column,
we add BHC-fixed effects to control for any other unobserved heterogeneity.
The regression results generally confirm our findings from the univariate tests. Most coefficients
are highly significant and have the expected sign. First, a point of particular interest is whether
the cost of equity funding is lower for well-capitalized BHCs as suggested by the Modigliani-
Miller theorem (see Admati et al., 2013). Prior studies have produced ambiguous evidence
regarding this point. Tsatsaronis and Yang (2012) find that required returns are higher for
banks with higher leverage. For a different sample and time period, Baker and Wurgler
(2015) establish a low-risk anomaly in the banking industry and find that well-capitalized
banks earn the same or even higher realized returns than riskier banks. Using IRP as a
measure of expected returns, our results suggest that lower leverage indeed reduces the cost
of equity funding. Economically, the effect is rather moderate given a decrease in IRP in
the range of 10 to 14 basis points for a one percent increase in the ratio of book equity to
total assets (EQUITY), which is inversely proportional to leverage.51 IRP also decreases
with accumulated loan loss reserves (LLR) as a further indicator of capitalization strength.
Again, we also find a particularly pronounced effect for asset liquidity (LIQUIDITY), funding
stability through core deposits (CORE_DEP) and the cost of funding (DEP_COST). A
positive coefficient on the return of assets seems counter-intuitive at first, but is in line with
the idea that higher returns can ceteris paribus only be realized through a riskier business
model. As for the indicators of credit risk, the cost of equity increases with the share of loan
loss provisions (LLP) and past due loans (PAST_DUE), but decreases with net charge-offs
(CHARGEOFFS). These findings add to the prior literature on signaling effects of loan loss
provisions (e.g., Wahlen (1994); Liu et al. (1997); Ahmed et al. (1999); Kanagaretnam et al.
51 We find similar results for a risk weighted tier 1 or total capital ratio. However, these ratios are reported
in FR Y-9C reports only from 1996. To preserve sample size, we therefore concentrate on book equity.
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(2004)) and suggest that investors treat past due loans and loan loss provisions as bad news
about the credit quality of the loan portfolio, while high charge-offs are likely perceived as
an indicator of proactive portfolio reorganization. Finally, IRP decreases with the share of
the loan portfolio (LOANS) and increases with the share of equity investments (EQU_INV),
indicating that equity investors apply a lower risk discount to BHCs with a traditional business
model. However, our results on details of the loan portfolio composition (consumer loans
(CONS_LOANS) vs. commercial/industrial loans (COMM_LOANS)) are inconclusive. All in
all, our results provide strong evidence that common public risk indicators are reflected in the
risk discount applied by equity investors.
The univariate results from Section 3.4.1.1 suggest a nonlinear relationship between some of the
bank accounting risk indicators and IRP. Based on these results we additionally run quantile
regressions for the quantiles 10, 30, 50, 70 and 90. The results are presented in Appendix
A.2.3 in Table A7 and reveal that, with some variation in significance, most coefficients show
the same sign and a similar magnitude compared to the OLS regression. The tenor of our
main results therefore remains unchanged.
The forward-looking nature of IRP is a distinct theoretical advantage of its methodology
compared to historical measures of expected returns. We challenge this claim by re-estimating
the regression model of the last subsection with future accounting risk indicators as outlined
in Equation (3.4). We implicitly assume that investors have correct expectations about the
BHC’s future risk position. The informative value of these tests would be limited when risk
indicators are sticky over time, i.e., change very slowly from one observation to the next.
Therefore, in these regressions we use a subset of significantly time-variant, i.e., non-sticky,
accounting risk indicators. For each risk indicator used in Subsection 3.4.1.2, we calculate the
changes between two consecutive quarters and test the mean of the pooled series of changes
for being significantly different from zero. We then eliminate all risk indicators identified as
being sticky (having a p-value less than 10%) and regress the IRP on leads of 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10
and 12 quarters of the remaining indicators. We again include mean average absolute error of
forecasts (ERROR) and long-term growth (GROWTH). The results for the subsample of BHCs
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Table 3.6: Direct Market Discipline: Analysis of IRP Sensitivity to Public Risk Indicators
Expected IRP IRP IRP IRP
Sign
EQUITY - -0.136*** -0.109*** -0.128*** -0.103***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LLR - -0.235* -0.150 -0.167* -0.619***
0.085 0.294 0.053 0.000
ROA +/- 0.537** 0.509** 0.988*** 0.802***
0.018 0.024 0.000 0.000
ROA_VOL + -0.608 -1.157*** -1.111*** -0.758***
0.124 0.001 0.000 0.000
EFFICIENCY + 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.303 0.708
PAST_DUE + 0.236 0.252 0.359*** 0.201*
0.210 0.181 0.000 0.055
CHARGEOFFS +/- -1.940** -1.921** -1.402*** -1.662***
0.016 0.027 0.006 0.001
LLP + 1.769** 1.850** 1.212** 1.478***
0.017 0.019 0.020 0.003
LOANS - -0.003 -0.006 0.005 -0.021***
0.662 0.382 0.352 0.009
EQU_INV + 0.252 0.438* 0.831*** 0.759***
0.296 0.078 0.000 0.002
COMM_LOANS +/- -0.013** -0.014** -0.016*** 0.010
0.032 0.041 0.000 0.348
CONS_LOANS +/- -0.027*** -0.026*** 0.017*** 0.025**
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.020
LIQUIDITY - -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.020*** -0.031***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CORE_DEP - -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.021***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LARGE_DEP + 0.014* 0.017** -0.028*** -0.011
0.057 0.039 0.000 0.268
DEP_COST + 1.481*** 1.482*** 1.028*** 0.436
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.166
GAP + 0.015 0.032 0.013 0.050**
0.527 0.182 0.450 0.025
SIZE +/- 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000
0.005 0.006 0.000 0.471
UNEMPL + 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.030 0.048
0.000 0.000 0.203 0.176
ERROR 0.019 0.040** 0.010
0.433 0.026 0.574
GROWTH 29.954*** 31.104***
0.000 0.000
N 15791 13341 13341 13341
adj_R2 0.161 0.168 0.624 0.712
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates based on robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a bandwidth of 3. The base sample comprises 15,791 quarterly observations
from 674 BHCs over the time period from 1990 to 2012. The dependent variable is the IRP as presented in Section 3.2.
All other variable definitions are given in Table 3.1. We include quarter-fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report
the coefficients. In column four, we also include firm-fixed effects. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
with available data are reported in Table 3.7 and confirm our findings from the regression
with contemporary indicators. While the sign and significance of most coefficients remains,
their magnitude decreases in some cases over longer time periods. However the explanatory
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power of the the model does not decrease with longer time horizons. Overall these results are
supportive of the IRP as a forward-looking measure of bank risk.
Table 3.7: Direct Market Discipline: Analysis of ICC Sensitivity to Future Risk Indicators
1 2 4 6 8 10 12
EQUITY -0.054** -0.047** -0.036* -0.016 -0.006 -0.013 -0.017
0.012 0.042 0.062 0.384 0.742 0.435 0.282
ROA 0.319 0.081 0.036 -0.194 -0.250 -0.290* -0.181
0.382 0.832 0.890 0.310 0.121 0.065 0.120
ROA_VOL -0.634 -0.657 -0.578 -0.700 -0.645 -0.489 -0.416
0.278 0.302 0.354 0.147 0.108 0.131 0.117
EQU_INV 0.539** 0.571** 0.629*** 0.683*** 0.565*** 0.527*** 0.564***
0.036 0.028 0.009 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.004
COMM_LOANS -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020***
0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
CONS_LOANS 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.034***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LIQUIDITY -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CORE_DEP -0.006** -0.006** -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
0.028 0.031 0.122 0.235 0.226 0.318 0.428
SIZE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
UNEMPL 0.051 0.054 0.061 0.074* 0.068 0.071* 0.062
0.267 0.231 0.150 0.091 0.107 0.079 0.108
ERROR 0.244*** 0.243*** 0.244*** 0.240*** 0.239*** 0.235*** 0.230***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
GROWTH 26.882*** 26.878*** 26.930*** 26.978*** 27.019*** 27.049*** 27.074***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005 5005
adj_R2 0.495 0.494 0.493 0.494 0.495 0.495 0.494
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates based on robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a bandwidth of 3. The sample comprises 5,505 quarterly observations from
262 BHCs over the time period from 1990 to 2009. We employ leads of one to twelve quarters for the risk indicators
(see column headers). The dependent variable is the IRP as presented in Section 3.2. All other variable definitions are
given in Table 3.1. The risk indicators are a subset of non-sticky variables chosen from those used in Table 3.6. We
include quarter-fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
3.4.2 Indirect Market Discipline: Predicting Bank Distress Using the IRP
The results presented in Section 3.4.1 show that IRP reflects contemporaneous and forward-
looking information about BHC risk. Just like bond spreads, this makes the IRP itself a
potentially valuable source of information about the risk of future financial distress from the
perspective of indirect market discipline. In this section we gauge the usefulness of the IRP to
predict financial distress over different time horizons. We are now also interested in whether
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the IRP is the most efficient way to extract risk-related information from the stock market.
Therefore, we explicitly compare our results for the IRP with the following established market
based risk indicators: the distance-to-default measure (DD) as derived in Appendix A.2.1,
the market factor coefficient from Fama and French (1993b) regressions (FF_BETA) as a
historical measure of (firm-specific) systematic risk, the standard deviation of the residuals of
daily returns from Fama and French (1993b) regressions as a historical measure of idiosyncratic
(unsystematic) risk (FF_RES_VOL), and the standard deviation of daily returns as a general
risk indicator (RET_VOL).
As outlined in Section 3.3.2, we use S&P ratings to determine BHC rating downgrades and
upgrades as proxies for financial distress and recoveries. Firms that are severely downgraded
are eliminated from the sample until they recover back, since a downgrade is only noted
once, and afterwards we would otherwise misleadingly correlate indicators of high risk with
non-downgrades ( (and vice versa, see Auvray and Brossard, 2012). Accordingly, also BHCs
that already initially have a rating of BB+ or lower are eliminated from the analysis of distress
prediction and BHCs that initially have a rating of BBB- or higher are eliminated from the
recovery analysis. Information about the number of severe downgrades per year can be taken
from Panel B of Table 3.2.
3.4.2.1 Descriptive Results
For a first intuition on the informativeness of the IRP, we follow Vassalou and Xing (2004) and
use the accuracy ratio proposed by Moody’s to measure the ability of IRP to predict severe
rating downgrades. For every month in our sample, we rank all observations of rated BHCs
in order of decreasing riskiness as indicated by each of the market risk indicators. For every
percentile p ∈ 0, 1, 2, . . . , 99, 100 of a risk indicator, we calculate the percentage of BHCs that
are downgraded within the next 12 months out of the n monthly observations. We use the
average of these percentages over all months in the sample period to construct the (empirical)
cumulative accuracy profile (CAP) of the respective risk indicator, c(p), where c(0) = 0 and
c(100) = 1. The nearer the curve c(·) is to the upper left corner, generally the more accurate
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is the risk indicator.
The cumulative accuracy profile is benchmarked against a hypothetical perfect risk indicator
and a random risk indicator of distress risk. Let there be n observations and m severe
downgrades. The hypothetical perfect indicator maps all firms with future downgrades to
its lowest percentiles (ranked according to descending order of riskiness), i.e. this indicator
perfectly captures future downgrades and assigns more risk to distressed firms than to all other
firms. Its cumulative accuracy profile is then given by c(p) = p ∗ (n/m) for p < m/n, and
c(p) = 1 for p ≥ m/n. The random risk indicator does not contain any information regarding
the likelihood of future downgrades. In other words, the observations are ranked randomly.
If done repeatedly for different random sequences, the average c(p) for each p converges to
c(p) = p, i.e., a 45◦ line. The visual information from the CAPs can then be quantified by
computing the area between each CAP and the random 45◦ line in relation to the area between
the CAP of the hypothetical perfect indicator and the random line. This accuracy ratio (AR)
of risk indicator i is then equal to the area below its CAP (areai) minus a half divided by the
area below the CAP of the perfect indicator (areaperfect) minus a half.
ARi =
areai − 0.5
areaperfect − 0.5 (3.8)
The AR of the random indicator is zero, as it contains no information about the likelihood of
future distress, while the AR of the perfect indicator is one. In Figure 3.2 we plot the CAPs
of the IRP (blue), DD (red) and the standard deviation of the residuals of daily returns from
Fama and French (1993b) (green) regressions along with the random indicator (45◦ dashed
line) and perfect indicator (dotted line). Panel A reports CAPs in levels of IRP, DD52 and
FF_RES_VOL for rating downgrades from a rating equal BBB- or higher to a rating equal to
BB+ or lower as our proxy of financial distress. For illustrative purposes, in Panel B we also
52DD is ranked in ascending order, since a lower distance to default implies higher distress risk.
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report CAPs in levels of (reversely ranked) IRP, DD and FF_RES_VOL for rating upgrades
from a rating equal to BB+ or lower to a rating equal to BBB- or higher as a proxy for
recovery.
Figure 3.2: Indirect Market Discipline: Cumulative Accuracy Profiles
Panel A: Defaults / One Year Prediction Horizon
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The graphs plot the cumulative accuracy profiles (CAPs) for the prediction of severe downgrades/recoveries over a one
year prediction horizon. Details on the computation of the CAPs are presented in Section 3.4.2.1. We plot the graphs for
the implied risk premium (blue), the distance to default measure (red, see Appendix A.2.1) and the standard deviation
of daily return residuals from Fama and French (1993b) regressions (green, see Table 3.1). Panel A reports CAPs for the
prediction of downgrades for a sample of 156 BHCs. Panel B reports CAPs for the prediction of recoveries for a sample
of 35 BHCs. The dashed 45 ◦ line represents the CAP of a random risk indicator, while the dotted line represents a
hypothetical perfect risk indicator for purposes of comparison.
The CAP of DD clearly dominates that of the IRP in Panel A. Consequently, the AR of DD
is 0.435, while that of the IRP is only 0.057, i.e., only slightly better than a random risk
indicator. Both risk indicators are however outperformed by FF_RES_VOL with a AR of
0.493. Panel B reveals a higher CAP for the IRP (AR: 0.168) compared to DD (AR: 0.134),
while again FF_RES_VOL is the best standalone predictor of recoveries (AR: 0.282). As
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Figure 3.3: Indirect Market Discipline: Chronological Development of Risk Indicators
Panel A: Implied Risk Premium
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Panel C: Standard Deviation of Fama and French (1993b) Residuals
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In panel A, we plot the average monthly IRP for each of the sixty months up to the downgrade for the sample BHCs
that get downgraded (blue) and have at least 6 IRP observations before their downgrade. As a benchmark, we also plot
the average IRP for the sample of non-defaulting BHCs over the sixty months up to each point in time (dashed line).
In panel B, C and D, we repeat the analysis for the distance to default measure (see Appendix A.2.1), calculated as 2 -
DD for comparison reasons, the standard deviation of daily return residuals from Fama and French (1993b) regressions,
and raw stock prices, respectively. All values are scaled by their respective initial values at t = −60.
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such, while the IRP contains some risk relevant information, at first glance its usefulness as a
distress predictor appears limited.
As a further test of the ability of the IRP risk indicator to capture distress risk, in Figure
3.3 we compare the chronological development of the IRP of downgraded BHCs with that of
the remaining sample. In Panel A, we plot the average monthly IRP for each of the sixty
months up to the downgrade. As a benchmark, we also plot the average IRP for the sample
of non-distressed BHCs over the sixty months up to each point in time. Given the above
findings, as a comparison we also present the results for DD in Panel B and FF_RES_VOL
in Panel C.53 All values are scaled by their initial values at t = −60. We observe that the
IRP increases significantly before severe downgrades, while it stays relatively constant in the
benchmark observations. However in comparison, DD and FF_RES_VOL show a slightly
delayed, but much more pronounced increase. Another noteworthy observation is that the
IRP decreases again during the last year before the downgrade. To further investigate this
matter, we also document the chronological development of stock prices per se in Panel D.
It shows that, together with IRP, stock prices first also increase, but ultimately drop again
as a consequence of revised cash flow expectations. As the IRP is a measure of systematic
rather than idiosyncratic risk, this finding suggests that for firms close to distress idiosyncratic
determinants are more relevant than systematic factors (i.e., the underlying factors for the
revised cash flow expectations are perceived as firm-specific). This effect also likely accounts for
the relatively poor performance of the IRP as a standalone distress predictor as demonstrated
by its CAP.
3.4.2.2 Regression Analyses
In the next step we formalize our analysis and estimate the complimentary log-log distress
prediction model in Equation (3.5) for leads from one to twelve quarters. As we are interested
in the incremental informative value of the IRP, we simultaneously include both the full array
53 DD is multiplied by (−1) and shifted by 2 upwards to be increasing and comparable with the other two
risk indicators.
Marwan El Chamaa 80
Table 3.8: Indirect Market Discipline: Discrete Choice Regressions for Distress Prediction
Panel A: Excluding IRP
1 2 4 6 8 10 12
DD 0.766** 0.489*** 0.353*** 0.354*** 0.617** 1.097 1.115
0.049 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.344 0.328
RET_VOL 0.773 0.912 1.034 0.931 1.251 0.970 0.914
0.264 0.593 0.871 0.827 0.365 0.936 0.839
FF_BETA 1.589 0.244*** 0.776 2.296 0.479 1.186 1.387
0.385 0.007 0.731 0.315 0.390 0.839 0.708
FF_RES_VOL 1.751* 1.298 0.858 0.552 0.655 0.892 1.027
0.051 0.276 0.637 0.209 0.332 0.825 0.962
EQUITY 1.042 0.965 0.999 1.106 1.178* 1.235** 1.175
0.789 0.792 0.995 0.344 0.079 0.018 0.202
LLP 1.645 61.690*** 2.336 4.743 0.127 0.017 0.004
0.660 0.002 0.577 0.358 0.542 0.360 0.293
EFFICIENCY 1.000* 1.000 1.000 0.999* 1.000 1.000* 0.999
0.065 0.822 0.365 0.093 0.684 0.098 0.493
ROA 0.238** 5.208 0.357 0.121 1.926 0.124 0.298
0.012 0.156 0.241 0.102 0.751 0.177 0.527
LIQUIDITY 0.986 1.022 1.018 1.004 0.982 0.972 0.988
0.604 0.354 0.490 0.886 0.526 0.302 0.637
SIZE 0.975** 0.984 0.968* 0.966* 0.993 0.995 0.995
0.028 0.118 0.050 0.051 0.419 0.556 0.549
N 4585 4536 4392 4243 4102 3958 3811
pctevent 0.349 0.353 0.273 0.283 0.268 0.303 0.315
pseudo_R2 0.286 0.29 0.267 0.227 0.093 0.063 0.045
likelihood 153.06 152.10 121.96 127.91 138.31 153.02 155.04
wald 75.486** 59.724** 41.994** 25.344** 14.530 11.057 6.733
Panel B: Including IRP
1 2 4 6 8 10 12
DD 0.775* 0.528*** 0.387*** 0.390*** 0.633** 1.103 1.112
0.068 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.035 0.304 0.335
RET_VOL 0.770 0.963 1.030 0.963 1.275 0.962 0.893
0.261 0.836 0.889 0.906 0.331 0.921 0.804
FF_BETA 1.633 0.206*** 0.717 2.042 0.427 1.037 1.269
0.361 0.006 0.659 0.388 0.338 0.966 0.789
FF_RES_VOL 1.753* 1.165 0.773 0.535 0.617 0.901 1.026
0.052 0.557 0.444 0.173 0.278 0.844 0.965
IRP 1.019 1.113** 1.228*** 1.160 1.166** 1.139** 1.132*
0.722 0.016 0.000 0.114 0.023 0.046 0.066
EQUITY 1.042 0.970 1.001 1.103 1.167* 1.230** 1.186
0.790 0.822 0.990 0.318 0.085 0.018 0.177
LLP 1.603 70.971*** 4.328 4.078 0.144 0.015 0.004
0.680 0.003 0.390 0.405 0.562 0.340 0.288
EFFICIENCY 1.000* 1.000 1.000 0.999* 1.000 1.000 0.999
0.076 0.776 0.695 0.063 0.660 0.123 0.475
ROA 0.227** 4.670 0.223 0.114* 1.430 0.102 0.245
0.012 0.185 0.103 0.089 0.858 0.142 0.471
LIQUIDITY 0.987 1.024 1.030 1.008 0.987 0.974 0.991
0.641 0.309 0.281 0.760 0.642 0.340 0.734
SIZE 0.975** 0.985 0.966** 0.966* 0.992 0.994 0.994
0.028 0.129 0.049 0.051 0.345 0.496 0.493
N 4585 4536 4392 4243 4102 3958 3811
pctevent 0.349 0.353 0.273 0.283 0.268 0.303 0.315
pseudo_R2 0.287 0.31 0.321 0.24 0.113 0.078 0.057
likelihood 152.94 147.75 113.19 125.89 135.36 150.69 153.12
wald 75.940** 63.048** 53.790** 28.596** 18.900** 15.077 9.700
81 Chapter 3
Table 3.8: Indirect Market Discipline: Discrete Choice Regressions for Distress Prediction
(Continued)
The table reports the results of discrete choice regressions (using a complimentary log-log model) for the prediction of
defaults over leads from one to twelve quarters (see column headers). We estimate the regressions including all market
based risk indicators presented in panel C of table 3.1 and a set of CAMEL accounting indicators (for variable definitions
see panel A of table 3.1). We report results without (Panel A) and including the IRP (panel B). We include quarter-fixed
effects such that the regressions are equivalent to a discrete proportional hazard model. pctevent is the percentage of
BHC-quarters with an event of default. pseudo_R2 is the coefficient of determination from Nagelkerke (1991) which
measures the relative increase in likelihood of the model when the regressors are included and can take on values from
zero to one like the regular coefficient of determination. likelihood is computed as −2 logL as a measure of goodness of
fit of the model, where L is the likelihood function. wald is the χ2 statistic from testing the null that all coefficients of
the regressors are jointly zero. p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
of market based risk indicators and the following accounting risk indicators according to the
Federal Reserve’s CAMEL rating system: book equity to total assets (Capital Adequacy),
loan loss provisions to total assets (Asset Quality), the ratio of non-interest expenditures to
net income (Management Capability), return on assets (Earnings), liquid assets to total assets
(Liquidity).54 The estimation results are presented in Table 3.8. For purposes of comparison
we show our results both excluding IRP in Panel A and including IRP Panel B. We find that
while mostly only DD adds significantly to the reduced model, the IRP enters the model as
a highly significant risk indicator for prediction horizons from two to twelve quarters ahead
and improves the model’s explanatory power.55 As we present the results as hazard ratios
(exponential of the regression coefficients), a coefficient of 1.132 in the last column suggests
that an increase of one percent in the IRP reveals the likelihood of distress at the end of the
following three years to be 13.2% times higher. These findings suggest that the forward-looking
information on systematic risk contained in the IRP does indeed help to evaluate the risk
profile of a BHC, however again the informative value seems more present for longer prediction
54 We also run the regressions of Sections 3.4.2.2 and 3.4.2.3 with past due loans and net charge-offs instead
of loan loss provisions for Asset Quality. The results are similar and reported in Appendix A.2.3 in Tables A8,
A9, A10 and A11.
55The likelihood criterion is calculated as (−2) times the log likelihood function value of the model, i.e. a
decrease in likelihood is an increase in the explanatory power of the model.
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horizons.56
3.4.2.3 Duration Regressions
To accommodate the findings of the last subsection from a different point of view, we conclude
our analysis with a Cox proportional hazard duration model, as in Equation (3.6).57 While we
use the same covariates as in our prior analyses, here we use only the earliest observation per
BHC with rating data and all independent variables available, hence maximizing the possible
prediction horizon. In other words, we observe the explanatory variables once the BHCs enters
the sample, either for the first time or after a recovery, and measure the duration until they
are either downgraded or exit the sample. We present the results in Table 3.9 and estimate
the model with all market based risk indicators except IRP, only with IRP and finally with
the full array of market based risk indicators including the IRP, all including the CAMEL
accounting risk indicators from Subsection 3.4.2.2. The results in the first column show that,
as already suggested by Table 3.8, the predictive value of the DD measure diminishes in the
long run, and that none of the other historical risk indicators enter the model as relevant
distress predictors. On the other hand, the IRP as a standalone market-based predictor is
highly significant in explaining future downgrades (column two). A hazard ratio of 1.109
implies that an increase of one percent in IRP increases the likelihood of distress by 10.9% for
a BHC. This relation persists when the other market based indicators are added to the model
(column three), indicating that they capture different aspects of a BHC’s risk position. As in
the complimentary log-log model, our results point at the usefulness of stock market data to
evaluate BHC risk. The IRP reflects future systematic risk in a unique way that makes it an
advisable early warning indicator.
56 As a robustness check, in unreported results we also control for one quarter lagged ERROR and GROWTH
(as a remedy against multicollinearity with IRP) as proxies for forecast error and future earnings growth, which
both might vary over BHC-quarters and hence have a significant effect on computed ICCs. We find that analyst
forecast errors are a relevant distress predictor themselves, likely as they identify BHCs with an unstable
business model. Our main results however remain unchanged.
57 By varying the values of the regressors for each quarter, the complementary log-log regression model from
Section 3.4.2.2 would be the discrete counterpart of the proportional hazard model in this Section (see Jenkins,
1995).
83 Chapter 3
Table 3.9: Indirect Market Discipline: Duration Regressions for Distress Prediction
default default default
DD 0.911 0.894
0.525 0.491
RET_VOL 0.641 0.691
0.279 0.377
FF_BETA 0.978 0.649
0.962 0.417
FF_RES_VOL 2.007 1.785
0.165 0.266
IRP 1.109*** 1.136***
0.000 0.000
EQUITY 1.214 0.981 1.240*
0.114 0.856 0.070
LLP 22.866** 1.467 23.359*
0.041 0.774 0.059
EFFICIENCY 1.000 1.000*** 1.000
0.669 0.002 0.449
ROA 0.131 0.259** 0.058
0.287 0.049 0.175
LIQUIDITY 1.050** 1.034* 1.074***
0.021 0.091 0.002
SIZE 0.982 0.973 0.984
0.312 0.119 0.368
N 151 156 151
pctevent 12.583 14.744 12.583
likelihood 140.53 170.65 131.34
wald 22.581** 31.632** 29.598**
The table reports the results of hazard model regressions for the prediction of BHC defaults. We estimate the regressions
including IRP, all market based risk indicators presented in Panel C of Table 3.1 and a set of CAMEL accounting
indicators (for variable definitions see Panel A of Table 3.1). All covariates have the values at the beginning of the spell
(time of inclusion or of recovery after a default) until eventual default or censorship (exclusion from the sample or end
of the sample). pctevent is the percentage of BHCs with an event of default. likelihood is computed as −2 logL as a
measure of goodness of fit of the model, where L is the likelihood function. wald is the χ2 statistic from testing the
null that all coefficients of the above regressors are jointly zero. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
3.4.3 Robustness Checks
We perform several (unreported) sensitivity tests to gauge the robustness of our findings.
Throughout the paper, we choose to use the IRP model by Pástor et al. (2008) as one of the
most sophisticated models proposed in the literature. Nevertheless, we replicate our analysis
using IRP estimates from two alternative established models. First, we compute IRPs based
on the ICC model proposed by Gebhardt et al. (2001), a variant of the residual income model
(RIM), and second we also compute IRPs using the ICC model from Easton (2004), which is
based on a rather simple abnormal earnings growth (AEG) model. Just as the discounted
earnings model employed by Pástor et al. (2008), the RIM and the AEG models are both
variations of the net present value model. In both cases we obtain results very similar to the
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ones presented in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.58
We further address a technical issue within the Pástor et al. (2008) model concerning the time
horizon employed before the period of the terminal value begins (T from Subsection 3.2). We
re-estimate the model with time horizons of 10 years and 20 years, respectively, and rerun our
main regressions. Again, we obtain very similar results.
An interesting question would be whether stock investors’ reaction to bank risk varies over
time. We therefore rerun our analyses for alternative sub-periods (e.g., before and after the
2007/2008 financial crisis) but find no evidence for a differential sensitivity across time-periods.
Our overall results hold rather constantly over the entire period under observation or weaken
when the sample size and hence the power of our test decreases (in particular for the tests on
indirect market discipline) .
Finally, we also investigate whether our results are influenced by stock market characteristics.
It seems plausible that stock prices should be more informative for stocks that are actively
traded compared to less liquid stocks or for stocks with larger market capitalization and hence
higher visibility. We therefore split our sample firms according to their relative share turnover
and market value and rerun our analyses separately. We find tentative evidence that direct
stock market discipline is indeed more pronounced for larger and more liquid firms, however
our results for indirect market discipline are again generally weaker due to a lack of variation,
and hence statistical power, in the subsamples.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper examines whether the risk position of financial institutions is reflected in the risk
discount equity investors apply to their expected cash flows. Using the implied cost of capital
methodology offers a convenient way to directly estimate the risk discount and to disentangle
it from possibly positive cash flow effects from higher risk taking. Employing a large sample
58 The model from Gebhardt et al. (2001) requires the availability of more variables than the other two
models and hence results in more missing values. This decrease in power reduces the significance of our results.
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of U.S. bank holding companies from 1990 to 2012, we find that the implied risk premium
varies significantly with publicly available risk information. We are the first to provide such
evidence for direct bank market discipline via higher funding costs in the stock market.
We then go on to evaluate the forward-looking informativeness of the implied risk premium
with respect to bank financial distress. We find that, in particular in the long run, the implied
risk premium adds significantly to models of distress prediction. However, in the short run
other market based indicators like the distance to default, which explicitly reflects BHC
capitalization, or a measure of idiosyncratic risk like the standard deviation of daily return
residuals from Fama and French (1993b) regressions dominate the implied risk premium and
also still complement it for longer prediction horizons. All in all, our findings suggest that
BHCs’ distress risk is neither fully systematic nor idiosyncratic. While the implied cost of
capital as a forward-oriented measure of systematic risk captures some risk information, it
should be used as a complement to rather than as a substitute for other established risk
indicators.
Using the ICC entails some inevitable biases. E.g., steady-state growth rates might differ from
the economy-wide growth rate for some firms, and analyst earnings forecasts might not be
representative of the market’s expectations in particular during times of financial turmoil.59
It is also important to note that both our study and the applicability of the ICC measure are
limited by the input variables required for the calculation of the implied cost of (equity) capital.
As we depend on the availability of analyst forecasts (and, in the second part of the paper,
rating information), our sample is per se limited to larger and more relevant institutions, which
are plausibly more stable and consequentially get into financial difficulties less frequently. As
this mechanism however in fact works against our argument, we do not believe it limits the
generalizability of our results.
Finally, though we address the issue of share liquidity and size in our robustness checks, we do
not explicitly investigate how firm-level characteristics affect the strength of market discipline
59Also, we do not account for the information contained in possible equity risk ratings (see Lui et al., 2007,
2012).
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for individual BHCs. For example, as shown by Auvray and Brossard (2012), ownership
concentration and investor characteristics are likely to influence the risk sensitivity of stock
prices. Also, we assume that our accounting indicators are risk relevant a priori, while the
market reaction might incorporate the effect of reporting discretion on the informativeness of
such indicators (see Beaver et al., 2012). We leave questions like these to future research.
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4 An Iterative Approach to Simultaneously Estimate Implied
Cost of Capital, Earnings and Dividends
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I combine and extend the models from Easton (2004) and Nekrasov and Ogneva
(2011) into a new approach to estimate the implied cost of capital (ICC) while endogenously
estimating the remaining input variables of the valuation model: expected future earnings,
earnings growth and expected future dividends. This approach is of an iterative nature and
aims at a methodological equilibrium between the components of the accounting valuation
model. The equilibrium is defined through an interplay between two variants of the valuation
model, as I explain in 4.3.
Research has pushed earnings based valuation models over the last twenty years, most probably
because earnings, compared to cash flows, give a better and broader picture about the present
and future activities including value creation and growth. The residual income model (RIM),
the abnormal earnings growth (AEG) model and other derivatives have been used primarily
to estimate the ICC while assuming some values for the remaining input variables of the
models (e.g., Claus and Thomas (2001); Gebhardt et al. (2001); Easton (2004); Ohlson and
Juettner-Nauroth (2005); Pástor et al. (2008)). Other papers built RIM and AEG models
into a regression framework in order to estimate ICC and earnings growth simultaneously as
means of a group of firms (see e.g., Easton et al., 2002; Easton, 2004) or firm-specific values
(Nekrasov and Ogneva, 2011).
All previous research, up to my knowledge, assume a constant dividend payout ratio or a
deterministic function for it and rely on analyst consensus earnings forecasts (e.g., from
I/B/E/S) in order to proxy for expected future earnings and dividend payout ratio respectively.
Aside from the unrealistic assumption of a constant dividend payout ratio for future years,
analyst earning forecasts have been shown to be biased differently among firms with different
characteristics, leading to false estimates of ICC as shown in Easton and Sommers (2007).
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Hence, it is important that ICC estimates are in balance (equilibrium) with estimates of
earning forecasts and other input variables, such that possible biases in proxies, used as
starting values, are reduced to a minimum.
The first contribution of my approach is to estimate ICC, being in a steady state with all
other input variables (while estimating the change in earnings growth, similar to Nekrasov
and Ogneva (2011)). All the other approaches, including the one by Nekrasov and Ogneva
(2011), have concentrated only on estimating or determining a subset of the input variables:
ICC (and earnings growth).
The second contribution of my approach is that it allows simultaneous estimation of expected
future earnings and expected future dividends if estimates of ICC and earnings growth were
given. Up to my knowledge, in the literature so far expected future earnings and expected
future dividends are estimated in the literature using different models, i.e. they are not linked
together through an accounting based valuation model. In that way my approach extends the
literature on earnings and dividends estimation.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes my approach,
divided into two direction, the first to estimate ICC and change in earnings growth and the
second to estimate earnings forecasts and the dividends forecast. Section 4.3 defines the
methodological equilibrium which combines both directions of the approach. Section 4.4
concludes.
4.2 The Approach
In this section I describe and derive the valuation approach which constitutes several steps (and
iterations). The output of this approach will be estimates of ICC, expected future earnings,
earnings growth and expected future dividends.
In the center of my approach is the AEG model from Easton (2004) which will produce mean
results for a group of similar firms. To estimate firm-specific values around the group means, I
use the algorithm based on Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011). The approach is divided into two
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directions. The first direction uses starting values of expected future earnings and expected
future dividends to estimate ICC and earnings growth while the second direction uses starting
values for ICC and earnings growth to estimate expected future earnings and expected future
dividends.
4.2.1 First Direction
Starting with the AEG model from Easton (2004) I get the following pricing formula:
pt =
epst+1
r
+ agrt+1
r(r − g) (4.1)
where agrt+1 = (epst+2 + rdpst+1) − ((1 + r)epst+1) = ∆epst+2 − r(epst+1 − dpst+1), i.e.
expected cum-dividend earnings less normal earnings. pt is the market stock price at time t,
epst+x are the earnings per share at time t + x (for x = 1, 2), dpst+1 are the dividends per
share at time t+ 1, r is the cost of equity and g is the rate of change in abnormal growth in
earnings, henceforth referred to as change in earnings. Rearranging Equation (4.1) Easton
(2004) derives the following relation:
epst+2 + rdpst+1
pt
= γ0 + γ1
epst+1
pt
(4.2)
with γ0 = r(r − g) and γ1 = 1 + g. Simultaneously solving for r and g requires at least two
equations. There is however only one observation per firm at one point in time. Following
Easton (2004) I build portfolios of firms, resulting in an overidentified system of equations,
which assumes model (4.2) for all firms i in the portfolio.
epsi,t+2 + ridpsi,t+1
pi,t
= γi,0 + γi,1
epsi,t+1
pi,t
The above identity will only hold with some error when applied to the data, divided into
portfolios of firms. Hence I do not solve for r and g deterministically, but through the following
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regression model:
epsi,t+2 + ridpsi,t+1
pi,t
= γ0 + γ1
epsi,t+1
pi,t
+ i,t (4.3)
where i stands for a specific firm in the portfolio. Regression model (4.3) is hence run for each
portfolio and year (more generally, for each cross-sectional unit and time unit). Note that the
dependent variable is a function of ri, which we want to estimate. This issue is tended to by
setting a starting value for ri as explained at the end of this subsection. The derivation of
Model (4.3) from Model (4.2) leads to the following three related econometric statements, all
of which are to be found in or based on Easton (2004).60
1. Regression Model (4.3) is a random coefficients model, since it derives from Model (4.2)
without an error term, which makes the error term in (4.3) come from the randomness
of γi,0 = γ0 + ui,0 and γi,1 = γ1 + ui,1.
2. Looking carefully at the error term i,t Easton (2004) makes it clear that heteroscedasticity
is at play.
i,t = ui,0 + ui,1
epsi,t+1
pi,t
Hence the heteroscedasticity comes from the varying term epsi,t+1
pi,t
for each i and t even
though ui,0 and ui,1 could be assumed to have together a constant variance.
3. E[γi,0] = γ0 = r(r− g) and E[γi,1] = γ1 = 1 + g, meaning that the estimates of γ0 and γ1
are the means of the firm-specific coefficients γi,0 and γi,1 respectively. This implies that
γˆ0 = r(r − g) and γˆ1 = 1 + g = 1 + g¯.61
γˆ0 can not be linearly separated into individual means of r and g as was done with γˆ1. I
60The aim of the regression Model (4.3) is not to study the economic effect of the regressor(s) on the
dependent variable. It is merely a technical method to estimate r and g for all the firms in a portfolio.
61E[X] is the expected value of the random variable X and x¯ is the sample mean of the realizations of X.
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therefore apply a Taylor expansion of γ0 at some point or starting values (r0, g0) to linearize
it:
γ0 ≈ a+ br + cg
where a := −r0(r0 + g0), b := −(2r0 − g0) and c := r0. For simplicity of notation I regard this
approximation as an equality from here on, which will hold only in expectation due to the
firm-specific nature of γ0, r, and g respectively. Combining the results from statements 2 and
3, I rewrite i,t as a linear combination of the deviation of firm-specific cost of equity ri from
its mean and the deviation of firm-specific change in earnings growth gi from its mean.
i,t = ui,0 + ui,1
epsi,t+1
pi,t
= (γi,0 − γ0)− (γi,1 − γ1)epsi,t+1
pi,t
= ((a− a) + b(ri − E[r]) + c(gi − E[g]))− ((1− 1) + (gi − E[g]))epsi,t+1
pi,t
= bri,t + 
g
i,t
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)
(4.4)
where ri,t := ri − E[r] and gi,t := gi − E[g].
Here is where I build a bridge to the algorithm by Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011), who note
that just using the estimates γˆ0 and γˆ1, leaves the firm-specific cost of capital ri and change
in earnings growth in earnings gi unidentified. They model these firm-specific figures as
associated with certain firm characteristics and firm unobservable risk.62
62Note that I differentiate between the expected values and means of r and g, depending on if I am looking
at the random variable or its estimate.
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ri = E[r] + λrXri,t + ri,t (4.5)
gi = E[g] + λgXgi,t + 
g
i,t (4.6)
where Xri,t and X
g
i,t are observable drivers for r and g respectively. To estimate Equations
(4.5) and (4.6) simultaneously Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011) set up an optimization problem,
which translates into the following in my setting:

min
λˆr,λˆg ,ri,t,
g
i,t
∑
i
wir(ri,t)2 + wig(
g
i,t)2
s.t. ri = r¯ + λˆrXri,t + ri,t
gi = g¯ + λˆgXgi,t + 
g
i,t
(P)
where λˆr and λˆg are possible realizations for the coefficient vectors λr and λg respectively.
Inserting Equations (4.5) and (4.6) into Equation (4.4) and the latter into the regression
Model (4.3), analogously to Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011), I get the first weighted least squares
(WLS) regression model, with the derivation to be found in Appendix A.3.1.
epsi,t+2 + ridpsi,t+1
pi,t
= γ0 + γ1
epsi,t+1
pi,t
+ b(λrXri,t + ri,t) +
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)
(λgXgi,t + 
g
i,t)
= γ0 + γ1
epsi,t+1
pi,t
+ bλrXri,t +
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)
λgX
g
i,t + νi,t (WLS(1))
where νi,t = bri,t +
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)
gi,t.63 and its weights wi are64
63Although νi,t = i,t, the left-hand side stems from the model with firm specific characteristics, while the
right-hand side stems from the model before introducing these characteristics.
64Note that wir and wig are weights which are fixed before estimating the WLS model.
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wi =
wirw
i
g
wigb
2 + wir
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)2 (4.7)
Before estimating the Model (WLS(1)) I tackle two issues regarding the exogeneity of the
regressor epsi,t+1
pi,t
. The first issue is induced by this regressor being a part of the error term
νi,t. However, conditional on the assumption that epsi,t+1 and pi,t are exogenous regarding the
cost of equity and growth error terms, ri,t and 
g
i,t respectively, exogeneity with respect to νi,t
is achieved as well, i.e. E[νi,t|epsi,t+1, pi,t] = 0. The second issue stems from including a lagged
variable into the model, epsi,t+1, which makes it endogenous. Since however E[νi,t|epsi,t−s] = 0
for s ≥ 0 the regressor epsi,t+1 is predetermined and hence allows for consistent estimation of
the model (see Greene, 2011).
In order to estimate Model (WLS(1)) I set a starting value for ri, similar to value chosen in
Easton (2004). I use the estimated coefficients and related residuals from the Model (WLS(1)),
(γˆ0, γˆ1, λˆr, λˆg, νˆi,t), and the following identities to identify firm-specific cost of equity ri and
firm-specific change in earnings growth gi.
1. I insert γˆ0 and γˆ1 into the following identities to determine estimates of r¯ and g¯:
γˆ0 = a+ br¯ + cg¯ ⇒ r¯ = γ0 − a− cg¯
b
γˆ1 = 1 + g¯ ⇒ g¯ = γ1 − 1
2. I insert the estimates of the residuals from the Model (WLS(1)), νˆi,t, to get estimates
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for the error terms in Equations (4.5) and (4.6):
ri,t =
wigbνi,t
wir
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)2
+ wigb2
gi,t =
wir
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)
νi,t
wir
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)2
+ wigb2
3. I then use r¯ and g¯, the estimates of the residuals ri,t and 
g
i,t and the estimates λˆr and
λˆg to get estimates for ri and gi:
ri = r¯ + λˆrXri,t + ri,t
gi = g¯ + λˆgXgi,t + 
g
i,t
Based on Easton (2004) I insert ri into (WLS(1)) and reestimate the model followed by steps
one to three until the change in ri from one iteration to the next is below a given threshold.
Getting simultaneous estimates of firm-specific ri and gi concludes the first direction of my
approach. Although Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011) introduce an approach which ends up with
estimates of ri and gi, I choose a model which allows for the estimation of the other parameters
of the model as well, earnings forecasts and dividends forecasts. This would not be possible
with the model used by Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011) since one of their variables is a sum of
future earnings forecasts and dividends forecasts which makes single earnings forecasts and
the dividends forecast unidentifiable. The following subsection shows how using my approach
based on the valuation model from Easton (2004) identifies earnings forecasts as well as the
dividends forecast.
4.2.2 Second Direction
I rearrange the AEG Model (4.1) differently than done in Equation (4.2) to arrive at the
following:
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rt(rt − gt)pt = β0 + β1(−(1 + gt))β2rt (4.8)
where β0 = epst+2, β1 = epst+1 and β2 = dpst+1. I do not drop the time index from epst+2,
epst+1 and dpst+1, since they resemble the number of leads of these variables. Again I follow
Easton (2004) and build portfolios of firms to get a system of equations.
ri,t(ri,t − gi,t)pi,t = βi,0 + βi,1(−(1 + gi,t))βi,2ri,t
Note that here the cost of equity ri,t and the rate of change in abnormal growth gi,t are
period- and firm-specific since the models assumes that they are known, just like price pi,t.
Since however the model can only hold for all firms i in a portfolio with some error, I run it
analogously to Model (4.3) as a linear regression.65
ri,t(ri,t − gi,t)pi,t = β0 + β1(−(1 + gi,t))β2ri,t + ηi,t (4.9)
As in the first direction model from 4.2.1, note that regression Model (4.9) is a random
coefficients model, the error term ηi,t is heteroscedastic and by estimating β0, β1 and β2 I
would be estimating the means of epst+2, epst+1 and dpst+1 respectively. Analogously to the
decomposition of i,t in (4.4), I decompose ηi,t into a linear combination of error terms coming
from βi,0, βi,1 and βi,2 being random coefficients.
βi,0 = β0 + ni,0 ⇒ ni,0 = βi,0 − β0 = βi,0 − E[βi,0] and βˆ0 = epst+2
βi,1 = β1 + ni,1 ⇒ ni,1 = βi,1 − β1 = βi,1 − E[βi,1] and βˆ1 = epst+1
βi,2 = β2 + ni,2 ⇒ ni,2 = βi,2 − β2 = βi,2 − E[βi,2] and βˆ2 = dpst+1
65Also regression Model (4.9) aims at estimating epst+1, epst+2 and dpst+1 and not interpreting the
coefficients of the model economically.
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ηi,t = ni,0 + ni,1(−(1 + gi,t)) + ni,2ri,t
= (βi,0 − β0) + (βi,1 − β1)(−(1 + gi,t)) + (βi,2 − β2)ri,t
= (epsi,t+2 − E[epst+2]) + (epsi,t+1 − E[epst+1])(−(1 + gi,t)) + (dpsi,t+1 − E[dpst+1])ri,t
= ηe2i,t + (−(1 + gi,t))ηe1i,t + ri,tηdi,t (4.10)
where ηe2i,t := epsi,t+2 − E[epst+2], ηe1i,t := epsi,t+1 − E[epst+1] and ηdi,t := dpsi,t+1 − E[dpst+1].
If I would proceed as in the first direction and minimize the sum of squared error terms
ηe2i,t, ηe1i,t and ηdi,t respectively, I could not derive a WLS model, since there are three error
terms summed into its overall error term, as seen in result (4.10). Hence I have a problem
of identification of all error terms here, since only two error terms can be identified using
the procedure of the first direction. I solve this problem by assuming that the error terms
resulting from the random coefficients βi,0 and βi,1 have the same expected value. This is a
sound assumption since both random coefficients represent earnings at time periods t+ 1 and
t+ 2 respectively. The deviation of epsi,t+1 from its mean could be assumed equal in expected
value to the deviation of epsi,t+2 from its mean. This gives the following result:
ηi,t = −gi,tηei,t + ri,tηdi,t (4.11)
where ηei,t := ηe1i,t = ηe2i,t.
Analogous to the idea by Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011) and Equations (4.5) and (4.6), I model
the firm-specific earnings forecasts and dividends forecasts as follows:
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epsi,t+1 = E[epst+1] + λeXei,t + ηei,t (4.12)
epsi,t+2 = E[epst+2] + λeXei,t + ηei,t (4.13)
dpsi,t+1 = E[dpst+1] + λdXdi,t + ηdi,t (4.14)
where Xei,t and Xdi,t are observable drivers for epst+1, epst+2 and dpst+1 respectively. Since I
assume the error terms in Equations (4.12) and (4.13) to be identical, I also assume the set
of firm characteristics Xei,t to be identical for both epst+1 and epst+2. Again, this is a sound
assumption, since there is not any reason to suspect significantly different behavior of earnings
in two consecutive periods in expectation.
To estimate the above Equations (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14) simultaneously I set up the following
optimization problem:

min
λˆe,λˆd,η
e
i,t,η
d
i,t
∑
i
wie(ηei,t)2 + wid(ηdi,t)2
s.t. epsi,t+1 = epst+1 + λeXei,t + ηei,t
epsi,t+2 = epst+2 + λeXei,t + ηei,t
dpsi,t+1 = dpst+1 + λdXdi,t + ηdi,t
(Q)
where λˆe and λˆd are possible realizations for the coefficient vectors λe and λd respectively.
Inserting Equations (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14) into Equation (4.11) and the latter into the
regression Model (4.9), analogously to Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011) and Model (WLS(1)), I
get the second WLS regression model, with the derivation to be found in Appendix A.3.2.
ri,t(ri,t − gi,t)pi,t = β0 + β1(−(1 + gi,t)) + β2ri,t + (−gi,t)λeXei,t + ri,tλdXdi,t + ψi,t (WLS(2))
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where ψi,t = −gi,tηei,t + ri,tηdi,t.66 and its weights zi are
zi = w
i
ew
i
d
wier
2
i,t + widg2i,t
(4.15)
As discussed above regarding the exogeneity of all regressors in the Model (WLS(1)), I
emphasize here that by assuming E[ηei,t|gi,t] = 0 and E[ηdi,t|ri,t] = 0 the regressors (−(1 + gi,t))
and ri,t become exogenous with respect to ψi,t, E[ψi,t|gi,t, ri,t] = 0.
After estimating the above Model (WLS(2)), I use the estimates of the coefficients and the
residuals (βˆ0, βˆ1, βˆ2, λˆe, λˆd, ψˆi,t), and the following identities to identify firm-specific earnings
forecasts epst+1 and epst+2 and firm-specific dividends forecasts dpst+1.67
1. I insert βˆ0, βˆ1 and βˆ2 into the following identities to determine epst+1, epst+2 and dpst+1:
βˆ0 = epst+2
βˆ1 = epst+1
βˆ2 = dpst+1
2. I insert the estimates of the residuals from the Model (WLS(2)), ψˆi,t, to get estimates
for the error terms in Equations (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14):
ηei,t = −
widgi,tψi,t
wier
2
i,t + widg2i,t
ηdi,t =
wieri,tψi,t
wier
2
i,t + widg2i,t
3. I then use epst+1, epst+2 and dpst+1, the estimates of the residuals ηei,t and ηdi,t and the
66Again, although ψi,t = ηi,t, the left-hand side stems from the model with firm specific characteristics,
while the right-hand side stems from the model before introducing these characteristics.
67Note that none of the variables of interest here are part of the dependent variable, i.e. one iteration gives
the desired estimates.
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estimates λˆe and λˆd to get estimates for epsi,t+1, epsi,t+2 and dpsi,t+1:
epsi,t+1 = epst+1 + λeXei,t + ηei,t
epsi,t+2 = epst+2 + λeXei,t + ηei,t
dpsi,t+1 = dpst+1 + λdXdi,t + ηdi,t
The estimates of epsi,t+1, epsi,t+2 and dpsi,t+1 conclude the second step of my approach.
Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011) use in their analogous model to (WLS(1)) as the dependent
variable a sum of future earnings and dividends. If I would use the same model and rearrange
it as I did in Model (4.8), this variable would have become part of the parameters to estimate
β. I would then have estimated one value for a sum of variables which can not be separated
anymore, i.e. epsi,t+1, epsi,t+2 and dpsi,t+1 would have been unidentifiable.
4.3 The Estimation Equilibrium
The first and second directions of the approach in Section 4.2 can be used separately to
estimate ICC and the change in earnings growth or earnings forecasts and the dividends
forecast. However, since the starting models of both directions originate from the same AEG
model by Easton (2004), they can be iterated alternately, starting by the direction for which
starting values are available. I iterate then until the implied cost of capital, the estimate of the
change in earnings growth, estimates of future earnings and the estimate of future dividends
converge to stable values. The combined approach aims at an equilibrium in the components
of the original AEG valuation model. This equilibrium is in the sense of the convergence of
said components to stable values, denoted as an equilibrium in valuation components.
Definition 1 (Methodological Equilibrium in Valuation Components). Assume a valuation
model M , with a set of known arguments K and a set of unknown arguments U to be estimated.
Let M1, M2, . . . ,Mn be a set of valuation models equivalent to M , such that Mi can estimate
only a subset of U , Ui, where Ui ∩ Uj = ∅, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i 6= j. Let Uˆi,t denote the
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estimates of all arguments in Ui derived in iteration step t, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. An equilibrium in
the valuation components of M is given if and only if, ∀t ≥ t0,∃ > 0 such that
|| θˆt − θˆt−1
θˆt−1
|| < ,∀θˆt ∈ Uˆi,t, θˆt−1 ∈ Uˆi,t−1, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
where || · || is a norm.
The iterations t ∈ {1, . . . , T} are not to confuse with the iterations done at the level of the
WLS model in the first direction. This definition of a methodological equilibrium generalizes
to all models which can be separated or rearranged into different equivalent versions such that
all unknown input variables or parameters become identified.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I introduce a new approach to simultaneously estimate the implied cost of
capital with the other input variables of the valuation model from Easton (2004). I combine
this valuation model into an estimation approach similar to the approach from Nekrasov and
Ogneva (2011).
The first contribution of my approach is to estimate the implied cost of capital, being in a
steady state with all other input variables (while estimating the change in earnings growth).
The second contribution of my approach is that it allows simultaneous estimation of expected
future earnings and expected future dividends if estimates of ICC and earnings growth were
given.
The estimation approach has one main limitation. It strongly depends on the structure of
the underlying valuation model. Not every valuation model allows writing it in two different
ways (directions), as shown in Section 4.2, such that all variables are identified. I leave the
empirical testing of my approach and the transfer of my approach to other suitable valuation
models for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Chapter 2
A.1.1 ACSI Data and COMPUSTAT
Similar to the cleaning procedure suggested in Ittner et al. (2009), a corresponding GVKEY
from COMPUSTAT based on the name of each ACSI entity was manually matched. This
ACSI - GVKEY match was manually classified into one of the following mutually exclusive
categories (0-6 are taken from Ittner et al. (2009)). We report the details with one example
per coding in Table A1.
Table A1: Matching between ACSI Data and COMPUSTAT
Coding Examples Label / Description Handling
0 IBM; Twitter.com No record on COMPUSTAT over
the period from 1994-2012
ACSI data is not used (dropped)
1 Cadbury Schweppes; FedEx Cor-
poration
Clean match ACSI data is used for entity-years
covered by COMPUSTAT
2 H. J. Heinz Company (Food Man-
ufacturing and Pet Food)
Multiple divisions (ACSI enti-
ties) are assigned to a parent’s
GVKEY, and the parent is not
covered by ACSI over the period
1994-2012
ACSI is averaged across divisions
and the average is used for entity-
years covered by COMPUSTAT
for the parent firm (see coding 8)
3 Apple (Cellular Phones); Lexus
(Toyota)
A single division is assigned to
the parent’s GVKEY, and the
parent is covered by ACSI over
the period 1994-2011
ACSI data of the single division
is not used (dropped)
4 T-Mobile USA, Inc. (Deutsche
Telekom AG)
A single division is assigned to
the parent’s GVKEY, and the
parent is not covered by ACSI
over the period 1994-2011
ACSI data is used for entity-years
of the parent firm covered by
COMPUSTAT
5 Gateway, Inc. acquired by ACER
in 2007
Merger with overlapping ACSI
observations
The overlapping entity-years for
the surviving entity are retained
6 Texaco Inc., acquired by Chevron
in 2001
Merger with non-overlapping
ACSI score data
ACSI data is used for entity-years
covered by COMPUSTAT
7 Target Corporation (Department
Stores; Discount Stores)
Multiple divisions (ACSI enti-
ties) are assigned to a parent’s
GVKEY, and the parent is cov-
ered by ACSI over the period
ACSI data of the multiple divi-
sions are not used (dropped)
8 H. J. Heinz Company Created average firm out of coded
entities coded by 2
ACSI data is used for entity-years
covered by COMPUSTAT
The table provides details and examples on merging ACSI data with COMPUSTAT gvkeys.
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A.1.2 The Cost of Equity from an Asset Pricing Perspective
In what follows we start by deriving the cost of capital from asset pricing and go on to lay
down the valuation model we use to compute ICC. Following Cochrane (2005), the basic
pricing formula can be expressed as
pt = Et(mt+1xt+1),
where t in the index stands for the time at which the variable realizes its value except for t
in Et(·), which stands for conditioning the expected value on the information up to time t.
pt is the asset price, mt is the discount factor and xt is the asset payoff. Using covariance
decomposition68 in the above equation we arrive at the following pricing formula.
pt = Et(mt+1)Et(xt+1) + covt(mt+1, xt+1), (A.1)
where covt(·, ·) is the covariance conditioned on information available at time t. In case the
covariance is zero, i.e. that the discount factor and asset payoff are uncorrelated, we then have
a risk-free case, making 1 unit of an asset at time t payoff 1 + rf units of the same asset at
time t+ 1, where rf is the risk-free rate. Plugging these values into Equation (A.1) we get
1 = Et(mt+1)(1 + rf )⇔ Et(mt+1) = 1/(1 + rf )
68 cov(a, b) = E(ab)− E(a)E(b).
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Going back to Equation (A.1) we see that we correct for risk through the covariance term,
which we call systematic risk. Idiosyncratic or unsystematic risk on the other hand is the part
of this covariance which drops out for being zero and hence is uncorrelated with the discount
factor69. The first term is the risk-free value of the asset.
pt =
1
1 + rf
Et(xt+1) + covt(mt+1, xt+1) =
1
re
Et(xt+1) (A.2)
As we demonstrate in the second equation of (A.2) we are interested in a risk correction
directly made in the discount factor re, which we define in what comes as the cost of equity.
We basically transfer the risk from the covariance in the nominator to the cost of equity in the
denominator. Summing up, the asset price is the future payoff divided by one plus the cost of
equity containing the systematic risk the asset holder has to bear for a high expected return
(or the other way around, a discount factor resembling the expected return the asset holder
can expect for bearing that much systematic risk). Hence cost of capital can be regarded as a
discount rate, expected return or systematic risk interchangeably.70
69 Cochrane (2005) defines idiosnycratic risk as uncorrelated with the discount factor.
70 Cochrane (2005) shows that if the discount factor can be written as m = a+ b′f , then the expected return
can be written as E(Ri) = α+ λ′βi where b′f and λ′βi are vector multiplications constituting the systematic
risk equivalently. This should give an even clearer image of why it is called systematic risk, if one compares the
second representation to the CAPM or other factor models.
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A.1.3 Further Tables
Table A2: Analysis of ICC Sensitivity to ACSI (Random Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACSI -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.062***
0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004
SIZE 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
LEV 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
0.660 0.632 0.595 0.588
BTM -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016**
0.020 0.017 0.018 0.016
ROA 4.737*** 4.649*** 4.533*** 4.514***
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
RD -17.01*** -16.77*** -15.48*** -15.52***
0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
ERROR -0.154* -0.155* -0.155** -0.156**
0.055 0.056 0.048 0.050
GROWTH 18.077*** 18.148*** 18.227*** 18.250***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FF_BETA -0.198 -0.102
0.447 0.717
FF_RES_VOL -0.069 -0.062
0.288 0.379
KAZI -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.002**
0.063 0.063 0.043 0.045
N 1738 1738 1738 1738
adj_R2 0.245 0.245 0.245 0.245
The table reports the same results as in table 2.5 but with year-fixed and firm-random effects. Two-tailed p-values in
italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A3: Analysis of ICC (Gebhardt et al., 2001) Sensitivity to ACSI
Panel A: Year-Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACSI 0.020 0.029 0.036 0.037
0.534 0.363 0.243 0.235
SIZE 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LEV -0.177*** -0.181*** -0.183*** -0.183***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
BTM 0.421*** 0.427*** 0.425*** 0.425***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA -17.81*** -16.52*** -16.05*** -15.97***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RD 44.993*** 42.587*** 37.242*** 37.184***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ERROR -0.164* -0.150 -0.151 -0.150
0.064 0.109 0.107 0.112
GROWTH 1.428 -0.214 -2.322 -2.392
0.602 0.944 0.474 0.472
FF_BETA 1.217** 0.106
0.017 0.854
FF_RES_VOL 0.535*** 0.524***
0.000 0.000
KAZI 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
0.299 0.302 0.304 0.304
N 1673 1673 1673 1673
adj_R2 0.6 0.602 0.61 0.609
Panel B: Year-Fixed and Firm-Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACSI -0.097*** -0.095*** -0.076** -0.077**
0.006 0.007 0.023 0.023
SIZE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.772 0.774 0.793 0.793
LEV -0.090** -0.091** -0.093** -0.093**
0.016 0.016 0.012 0.012
BTM 0.226*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.227***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROA -0.368 -0.233 0.571 0.534
0.867 0.917 0.799 0.813
RD 16.330 16.576 8.200 7.839
0.266 0.269 0.596 0.614
ERROR -0.129 -0.127 -0.129 -0.130
0.115 0.122 0.154 0.154
GROWTH -3.011 -3.014 -3.142 -3.144
0.216 0.217 0.199 0.198
FF_BETA 0.332 -0.158
0.367 0.689
FF_RES_VOL 0.352*** 0.363***
0.000 0.000
KAZI -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003***
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004
N 1673 1673 1673 1673
adj_R2 0.861 0.861 0.863 0.863
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates based on robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
Newey and West (1987) standard errors (having a bandwidth of 2). The base sample comprises 1,714 yearly observations
from 185 firms (we loose firms because of missing values) over the time period from 1994 (1993 after dating ACSI values
3 month backwards) to 2012. The dependent variable is the ICC according to Gebhardt et al. (2001) and the variable
of interest is ACSI as presented in section 2.3.4. We include year-fixed effects in the regressions of panel A whereas
we include year-fixed and firm-fixed effects in panel B, but do not report their results. Two-tailed p-values in italic.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A4: Analysis of ICC (Easton, 2004) Sensitivity to ACSI
Panel A: Year-Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACSI -0.062*** -0.053*** -0.047*** -0.045**
0.001 0.004 0.009 0.012
SIZE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007***
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
LEV 0.018* 0.015* 0.012 0.012
0.058 0.079 0.189 0.191
BTM -0.028** -0.024** -0.025** -0.024*
0.024 0.037 0.047 0.051
ROA -6.306*** -5.391*** -5.088*** -4.905***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RD 6.553 4.484 0.127 0.013
0.276 0.458 0.984 0.998
ERROR 0.123* 0.140* 0.152** 0.155**
0.088 0.070 0.036 0.037
GROWTH 4.713*** 3.311* 1.742 1.552
0.008 0.073 0.398 0.456
FF_BETA 1.081*** 0.332
0.001 0.322
FF_RES_VOL 0.420*** 0.386***
0.000 0.000
KAZI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.913 0.865 0.759 0.754
N 1553 1553 1553 1553
adj_R2 0.096 0.104 0.122 0.122
Panel B: Year-Fixed and Firm-Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ACSI -0.050 -0.051 -0.043 -0.043
0.113 0.108 0.165 0.161
SIZE 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
LEV 0.025** 0.025** 0.023** 0.023**
0.013 0.012 0.022 0.022
BTM -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018
0.161 0.157 0.180 0.172
ROA -1.625 -1.654 -1.213 -1.245
0.299 0.289 0.438 0.425
RD 2.317 2.370 -1.508 -1.873
0.774 0.768 0.863 0.830
ERROR 0.105* 0.104* 0.115* 0.115*
0.079 0.081 0.056 0.058
GROWTH 4.948*** 4.958*** 4.782*** 4.791***
0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006
FF_BETA -0.083 -0.261
0.785 0.391
FF_RES_VOL 0.132 0.150*
0.107 0.070
KAZI 0.003* 0.003* 0.004* 0.004*
0.087 0.088 0.054 0.053
N 1553 1553 1553 1553
adj_R2 0.386 0.385 0.386 0.386
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates based on robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
Newey and West (1987) standard errors (having a bandwidth of 2). The base sample comprises 1,714 yearly observations
from 185 firms (we loose firms because of missing values) over the time period from 1994 (1993 after dating ACSI values
3 month backwards) to 2012. The dependent variable is the ICC according to Easton (2004) and the variable of interest
is ACSI as presented in section 2.3.4. We include year-fixed effects in the regressions of panel A whereas we include
year-fixed and firm-fixed effects in panel B, but do not report their results. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Analysis of the Sensitivity of Monthly Firm Value Decompostion to Interpolated
ACSI Values
Panel A: Cash Flow Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ S_ACSI -0.003 -0.012*** -0.004 0.010*** 0.023***
0.175 0.000 0.238 0.005 0.000
∆ SIZE 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001***
0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∆ BTM -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.031*** 0.016* 0.025***
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.053 0.000
∆ ROA 1.340*** 3.359*** 4.662*** 5.613*** 7.189***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 9840 9840 9840 9840 9840
adj_R2 0.084 0.16 0.165 0.16 0.163
Panel B: Cost of Equity Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ S_ACSI 0.006** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.003
0.031 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.237
∆ SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000***
0.122 0.338 0.405 0.017 0.000
∆ BTM -0.033*** -0.004 0.004 -0.028*** -0.030***
0.000 0.386 0.626 0.000 0.000
∆ ROA -0.566*** -1.024*** -1.130*** -0.937*** -1.249***
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 9840 9840 9840 9840 9840
adj_R2 0.057 0.085 0.082 0.087 0.077
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates based on robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
Newey and West (1987) standard errors (having a bandwidth of 2), similar to the regressions of table 2.6 but with
monthly data using interpolated ACSI values as described in a footnote in section 2.5. Two-tailed p-values in italic.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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A.2 Chapter 3
A.2.1 Derivation of the Distance to Default Measure
In a simple model of a corporate firm with equity and debt investors, Merton (1974) shows
that the value of the firm’s equity is equal to that of a call option on the assets of the firm,
where the strike price is the book value of the debt of the firm. The option matures with the
debt of the firm, at T . According to Black and Scholes (1973) the risk-neutral valuation of
the option is as follows:
Et = AtΦ(d)−Dt exp(−rfT )Φ(d− σA
√
T ), (A.3)
where
d = log(At/Dt) + (rf + σ
2
A/2)T
σA
√
T
The t in the index stands for the time at which the variable realizes its value. Et is the value
of equity of the firm, Φ(x) is the cumulative standard normal distribution at x, At is the value
of assets, Dt is the book value of debt, rf is the risk-free rate and σA is the volatility of the
assets.
The probability of default here is the probability that the value of the underlying, the assets
of the firm, is below the strike price, the book value of the debt of the firm.
PDt = Φ
(
− log(At/Dt) + (µA − σ
2
A/2)T
σA
√
T
)
(A.4)
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where PDt is the probability of default and µA is the drift in the stochastic process of the
assets.71
The term in the parentheses of the standard normal distribution above is the lower bound
below which the firm will default, hence the established the terminology Distance to Default
(DD). We take the absolute value though, since the result should resemble a distance.
DDt =
log(At/Dt) + (µA − σ2A/2)T
σA
√
T
(A.5)
Note that although the option is valued risk-neutrally, we use observed and not risk-neutral
probabilities, since we are interested in predicting observed default proxies through observed
rating downgrades. In other words, options are valued using the expected value of the payoff
function at maturity using probabilities, as if all agents were risk-neutral (Black and Scholes,
1973). Using such probabilities would give us though a DD estimate based on theoretical
risk-neutral probabilities. Since however our aim is to help predict observed (future realized)
defaults, we need to estimate observed probabilities. In this case we are not interested in
the theoretically sound valuation of the option, since we only use the valuation formula as a
technique to derive DD estimates.72 We further price the option at date t, assuming that it
came into effect at that exact same date. Otherwise T would become T − t in Equations A.4
and A.5.
In order to estimate the (market) value of the assets At, the drift µa and the volatility σA, we
go back to the valuation formula of the option in Equation A.3. We further use Itô’s Lemma
71 The assets of the firms are assumed to follow the following geometric Brownian Motion, which explains
the use of the standard normal distribution above (Wt is a standard Wiener process).
dAt = µAAtdt+ σAVAdWt
72 A risk-neutral valuation would substitute the drift µA with the risk-free rate rf in Equation (A.5).
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(see e.g., McKean, 1969) on the function defined by Equation A.3, Et = f(At, t). From the
diffusion term (i.e. the term concerning the Wiener process) we obtain the following second
equation for equity volatility σE :
σE = Φ(d)
At
Et
σA (A.6)
Following Hillegeist et al. (2004) and the SAS code provided in their appendix, we estimate
At and σA using the system of equations of A.3 and A.6. µa is then estimated as the asset
return, (At −At−1)/At−1.73 However, although we use the algorithm proposed by Hillegeist
et al. (2004), we adapt it to daily data along the lines of Distinguin et al. (2006). We define
maturity T = 1 and the risk-free rate rf as the 12-month interbank rate74 (e.g., (Hillegeist
et al., 2004; Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Distinguin et al., 2006)). Et, σE and rf are computed as
the 3 month averages of daily values at least 2 month after the fiscal quarter end. To solve the
non-linear system of equations of A.3 and A.6 using a Newton search algorithm (minimization
heuristic), we set the starting value of At to (Et + Dt) and the starting value of of σA to
σE · Et/(Et +Dt). We heuristically solve this system of equations for each BHC-quarter and
use the results to calculate PDt and DDt according to Equations A.4 and A.5, respectively.
73 If µa is less than rf , it is set to rf and if µa is greater than one it is set to one.
74 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USD12MD156N#. Hillegeist et al. (2004); Vassalou and
Xing (2004) use the 1-year T-bill rate.
111 Chapter A
A.2.2 Details on Downgraded and Upgraded BHCs
Table A6: Downgraded and Upgraded BHCs
BHC Name Date of Downgrade BHC Name Date of Upgrade
Baybanks Inc Jul 1990 Affiliated Bancshares of Colorado Nov 1992
MNC Financial Oct 1990 Equimark Corp Jan 1993
First City Bancorp of Texas Oct 1990 Signet Banking Corp Feb 1993
Baltimore Bancorp Nov 1990 Colorado National Bancshares Jun 1993
Midlantic Corp Dec 1990 Baybanks Jul 1993
Signet Banking Corp Jan 1991 Bank South Corp Nov 1993
Riggs National Corp Jan 1991 Mark Twain Bancshares May 1994
First Commerce Corp Jan 1991 Baltimore Bancorp Nov 1994
Bank South Corp Nov 1991 Midlantic Jan 1995
Magna Group Jan 1992 Magna Group Jul 1998
Riggs National Corp Oct 2000 Riggs National Corp Aug 1998
Provident Banking Corp Mar 2003 Huntington Bancshares Dec 2010
Doral Financial Corp Apr 2005 Associated Banc Corp May 2011
First Bancorp Dec 2005 Wilmington Trust Corp May 2011
Colonial Bancgroup Jan 2009 Regions Financial Corp Mar 2012
BanPonce Corp Apr 2009
Huntington Bancshares Jun 2009
Synovus Financial Corp Jun 2009
Whitney Holding Corp Jun 2009
Citizens Republic Bancorp Jun 2009
Associated Banc Corp Nov 2009
Wilmington Trust Corp Feb 2010
Marshall & Ilsley Corp Oct 2010
Regions Financial Corp Nov 2010
This table provides detailed information on banks that experience a downgrade to non-investment grade status (BB+ or
worse) or an upgrade to investment grade status (BBB- or better) during the sample period together with the respective
date of the downgrade (upgrade). Such downgrades (upgrades) are recorded as ‘distress’ (‘recovery’) events in Section
3.4.2.
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A.2.3 Further Tables
Table A7: Direct Market Discipline: Nonlinear Analysis of IRP Sensitivity to Public Risk
Indicators
ols p10 p30 p50 p70 p90
EQUITY -0.128*** -0.071*** ◦ -0.097*** ◦ -0.094*** ◦ -0.104*** ◦ -0.160*** ◦
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LLR -0.167* -0.158** -0.170*** -0.141*** -0.143** -0.158**
0.053 0.033 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.040
ROA 0.988*** 1.520*** ◦ 1.140*** 0.577*** ◦ 0.471*** ◦ 0.821***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
ROA_VOL -1.111*** -2.232*** ◦ -1.403*** -1.029*** -0.546*** ◦ -0.363◦
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107
EFFICIENCY 0.000 0.000*** ◦ 0.000*** ◦ 0.000** ◦ 0.000 0.000
0.303 0.000 0.006 0.014 0.481 0.769
PAST_DUE 0.359*** 0.295*** 0.258*** 0.297*** 0.380*** 0.280**
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033
CHARGEOFFS -1.402*** -0.979** -0.890*** -0.831*** ◦ -0.883** -0.505
0.006 0.021 0.007 0.003 0.015 0.323
LLP 1.212** -0.421◦ 0.140◦ 0.417◦ 0.777** 3.059*** ◦
0.020 0.407 0.664 0.104 0.029 0.000
LOANS 0.005 -0.006◦ 0.002 0.005 0.010** 0.012**
0.352 0.179 0.639 0.114 0.015 0.043
EQU_INV 0.831*** 0.823*** 0.627*** ◦ 0.326*** ◦ 0.071◦ -0.128◦
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.601 0.569
COMM_LOANS -0.016*** 0.004◦ -0.009*** ◦ -0.011*** ◦ -0.007** ◦ -0.025***
0.000 0.166 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000
CONS_LOANS 0.017*** 0.025*** ◦ 0.025*** ◦ 0.020*** 0.012*** -0.012** ◦
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015
LIQUIDITY -0.020*** -0.037*** ◦ -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.004◦
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.498
CORE_DEP -0.020*** -0.015*** ◦ -0.018*** -0.024*** ◦ -0.030*** ◦ -0.040*** ◦
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LARGE_DEP -0.028*** -0.014*** ◦ -0.033*** -0.042*** ◦ -0.048*** ◦ -0.060*** ◦
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DEP_COST 1.028*** 0.376** ◦ 0.435*** ◦ 0.661*** ◦ 0.888*** 1.357***
0.000 0.039 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
GAP 0.013 0.021* 0.004 -0.018* ◦ -0.013◦ 0.020
0.450 0.058 0.629 0.059 0.287 0.245
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001*** ◦ 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084
UNEMPL 0.030 0.049** 0.015 0.004◦ 0.011 0.040
0.203 0.028 0.224 0.732 0.452 0.133
ERROR 0.040** 0.024* 0.033** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.042**
0.026 0.068 0.036 0.001 0.001 0.040
GROWTH 29.954*** 16.300*** ◦ 23.661*** ◦ 28.783*** ◦ 33.100*** ◦ 42.529*** ◦
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 13341 13341 13341 13341 13341 13341
The table reports quantile regression coefficient estimates for the quantiles 10, 30, 50, 70 and 90 respectively (see column
headers) which are compared to OLS coefficient estimates with robust heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
(HAC) Newey and West (1987) standard errors (having a bandwidth of 3) and quarter-fixed effects in the first column.
The sample comprises 13,341 quarterly observations from 551 BHCs over the time period from 1992 to 2012 (we loose
years because of missing values). The dependent variable is the IRP as presented in Section 3.2. All other variable
definitions are given in Table 3.1.˚means that the estimator for the corresponding quantile is signifincantly different
from the OLS estimator with p-value less than 0.05. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A8: Indirect Market Discipline: Discrete Choice Regressions for Distress Prediction
with PAST_DUE
Panel A: Excluding IRP
1 2 4 6 8 10 12
DD 0.832 0.617** 0.371*** 0.403*** 0.606** 1.119 1.143
0.170 0.029 0.001 0.003 0.028 0.308 0.238
RET_VOL 0.933 1.093 0.955 1.030 1.215 1.101 0.928
0.752 0.633 0.829 0.937 0.474 0.845 0.864
FF_BETA 1.350 0.135** 0.868 3.919 0.342 0.527 0.876
0.663 0.015 0.850 0.152 0.247 0.538 0.883
FF_RES_VOL 1.382 1.189 0.974 0.479 0.625 0.486 0.877
0.236 0.503 0.936 0.182 0.337 0.329 0.831
EQUITY 0.952 1.183* 0.980 1.112 1.154 1.294** 1.144
0.779 0.095 0.861 0.324 0.168 0.016 0.323
PAST_DUE 3.114 0.612 1.118 1.192 1.631 9.603* 6.475
0.223 0.754 0.917 0.869 0.738 0.063 0.238
EFFICIENCY 1.000* 0.999* 1.000 0.999** 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.053 0.064 0.303 0.025 0.607 0.334 0.553
ROA 0.241** 1.468 0.280* 0.097* 2.889 0.113 0.617
0.024 0.624 0.089 0.060 0.613 0.338 0.824
LIQUIDITY 0.984 1.033 1.011 0.995 0.977 0.956 0.991
0.584 0.219 0.673 0.880 0.459 0.190 0.740
SIZE 0.979* 0.992 0.968* 0.974* 0.992 0.991 0.993
0.066 0.360 0.054 0.086 0.381 0.313 0.406
N 3521 3486 3348 3210 3074 2938 2807
pctevent 0.341 0.316 0.358 0.312 0.325 0.34 0.392
pseudo_R2 0.28 0.277 0.266 0.238 0.098 0.11 0.047
likelihood 116.12 108.09 117.45 103.69 121.64 119.19 137.33
wald 58.575** 37.531** 37.843** 21.264** 11.543 12.660 5.767
Panel B: Including IRP
1 2 4 6 8 10 12
DD 0.818 0.604** 0.412*** 0.452*** 0.648* 1.124 1.149
0.152 0.026 0.003 0.008 0.054 0.268 0.213
RET_VOL 0.928 1.074 0.966 1.058 1.304 1.232 0.952
0.732 0.713 0.876 0.876 0.338 0.672 0.911
FF_BETA 1.357 0.139** 0.842 3.296 0.246 0.248 0.642
0.657 0.017 0.826 0.219 0.159 0.245 0.647
FF_RES_VOL 1.395 1.219 0.862 0.450 0.527 0.383 0.811
0.224 0.475 0.659 0.121 0.209 0.212 0.736
IRP 0.969 0.965 1.242*** 1.303** 1.331** 1.283*** 1.195**
0.698 0.718 0.001 0.021 0.011 0.002 0.019
EQUITY 0.957 1.191* 0.974 1.093 1.151 1.303** 1.167
0.801 0.092 0.815 0.381 0.148 0.011 0.251
PAST_DUE 3.140 0.642 1.220 0.995 1.802 13.574** 6.972
0.224 0.777 0.837 0.996 0.683 0.038 0.227
EFFICIENCY 1.000* 0.999* 1.000 0.999** 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.051 0.081 0.624 0.013 0.552 0.398 0.541
ROA 0.253** 1.494 0.146** 0.077** 1.797 0.078 0.451
0.032 0.607 0.019 0.044 0.771 0.267 0.715
LIQUIDITY 0.982 1.033 1.019 1.000 0.976 0.950 0.991
0.557 0.218 0.496 0.994 0.457 0.164 0.758
SIZE 0.979* 0.992 0.965* 0.973* 0.990 0.989 0.992
0.071 0.366 0.058 0.056 0.258 0.214 0.329
N 3521 3486 3348 3210 3074 2938 2807
pctevent 0.341 0.316 0.358 0.312 0.325 0.34 0.392
pseudo_R2 0.281 0.278 0.321 0.272 0.137 0.153 0.07
likelihood 115.98 107.97 108.88 99.100 116.47 113.53 134.05
wald 58.337** 36.102** 51.177** 27.111** 17.420* 18.783** 10.465
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Table A8: Indirect Market Discipline: Discrete Choice Regressions for Distress Prediction
with PAST_DUE (Continued)
The table reports the results of discrete choice regressions (using a complimentary log-log model) for the prediction of
defaults over leads from one to twelve quarters (see column headers). We estimate the regressions including all market
based risk indicators presented in panel C of table 3.1 and a set of CAMEL accounting indicators (for variable definitions
see panel A of table 3.1). We report results without (Panel A) and including the IRP (panel B). We include quarter-fixed
effects such that the regressions are equivalent to a discrete proportional hazard model. pctevent is the percentage of
BHC-quarters with an event of default. pseudo_R2 is the coefficient of determination from Nagelkerke (1991) which
measures the relative increase in likelihood of the model when the regressors are included and can take on values from
zero to one like the regular coefficient of determination. likelihood is computed as −2 logL as a measure of goodness of
fit of the model, where L is the likelihood function. wald is the χ2 statistic from testing the null that all coefficients of
the regressors are jointly zero. p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Table A9: Indirect Market Discipline: Duration Regressions for Distress Prediction with
PAST_DUE
default default default
DD 0.771 0.777
0.230 0.210
RET_VOL 1.691 1.653
0.227 0.267
FF_BETA 0.542 0.478
0.178 0.120
FF_RES_VOL 0.527 0.536
0.242 0.258
IRP 1.172** 1.113
0.038 0.131
EQUITY 1.158 1.126 1.158
0.224 0.206 0.214
PAST_DUE 8.771 4.682 5.729
0.121 0.179 0.242
EFFICIENCY 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.486 0.415 0.446
ROA 0.017** 0.170*** 0.015***
0.010 0.000 0.010
LIQUIDITY 1.046* 1.059** 1.053**
0.063 0.017 0.041
SIZE 0.982 0.985 0.982
0.213 0.260 0.208
N 145 145 145
pctevent 10.345 10.345 10.345
likelihood 108.47 108.10 106.40
wald 18.162* 20.792** 19.417*
The table reports the results of hazard model regressions for the prediction of BHC defaults. We estimate the regressions
including IRP, all market based risk indicators presented in Panel C of Table 3.1 and a set of CAMEL accounting
indicators (for variable definitions see Panel A of Table 3.1). All covariates have the values at the beginning of the spell
(time of inclusion or of recovery after a default) until eventual default or censorship (exclusion from the sample or end
of the sample). pctevent is the percentage of BHCs with an event of default. likelihood is computed as −2 logL as a
measure of goodness of fit of the model, where L is the likelihood function. wald is the χ2 statistic from testing the
null that all coefficients of the above regressors are jointly zero. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
115 Chapter A
Table A10: Indirect Market Discipline: Discrete Choice Regressions for Distress Prediction
with CHARGEOFFS
Panel A: Excluding IRP
1 2 4 6 8 10 12
DD 0.742** 0.504*** 0.350*** 0.359*** 0.623** 1.106 1.120
0.019 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.295 0.316
RET_VOL 0.755 0.955 1.014 0.917 1.231 0.925 0.897
0.215 0.796 0.946 0.795 0.397 0.842 0.807
FF_BETA 1.642 0.265*** 0.814 2.481 0.511 1.423 1.599
0.337 0.010 0.781 0.265 0.437 0.683 0.600
FF_RES_VOL 1.872** 1.287 0.892 0.586 0.675 1.009 1.062
0.029 0.298 0.730 0.254 0.367 0.986 0.917
EQUITY 1.066 0.986 1.007 1.100 1.180* 1.238** 1.168
0.686 0.920 0.948 0.379 0.073 0.020 0.227
CHARGEOFFS 0.488 27.687** 0.590 1.790 0.031 0.000 0.000
0.690 0.021 0.808 0.813 0.412 0.112 0.176
EFFICIENCY 1.000* 1.000 1.000 0.999* 1.000 1.000* 0.999
0.071 0.752 0.378 0.079 0.672 0.091 0.553
ROA 0.219*** 2.300 0.250 0.087** 1.928 0.097 0.293
0.007 0.371 0.110 0.040 0.751 0.132 0.540
LIQUIDITY 0.980 1.019 1.013 1.000 0.980 0.966 0.985
0.458 0.430 0.633 0.991 0.472 0.191 0.536
SIZE 0.977** 0.983* 0.969* 0.966* 0.994 0.996 0.996
0.042 0.099 0.058 0.058 0.463 0.637 0.613
N 4586 4537 4393 4244 4103 3959 3812
pctevent 0.349 0.353 0.273 0.283 0.268 0.303 0.315
pseudo_R2 0.286 0.271 0.266 0.223 0.096 0.078 0.052
likelihood 153.07 156.07 122.19 128.58 137.88 150.60 153.90
wald 73.560** 58.951** 42.496** 25.240** 14.995* 12.646 7.450
Panel B: Including IRP
1 2 4 6 8 10 12
DD 0.753** 0.540*** 0.388*** 0.395*** 0.636** 1.110 1.115
0.033 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.037 0.272 0.330
RET_VOL 0.754 1.007 1.035 0.949 1.258 0.922 0.880
0.215 0.971 0.877 0.871 0.357 0.840 0.779
FF_BETA 1.683 0.221*** 0.735 2.175 0.448 1.216 1.433
0.317 0.007 0.683 0.338 0.370 0.826 0.691
FF_RES_VOL 1.871** 1.151 0.794 0.561 0.629 0.995 1.049
0.030 0.589 0.502 0.204 0.300 0.993 0.935
IRP 1.020 1.124*** 1.228*** 1.164* 1.162** 1.129* 1.124*
0.702 0.008 0.000 0.097 0.027 0.068 0.081
EQUITY 1.065 0.986 0.997 1.095 1.167* 1.230** 1.176
0.687 0.917 0.974 0.363 0.083 0.022 0.204
CHARGEOFFS 0.488 35.065** 1.522 2.115 0.048 0.000 0.000
0.693 0.015 0.864 0.767 0.469 0.129 0.184
EFFICIENCY 1.000* 1.000 1.000 0.999* 1.000 1.000 0.999
0.081 0.876 0.685 0.053 0.665 0.109 0.528
ROA 0.210*** 2.021 0.170** 0.085** 1.498 0.088 0.260
0.007 0.449 0.048 0.037 0.839 0.121 0.497
LIQUIDITY 0.982 1.022 1.025 1.006 0.985 0.969 0.988
0.500 0.358 0.348 0.839 0.600 0.234 0.642
SIZE 0.977** 0.983 0.966* 0.967* 0.992 0.996 0.995
0.042 0.108 0.056 0.056 0.378 0.575 0.560
N 4586 4537 4393 4244 4103 3959 3812
pctevent 0.349 0.353 0.273 0.283 0.268 0.303 0.315
pseudo_R2 0.287 0.295 0.317 0.237 0.115 0.091 0.064
likelihood 152.94 150.95 113.80 126.40 135.10 148.61 152.13
wald 74.218** 66.438** 54.554** 28.181** 19.081** 16.085* 10.319
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Table A10: Indirect Market Discipline: Discrete Choice Regressions for Distress Prediction
with CHARGEOFFS (Continued)
Panel B: Including IRP
The table reports the results of discrete choice regressions (using a complimentary log-log model) for the prediction of
defaults over leads from one to twelve quarters (see column headers). We estimate the regressions including all market
based risk indicators presented in panel C of table 3.1 and a set of CAMEL accounting indicators (for variable definitions
see panel A of table 3.1). We report results without (Panel A) and including the IRP (panel B). We include quarter-fixed
effects such that the regressions are equivalent to a discrete proportional hazard model. pctevent is the percentage of
BHC-quarters with an event of default. pseudo_R2 is the coefficient of determination from Nagelkerke (1991) which
measures the relative increase in likelihood of the model when the regressors are included and can take on values from
zero to one like the regular coefficient of determination. likelihood is computed as −2 logL as a measure of goodness of
fit of the model, where L is the likelihood function. wald is the χ2 statistic from testing the null that all coefficients of
the regressors are jointly zero. p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Table A11: Indirect Market Discipline: Duration Regressions for Distress Prediction with
CHARGEOFFS
default default default
DD 0.916 0.898
0.554 0.512
RET_VOL 0.622 0.646
0.268 0.320
FF_BETA 1.072 0.682
0.885 0.484
FF_RES_VOL 2.059 1.911
0.164 0.231
IRP 1.110*** 1.145***
0.000 0.000
EQUITY 1.266* 0.976 1.291**
0.050 0.823 0.030
CHARGEOFFS 7.512 0.484 12.785
0.254 0.703 0.155
EFFICIENCY 1.000 1.000*** 1.000
0.442 0.001 0.327
ROA 0.020** 0.189*** 0.009***
0.018 0.008 0.006
LIQUIDITY 1.046** 1.032 1.074***
0.037 0.117 0.003
SIZE 0.978 0.975 0.979
0.278 0.168 0.315
N 151 156 151
pctevent 12.583 14.744 12.583
likelihood 142.95 170.57 132.88
wald 19.907** 31.935** 27.354**
The table reports the results of hazard model regressions for the prediction of BHC defaults. We estimate the regressions
including IRP, all market based risk indicators presented in Panel C of Table 3.1 and a set of CAMEL accounting
indicators (for variable definitions see Panel A of Table 3.1). All covariates have the values at the beginning of the spell
(time of inclusion or of recovery after a default) until eventual default or censorship (exclusion from the sample or end
of the sample). pctevent is the percentage of BHCs with an event of default. likelihood is computed as −2 logL as a
measure of goodness of fit of the model, where L is the likelihood function. wald is the χ2 statistic from testing the
null that all coefficients of the above regressors are jointly zero. Two-tailed p-values in italic. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
117 Chapter A
A.3 Chapter 4
A.3.1 Derivation of the First Weighted Least Squared Model (WLS(1))
In this subsection of the appendix I derive the Model (WLS(1)) along the lines of Nekrasov
and Ogneva (2011). Integrating the regression Model (4.3) and the related equations into the
optimization Problem (P), I get the following expanded optimization problem:

min
γˆ0,γˆ1,λˆr,λˆg ,ri,t,
g
i,t
∑
i
wir(ri,t)2 + wig(
g
i,t)2
s.t. epsi,t+2 + ridpsi,t+1
pi,t
= γˆ0 + γˆ1
epsi,t+1
pi,t
+ i,t
i,t = b(ri − r¯) +
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)
(gi − g¯)
ri = r¯ + λˆrXri,t + eri,t
gi = g¯ + λˆgXgi,t + e
g
i,t
(P1)
where γˆ0 and γˆ1 are possible realizations for the coefficient vectors γ0 and γ1 respectively.
I substitute the corresponding equations for i,t, ri and gi into the first condition of the
optimization Problem (P1) and arrive at the following equivalent problem:

min
γˆ0,γˆ1,λˆr,λˆg ,ri,t,
g
i,t
∑
i
wir(ri,t)2 + wig(
g
i,t)2
s.t. epsi,t+2 + ridpsi,t+1
pi,t
= γˆ0 + γˆ1
epsi,t+1
pi,t
+ bλˆrXri,t +
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)
λˆgX
g
i,t + νi,t
νi,t = bri,t +
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)
gi,t
(P2)
I then rearrange the second condition of the optimization Problem (P2) and use its first order
condition (FOC)75 to derive an optimization problem which is equivalent to a WLS model.
75Note that the target function I am optimizing is a sum of non-negative terms. Hence the FOC of the sum
is equivalent to the set of FOCs of its summands.
Marwan El Chamaa 118
⇒ gi,t =
νi,t − bri,t(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
) (A.7)
⇒ ∂
∂ri,t
wir(ri,t)2 + wig
 νi,t − b
r
i,t(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)

2 != 0
⇔ 2wirri,t − 2wigb
νi,t − bri,t(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)2 = 0
⇔ ri,t =
wigbνi,t
wir
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)2
+ wigb2
(A.8)
Inserting the result from Equation (A.8) into Equation (A.7) yields the following expression
for gi,t:
gi,t =
wir
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)
νi,t
wir
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)2
+ wigb2
(A.9)
Finally, inserting the results from Equations (A.8) and (A.9) into the target function of the
optimization Problem (P2), I arrive the following optimization problem which is equivalent to
the Model (WLS(1)) with weights wi.
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
min
γˆ0,γˆ1,λˆr,λˆg ,ri,t,
g
i,t
∑
i
wi(νi,t)2
s.t. epsi,t+2 + ridpsi,t+1
pi,t
= γˆ0 + γˆ1
epsi,t+1
pi,t
+ bλˆrXri,t +
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)
λˆgX
g
i,t + νi,t
wi =
wirw
i
g(νi,t)2
wir
(
c+ epsi,t+1
pi,t
)2
+ wigb2
(P3)
A.3.2 Derivation of the Second Weighted Least Squared Model (WLS(2))
In this subsection of the appendix I derive the Model (WLS(2)) in my approach as done in
Nekrasov and Ogneva (2011) and in Subsection A.3.1. Integrating the regression Model (4.9)
and the related equations into the optimization Problem (Q), I get the following expanded
optimization problem:

min
βˆ0,βˆ1,βˆ2,λˆe,λˆd,ηei,t,η
d
i,t
∑
i
wie(ηei,t)2 + wid(ηdi,t)2
s.t. ri,t(ri,t − gi,t)pi,t = βˆ0 + βˆ1(−(1 + gi,t))βˆ2ri,t + ηi,t
ηi,t = −gi,tηei,t + ri,tηdi,t
epsi,t+1 = epst+1 + λeXei,t + ηei,t
epsi,t+2 = epst+2 + λeXei,t + ηei,t
dpsi,t+1 = dpst+1 + λdXdi,t + ηdi,t
(Q1)
where βˆ0, βˆ1 and βˆ2 are possible realizations for the coefficient vectors β0, β1 and β2 re-
spectively.I substitute the corresponding equations for ηi,t, epsi,t+1, epsi,t+2 and dpsi,t+1 into
the first condition of the optimization Problem (Q1) and arrive at the following equivalent
problem:76
76Note that I assume that epsi,t+1 and epsi,t+2 behave identically regarding their deviation from their
respective mean. This means that their related condition in the optimization model is treated as one.
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
min
βˆ0,βˆ1,βˆ2,λˆe,λˆd,ηei,t,η
d
i,t
∑
i
wie(ηei,t)2 + wid(ηdi,t)2
s.t. ri,t(ri,t − gi,t)pi,t = βˆ0 + βˆ1(−(1 + gi,t)) + βˆ2ri,t
+ (−gi,t)λeXei,t + ri,tλdXdi,t + ψi,t
ψi,t = −gi,tηei,t + ri,tηdi,t
(Q2)
I then rearrange the second condition of the optimization Problem (Q2) and use its first order
condition (FOC)77 to derive an optimization problem which is equivalent to a WLS model.
⇒ ηdi,t =
ψi,t + gi,tηei,t
ri,t
(A.10)
⇒ ∂
∂ηei,t
wie(ηei,t)2 + wid
(
ψi,t + gi,tηei,t
ri,t
)2 != 0
⇔ 2wieηei,t + 2widgi,t
ψi,t + gi,tηei,t
r2i,t
= 0
⇔ ηei,t = −
widgi,tψi,t
wier
2
i,t + widg2i,t
(A.11)
Inserting the result from Equation (A.11) into Equation (A.10) gives the following expression
for ηdi,t:
ηdi,t =
wieri,tψi,t
wier
2
i,t + widg2i,t
(A.12)
Finally, inserting the results from Equations (A.11) and (A.12) into the target function of the
optimization Problem (Q2), I arrive the following optimization problem which is equivalent to
the Model (WLS(2)) with weights zi.
77Again here the target function is a sum of non-negative terms. Hence the FOC of the sum is equivalent to
the set of FOCs of its summands.
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min
βˆ0,βˆ1,βˆ2,λˆe,λˆd,ηei,t,η
d
i,t
∑
i
zi(ψi,t)2
s.t. ri,t(ri,t − gi,t)pi,t = βˆ0 + βˆ1(−(1 + gi,t)) + βˆ2ri,t
+ (−gi,t)λeXei,t + ri,tλdXdi,t + ψi,t
zi = w
i
ew
i
d
wier
2
i,t + widg2i,t
(P3)
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